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Abstract
In the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2007–2009, Europe has been grappling with both a debt
and a banking crisis, which caused a prolonged recession and on–going stagnation in some countries
of the Eurozone. The distinctive feature of the European crisis, compared to the global recession
that originated in the United States, is that it emerged as sovereign debt crisis and later evolved
into a banking crisis, finally affecting the real economy. The banking and sovereign crises are heavily
intertwined because of the interplay between banks and sovereigns in Europe. In fact, the so–called
bank–sovereign nexus works both ways: not only banks hold large amounts of sovereign debt, espe-
cially from the domestic government, but also European governments retain a significant presence
in the domestic banks’ ownership. The adverse feedback loop is reinforced during a sovereign debt
crisis, as banks’ losses from sovereign debt further exacerbate the strain on the domestic sovereign in
expectation of a future bail–out. I summarize recent developments and some of the unique features
of the European crisis below.
Sovereign Debt Crisis Between 2010 and 2012, a group of European countries (Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, GIIPS hereafter) experienced a large increase in the borrowing
costs on their respective public debt. Figure 1 below plots the evolution of the GIIPS countries
10–year sovereign bond yields, as a spread over their German counterpart. From the beginning of
2010 there has been a clear deterioration of the borrowing conditions for Greece (note the different
scale on the right–hand–side), which quickly spread to Ireland and Portugal, reaching a peak at the
end of 2011, when also Spain and Italy were severely affected.
Figure 1: Sovereign Bond Yields, 10 year spread on German bonds (in %)
Note: Bond yield spreads are measured in %. Greek bond spread is on the right–hand–size (RHS) axis.
Banks’ Sovereign Debt Exposure and Bank Lending European banks hold substantial
amount of sovereign debt in their portfolios. Figure 2 contains the total sovereign bond exposure
as a fraction of total assets for the largest European banks at the onset of European sovereign debt
crisis in March 2010. On average, sovereign bond exposure represent 8% of banks’ total assets in
each country. This is a sizable exposure, considering that total banking assets in several countries,
including the large economies, are close to or even exceed the country’s Gross Domestic Product.
Figure 2: Total Sovereign Bond Exposure over Total Assets of European Banks, 2010Q1 (in %)
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Note: Total sovereign exposure to the 30 countries of the European Economic Area (EEA 30).
At the same time, the availability of credit in the countries most affected by the increase in the
sovereign debt yields rapidly declined. Figure 3 plots the growth rate of domestic loans to non–
financial corporations: GIIPS countries, on average, had a much lower growth rate of lending than
Germany after 2011.
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Figure 3: Growth Rate of Domestic Loans to Non–Financial Corporations (in %)
A number of commentators and policy makers have suggested that the banks’ exposure to sovereign
debt have contributed to the fall in aggregate lending. For example, Bundesbank governor Weid-
mann (2013) states that “banks that were highly exposed to strained European sovereign debt have
reduced their lending to the private sector”.
Government Ownership in Domestic Banks Differently from the US experience, government–
owned banks are quite common in Europe. Figure 4 shows the average share of government ownership
in each European country for the largest domestic institutions before the crisis (2006). Although
in some countries the government was not a shareholder in any of the large banks (France, Austria
and the UK), in others, including Germany, the domestic government was a large shareholder.
Figure 4: Average Domestic Government Ownership of Banks in 2006 (in %)
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Capital Requirements The sovereign debt crisis has forced European regulators and policy mak-
ers to take unprecedented steps to avoid a collapse of the Eurozone. Given its fundamental role in the
crisis, the European banking system has gone through an extensive regulatory scrutiny. Banks have
been subject to a number of supervisory exercises, such as the European Banking Authority (EBA)
Stress Tests and Recapitalization Exercises. More recently the European Central Bank (ECB), in its
new role as the bank supervisor for the largest financial institutions, has done an extensive review of
banks’ balance sheets. A common theme across these interventions has been the need for European
banks to strengthen their capital positions. The main prudential policy tool to achieve this goal
are bank capital requirements, expressed as a fraction of Risk–Weighted Assets (RWA). Capital re-
quirements are imposed by regulators to ensure that a bank has a sufficient buffer to remain solvent
in case of a downturn. However, demanding higher capital requirements during a crisis may in fact
exacerbate it by encouraging banks to deleverage, i.e. reduce RWA, to reach the target capital ratio.
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The overall goal of this dissertation is to have a better understanding of the interplay between
sovereign, banks and capital regulation. In my first and second chapter, I analyze the two–way
feedback loop between banks and sovereigns in Europe. In particular, in the first chapter, I show
that banks’ sovereign debt exposures had a negative effect on credit supply during the crisis. In the
second chapter I explore the role that politics may play in determining banks’ exposure to sovereign
debt. Finally, the third chapter investigates the effect of changing bank capital requirements for the
firms that borrow from the affected banks.
Has the sovereign debt crisis induced a credit crunch, i.e. a reduction in credit supply, in Eu-
rope? In my first chapter, a solo–authored work, I argue that indeed this has been the case. Using
detailed bank–level exposure from the EBA Stress Tests, I am able to calculate the mark–to–market
losses that banks had on their sovereign bond portfolios. These bank–specific losses are then used
to explain both the fall in lending at the bank level and the interest rate charged on syndicated
loans, which are loans to large, non–financial corporations. In particular, I find that for a 1% loss
of sovereign debt–to–total assets ratio, the growth rate of credit is 4% lower and, on average, in-
terest rate charged are 2% higher. Importantly, these results are not driven by aggregate credit
demand at the country level, which is also likely to fall after the sovereign shock, or by sector spe-
cific credit demand. The data suggest that the reason why these losses matter for credit is through
an effect on banks’ cost of funding, rather than through a negative impact on bank regulatory capital.
Does politics play a role in determining banks’ exposures to domestic government debt? In the
second chapter, a joint work with Marco Macchiavelli, we find that a bank where the domestic gov-
ernment is a relevant shareholder is associated with a disproportionate amount of domestic sovereign
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bonds over foreign bonds (home bias). We also document the extent of political pressure on the
banking system during the sovereign debt crisis: political banks that were recapitalized by their
respective governments increased the exposure to domestic sovereign bonds relative to foreign ones.
This effect is mostly present for banks belonging to the GIIPS than for political banks located in
other European countries. These results shed light on the importance of understanding the funda-
mental causes of the bank–sovereign nexus.
Finally, in my third chapter, a joint work with Tomasz Wieladek, we study the effect of changes
to UK bank-specific capital requirements on Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) asset growth
between 1998–2006. We focus on the UK experience in the pre–crisis period because of its unique
regulatory regime on bank capital requirements. In fact, UK regulators imposed bank–specific
and time–varying capital requirements to address risks that were not accounted for in Basel I, the
standard international regulatory framework at the time. This unique policy experiment is ideal to
test the impact of bank capital requirements while still being informative on the potential effects
of regulatory intervention during a crisis, when presumably the effects would be even larger. We
find that there are negative effects of changing capital requirements on SME growth rate of assets
at the beginning of a new bank–firm relationship, but this effect declines over time. Shocks to the
monetary policy rate also have an independent negative effect on SME asset growth and can reinforce
the negative impact of increasing capital requirements. These results are important to understand
the transmission channels at the firm level of prudential policy tools, an area yet relatively unexplored
in the literature.
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Chapter 1
Bank Lending and the Sovereign Debt
Crisis
Introduction
This paper examines the effect of the sovereign debt crisis on the European credit crunch through
its effect on banks’ balance sheets. Banks’ holdings of risky sovereign debt are substantial: Figure
1.1 shows that, at the beginning of 2010, the 90 European banks that participated in the European
Banking Authority (EBA) Stress Test had a total exposure of e750 bn. to the sovereign debt of
the periphery, the so–called GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). These
exposures are, on average, 7% of total banking assets of GIIPS banks 1 and 2–3% of the assets
of banks in the core countries (France and Germany) 2, as Figure 1.2 shows. In 2010–2012, rising
1Most of GIIPS debt held by GIIPS banks is domestic. European banks, especially in the GIIPS but also in Germany,
have a large home bias, as documented, among others, in Acharya and Steffen (2013), Battistini, Pagano and
Simonelli (2013) and De Marco and Macchiavelli (2014).
2It should be noted, however, that French and German banks are very large compared to the size of their own
economy. The top 5 French banks, for example, have total assets that are more than twice the size of the French
economy. GIIPS exposures of French and German represent roughly 5% of their respective countries’ GDP.
1
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yields in the sovereign bond markets for these countries caused a devaluation of the stock of sovereign
bonds held in banks’ balance sheets. At the same time, the growth rate of bank credit to European
customers rapidly declined. Figure 1.3 plots the evolution of bank loans to domestic non–financial
firms aggregated by country. The slowdown following the 2007–2009 global recession is common to
all countries, but the heterogeneity in growth rates of credit since 2010 is clear. Most GIIPS countries
have lower growth rates than in the core, especially in the final part of the sample 3. Moreover, the
average interest rate spreads for corporate borrowers in the periphery has been significantly higher
than in the core since 2009–2010 (Figure 1.4). The fact that loan volumes decreased while loan
prices (interest rates) increased suggest that, at least at an aggregate level, the sovereign debt crisis
had a negative effect on the supply of credit. In this work, I will show that the same argument holds
at the micro level: losses in banks’ sovereign portfolios have induced a reduction in the supply of
credit from banks, both on the quantity and the price of credit. The identification will come from
the cross–sectional differences in banks’ sovereign exposures.
My results suggest that European banks that were more exposed to the sovereign shock signifi-
cantly reduced credit supply during the crisis. In particular, a 1% increase in losses-over-total assets
ratio decreases the growth rate of domestic loans around 4%. The result is not driven by country
specific credit demand, even accounting for different categories of borrowers between large and small
banks, or by the own domestic sovereign exposure for GIIPS banks that experienced very large
shocks to their balance sheets. In this respect, I also acknowledge that sovereign exposures are en-
dogenous and I can instrument the domestic sovereign exposure with the level of political ownership
in each bank. In De Marco and Macchiavelli (2014) we find that banks’ home bias in sovereign
bonds can in part be explained by the amount of shares owned by the respective government in
each bank pre–crisis, in 2006. We believe that banks’ political ownership is fairly exogenous, as it
3Unexpectedly, this is not true for Italy, at least until the end of 2011. German credit growth actually fell behind
Italy’s in 2010–2011, underlying the difficulties of the banking sectors in the core too.
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is determined by historical and political factors. If politics has a direct influence on bank lending,
the IV would not be valid because exclusion restrictions are violated. I believe that this could ac-
tually work against me as political banks are generally encouraged to lend more, not less, during
a crisis (Coleman and Feler (2013)). Also, political banks could have more incompetent managers
or be lending to specific set of borrowers that fare worse than others during the crisis. However,
if that were the case, government–owned banks should have a higher share of non–perfoming loans
and lower profitability during the crisis, and they do not (see Table 1.20 in the Appendix). Also,
from EBA data for the end of 2010, it does not seem that government–owned banks have a signifi-
cantly different credit portfolio compared to private banks. The only difference is that non–GIIPS
government–owned banks tend to lend more to domestic public sector entities (see Table 1.21 and
1.22 in the Appendix).
Moreover, to provide further evidence for a credit supply shock, I show that the European cross–
border groups cut foreign loans, i.e. loans issued by their international subsidiaries, by the same
amount as domestic loans. I find evidence that credit supply tightening also occurred through loan
prices: loan interest rate spreads on syndicated loans are 40 to 65 basis points (bps.) higher for a
one standard deviation increase in the sovereign shock (20 bps. shock), even after controlling for
sector specific credit demand and borrower characteristics.
Why do sovereign losses matter for credit? There are two main channels: the capital channel
and the funding channel. According to the first, banks with large sovereign losses may fall below
the minimum regulatory capital ratio. Given that equity is a relatively costly source of finance and
banks may be reluctant to issue new shares at a time of low stock prices, banks would find optimal to
cut off loans. The funding channel indicates instead that banks with sovereign losses face a higher
cost of funding, either because they pay higher rates on interbank repos (Boissel et al. (2014)),
where government bonds are the preferred source of collateral or simply because a bank with higher
3
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losses is perceived as more risky by external investors. I find evidence that the second channel is
more important than the first. In fact, I show that banks relying heavily on short term funding cut
lending by more the higher the sovereign losses, whereas banks with low levels of regulatory capital,
defined as Tier1 Equity over Risk–Weighted Assets (RWA), were not more significantly affected than
other banks. In particular, this seems to be true for regulatory capital, expressed as a fraction of
RWA, rather than for effective capital, expressed as a fraction of Total Assets rather than RWA:
banks with low leverage ratios engaged in asset shedding more than other banks. This may indicate
that sovereign losses indeed induced banks to de–leverage to ease investors’ concerns about the
solvency of the institution, and not as a consequence of regulatory action. I interpret the absence of
a regulatory capital channel in terms of forbearance by the EBA in enforcing capital requirements in
a time of crisis: banks were given plenty of leeway into how they could address the capital shortfall
(capital requirements were effectively not binding). Also, since banks do not in fact mark–to–market
their sovereign bond exposures 4 as I do in my empirical exercise, it is not surprising that the effect
of sovereign losses on lending does not come through an impact on regulatory capital. The funding
channel is instead the result of market discipline, where banks with below average collateral are
either shut out of the market completely or face higher rates for wholesale funding. As additional
evidence for the funding channel, I study bank–specific cost of funding using data on bond issuance
from SDC Platinum. I find that coupon rates on fixed–rate notes issued by European banks increase
with banks’ sovereign losses, even after controlling for country–time factors and security specific
characteristics.
The dataset is the result of a merger of different data sources. I construct the bank specific
4On average, 40% of sovereign exposures are in the Hold–to–Maturity (HTM) and 40% in the Available–For–Sale
(AFS) books and the rest in the Fair–Value–Option (FVO) and the Held–For–Trading (HFT) books. Exposures
in the HTM are valued at historical prices. Exposures in the AFS are marked–to–market, but banks can then
net out valuation losses or gains in the calculation of regulatory equity (the so–called Prudential Filters). The
application of Prudential Filters varies by country, but it implies that in many cases even AFS exposures do not
impact regulatory equity.
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shock, i.e. potential losses on sovereign debt holdings, using data on exposure to sovereign debt
for the European banks participating in the European Banking Authority (EBA) Stress Tests and
Recapitalization Exercises. The granularity of the EBA data, containing individual bank–level
exposure to each European country and its maturity structure, allows me to exactly calculate the
capital loss (profit) caused by the deterioration (appreciation) of existing bond holdings on each
bank’s balance sheet during the sovereign crisis. I then match the EBA exposure data with balance
sheet information and explore the significance of the bank–specific sovereign shock in explaining
loan growth, controlling for aggregate credit demand conditions at the country level with a set of
country–time fixed effects. The key identifying assumption is that there are no systematic differences
in unobserved borrowers’ characteristics between the most exposed banks and the least exposed ones
once time–varying, country–level unobservables are accounted for 5. Note that I can somewhat relax
this assumption in the analysis of loan interest rate spreads. Syndicated loans from LPC DealScan,
in fact, contain the identity, industry and location of corporations borrowing in the syndicated loan
market. This allows me to control for credit demand by introducing country–industry–quarter fixed–
effects, so that I am comparing loans made to borrowers in the same country, industry and quarter
by banks with different sovereign exposures. Moreover, for those borrowers that can be linked to
Compustat, I introduce firm–level controls to further control for credit demand. Finally, bank bond
issuance is from SDC Platinum, a rich database on equity, bond, syndicated loans issuance and
M&A for both financial and non–financial firms.
This paper contributes to a recent, but active area of research, both theoretical and empirical,
that studies the relationship between sovereign and banking crises. Whereas most applied papers
look at cross–financial linkages between the two (Acharya and Steffen (2013) on bank stock returns,
De Bruyckere et al. (2012) on sovereign contagion, P. Kallestrup et al. (2012) on bank and sovereign
5This point is made more rigorously in a simple model of bank lending in Section 3.
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CDS, Colla and Bedendo (2014) and Augustin et al. (2014) on corporate CDS) or at the relationship
between sovereign risk and bank bailouts (Acharya, Drechsler and Schanbl (2014), Greenwood et al.
(2012)), few have focused on the real effects of the sovereign debt crisis. Gennaioli et al. (2013, 2014)
analyze the effects of sovereign defaults on bank lending, thus this paper is different in that, other
than Greece, there has been no sovereign default in Europe during the crisis. To my knowledge,
only Bofondi et al. (2013) and Popov and Van Horen (2014) look at the effects of the sovereign debt
crisis on credit supply in Europe as I do (Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger and Hirsch (2014) analyze the
real effects on borrowers using syndicated loan data while Correa, Sapriza and Zlate (2013) look at
lending by US branches of European banks). The main contributions of this paper compared to the
latter are the following. First, I investigate the effect on both credit quantity and prices. As far as I
am aware, this is the first paper that examines both these outcomes for European banks during the
sovereign debt crisis. Second, I attempt to shed light on the mechanisms as to why sovereign losses
matter for bank credit. I claim that risky sovereign bonds exposure matter because they increase
bank cost of funding, rather than by decreasing regulatory capital. Third, I specifically address
the endogeneity of sovereign exposures by instrumenting the domestic exposure with the degree of
political influence, as measured by government ownership, in the domestic banking system. This is
a novel approach in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 contains a brief review on the empirical
literature on credit supply shocks and the sovereign debt crisis. Section 2 describes the data and the
construction of the bank specific sovereign loss, while Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology.
Section 4 presents the regression results and Section 5 discusses the possible channels at work.
Finally Section 6 concludes.
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1.1 Literature Review
The academic literature on credit supply shocks faces significant empirical challenges for the identi-
fication of a causal effect. In fact, data on loans from banks’ balance sheets are the outcome of credit
supply and demand and thus it is hard to disentangle between the sources of the shock. Traditionally,
the literature has either exploited clever identification schemes (Kashyap et al. (1993), Kashyap and
Stein (2000), Ivashina and Scharfestein (2010)) or examined specific institutional/quasi–experimental
settings that allowed a clear separation from the two (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) on the finance–
growth nexus; Paravisini (2008) on financing frictions; Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) on the
international transmission of bank shocks; Rocholl et al. (2011) on retail credit in Germany dur-
ing the financial crisis) or, finally, having access to detailed firm–bank relationship data, included
firm–period fixed effects to fully control for credit demand (Khwaja and Mian (2008) seminal work;
Jimenez et al. (2012, 2014) for Spain; Bofondi et al. (2013) for Italy; Iyer et al. (2014) for Portugal).
Bofondi et al. (2013) provide evidence that foreign banks operating in Italy, mainly German
and French groups, tightened credit volumes less and charged lower interest rate than Italian banks
during the sovereign debt crisis. However, they do not find any differential impact for banks that are
more exposed to GIIPS debt. I emphasize instead that banks with higher sovereign exposure and
thus higher losses, were both cutting lending volumes by more and charging higher interest rates.
Popov and Van Horen (2014), on the other hand, is more closely related to my work. They also
use the EBA stress test data to show that non-GIIPS European banks with higher exposure to
GIIPS debt decreased the volume of syndicated loans at the country–borrower level by more than
less exposed banks. In a robustness check, I also confirm their result on syndicated loans volume
using my measure of the sovereign shock. Compared to their work, I analyze data from banks’
balance sheets, that includes loans to small and medium enterprises and households (syndicated
loans represent only 10% of aggregate lending in Europe, according to ECB MFI statistics). I also
7
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use syndicated loan data to investigate a “price channel” of the sovereign debt crisis through which
higher sovereign losses translate into higher syndicated loan interest rates. Moreover, I provide
evidence for the mechanism at work, showing that sovereign losses matter for banks’ cost of funding
rather than for regulatory equity.
This paper is also related to the literature on the role of politics in the banking system. The
predominant, political economy view considers state owned enterprises to be a source of ineffi-
ciency (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)), maximizing the individual goals of politicians, such as over–
employment and financing favored enterprises, rather than their own value. This view has the
support of some influential empirical evidence: La Porta et al. (2002) show that countries with a
higher share of government owned banks have lower growth rate of GDP per capita; Sapienza (2004)
shows that state–owned banks in Italy charge lower interest rates than privately owned banks and
Dinc¸ (2005) shows that government–owned banks increase lending in election years, suggesting in-
efficient allocations. Yet, other papers offer a different view: Andrianova et al. (2008) claim that
the results in La Porta et al. (2002) are not robust to appropriately controlling for the quality
of institutions 6. Coleman and Feler (2014) suggest that government–owned banks in Brazil are
actually better equipped to lend more, rather than less, during a crisis. Also, they show that the
quality of lending by state–owned banks actually improved during the crisis. The strongest evidence
in favor of the political economy view in Sapienza (2004), i.e. the fact that the stronger the political
party affiliated to the bank, the lower the interest rate charged, is actually economically small. In
Dinc¸ (2005), the effects are present only for emerging countries, with dubious quality of institutions.
Also, he mentions that although government owned banks increase their lending in election years,
the share of loans in total assets is not higher than at a privately owned banks, but government
securities as a fraction of total assets are about 50% higher. Thus the main difference between
6Actually, in La Porta et al. (2002) paper itself, the significance of the coefficient is largely dependent on the set of
controls.
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government and privately owned banks seem to be the exposure to sovereign debt, as in this paper.
1.2 Data
The final dataset is the result of the merger of different data sources. The master dataset consists of
the EBA sovereign exposure data collected during the “EU–wide Stress Test” and “Recapitalization
Exercises”. Specifically, the EBA, in an effort to enhance transparency and restore confidence in the
financial system, decided to disclose on its website bank–by–bank result for both the 2010 and 2011
Stress Test Results7 and the so–called 2011 and 2012 Recapitalization Exercises. These exercises
contain information on the capital composition (including government’s support measures), credit
risk exposure and, most importantly, sovereign debt exposure to each of the 30 members of the
European Economic Area (EEA 30) at different maturities for all the participating banks. The
2010 and 2011 Stress Tests sample consists of 90 European banks, covering more than 60% of
banking assets in Europe and at least 50% in each Member State. In the 2011-2012 Recapitalization
Exercises, the sample is restricted to around 60 banks, because smaller, non–cross border institutions
were excluded 8. In conclusion, the EBA exposure data offer an unbalanced, bank–level panel of
sovereign exposure data, at irregular frequency (2010Q1, 2010Q4, 2011Q3, 2011Q4 and 2012Q2).
For all the dates except in 2010Q1, a detailed breakdown by residual maturity, from 3 months to 15
years, is also provided 9.
A possible concern with this type of supervisory data is that banks may have been “window dress-
ing” their balance sheets around the stress tests’ reporting dates. There is some evidence (Acharya
7Data for the 2010 Stress Test, with data as of March 2010, were published on the former banking authority website,
CEBS. A link to the sovereign exposure for this date can be found at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics http://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime/?p=1711
8Most of the excluded banks are from Greece or Spain. The six Greek banks, present in the Stress Tests, were under
restructuring and IMF monitoring by the time of Recapitalization Exercises. Most of the regional savings bank in
Spain were excluded too.
9I will extrapolate the maturity structure for 2010Q1 exposure from the 2010Q4 data, by using the same proportions.
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and Steffen (2013), Acharya, Engle and Pierret (2014)) that some banks effectively “gamed” the
second stress test by reducing their GIIPS exposure right before the reporting date and increasing
it following the disclosure of the results. However, even if this behavior has indeed been common
practice among banks, it means that the EBA data understate the true amount of sovereign debt
on banks’ balance sheets, so that any negative effect of the sovereign shock on bank loans would be
underestimated.
Banks’ exposures are then matched with balance sheet information either from Bankscope or hand–
collected (and cross–checked) from banks’ annual reports. Since balance sheet data have a yearly
frequency, I end up eliminating the mid–year EBA exposures on 2011Q3 and 2012Q2. On the other
hand, I impute the 2010Q1 sovereign exposure to the beginning of the year and I match it with the
end–of–year 2009 balance sheet data. The EBA sovereign exposure data are provided at the group
level for the reporting banks; thus, the matching with the balance sheet data has to be done carefully.
Balance sheet controls in the regressions are kept at the same “highest” level of consolidation, but
the outcome variables, either domestic or foreign loans, need to be adjusted depending on the size
of the bank. For smaller, local banks, domestic loans come from the unconsolidated statements,
whenever possible, or the consolidated group statement otherwise. For the larger, global bank
groups, domestic loans either consist of the unconsolidated figures of the parent bank or, when no
unconsolidated statements were available, they are computed as the consolidated total minus the
loans of the foreign subsidiaries belonging to the group. For the cross–border groups only, I am able
to construct a series for foreign loans using the unconsolidated loans of the international subsidiaries.
In this case, I end up with 36 cross–border banks out of the original 90 banks of the EBA sample,
yielding a total of 140 subsidiaries (see Appendix for a list of banks).
Table 1.1 contains summary statistics for the EBA sample matched with balance sheet character-
istics at the group level. Banks in the sample are quite large, with average (median) Total Assets
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of e390 bn. (e135 bn.) with banks above the 90th pct. exceeding e1 tn. On average these assets
are funded through customer deposits for 40% and 10% through other, short–term funding sources.
They also seem to be well capitalized according to regulatory capital, as even banks in the 10th pct.
have a capital ratio of 8% (Basel I benchmark) and more than half are well above 10%. In terms of
the effective capital ratio, expressed as a fraction of total assets, the capitalization number are quite
different. The numbers are halved on average, with banks in the 10th pct. having an implied leverage
of 50 or more. The difference in the distribution of the two capitalization measures underlines the
flexibility of risk–weights in computing regulatory capital. Profits and the growht rate of domestic
lending are on average negative and non–performing loans (NPL) are quite high, as expected in a
crisis period. Finally, 50% of banks’ balance sheet on average consist of loans, while sovereign bonds
take up another 9%, with exposure to GIIPS taking 3.7% on average.
I also merge the EBA sample with LPC DealScan that contains loan–level information on interest
rate spreads. The largest EBA banks are especially active in the syndicated loan market, with
at least one of the top 10 European banks being present in more than 75% of the syndicated
loans granted by the EBA sample banks over 2009-2012. Interest rate spreads are available at the
tranche (facility) level, so that the relevant panel–id variable is the bank–facility pair at a quarterly
frequency. Moreover, I could match some of the borrowing firms in DealScan to accounting data
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics EBA Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
TotAss (ebn.) 232 388.08 576 20.56 45.7 135.5 405.3 1,160
Deposits/TA 230 0.432 0.16 0.233 0.307 0.439 0.53 0.63
STFund/TA 234 0.109 0.089 0.018 0.046 0.09 0.145 0.203
Tier1/RWA 228 0.116 0.039 0.083 0.097 0.112 0.131 0.152
Tier1/TA 232 0.05 0.028 0.02 0.034 0.047 0.064 0.078
Profits/TA in (%) 232 -0.097 1.978 -1.16 0.02 0.3 0.55 0.829
NPL/Loans (in %) 225 6.95 5.51 2.05 3.27 5.66 8.93 13.64
∆Loans domestic 233 -0.011 0.1 -0.1 -0.042 -0.007 0.029 0.074
Loan/TA 230 0.505 0.21 0.236 0.333 0.51 0.681 0.77
TotSov/TA 201 0.091 0.058 0.027 0.047 0.083 0.122 0.153
GIIPSExp/TA 201 0.037 0.048 2.40E-07 0.003 0.012 0.065 0.097
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available from Compustat using the link file provided by Chava and Roberts (2008). I exclude
corporate borrowers in the financial, insurance and real estate sectors 10 Table 1.2 below provides
some summary statistics for these two dataset mergers. Syndicated loans are large, with a mean
(median) of $430 mil. ($150 mil.), have an average maturity of 5 years, average all-in drawn spread
over the reference rate (Libor or Euribor) of 300 basis–points and attract an average (median) of 4.2
(3) participant banks, including 3 (2) Lead Arrangers. The DealScan-Compustat sample is broadly
consistent with the DealScan-EBA sample and, although loans are on average twice as large, the
spreads, maturity and number of banks are similar. Borrowing firms are also very large, with average
(median) assets of $25.9 bn. ($8 bn.), average profit margin (EBITDA/Sales) of 0.22 and average
leverage ratio of 0.36.
Table 1.2: DealScan Summary Statistics
DealScan-EBA Sample
N Mean Std.dev. 10th 50th 90th
Loan characteristics
Loan Amount ($ mil.) 11,795 430 960 18 150 1,140
All–in drawn spread (bps.) 7,041 301.2 162.4 115 275 500
Maturity (months) 11,331 65.14 50.32 18 60 102
Number of participants 11,810 4.2 4.3 1 3 9
Number of arrangers 11,810 3 3 1 2 7
DealScan-Compustat Sample
N Mean Std.dev. 10th 50th 90th
Loan characteristics
Loan Amount ($ mil.) 1,386 984 1,440 100 513 2,120
All–in drawn spread (bps.) 1,208 248.8 133.7 100 225 425
Maturity (months) 1,360 55.84 23.6 30 60 78
Number of participants 1,386 4 4.5 1 2 13
Number of arrangers 1,386 2.6 3 1 1 6
Borrower characteristics
Tot.Ass.($ bn.) 833 25.9 51.9 0.96 8 56
EBITDA/Sales 792 0.22 0.72 0.05 0.2 0.49
Leverage 805 0.36 0.24 0.13 0.35 0.63
Investment/Assets 667 0.015 0.017 0.003 0.01 0.029
Finally, bond yields are taken from Bloomberg. For the construction of the sovereign shock, I
keep only maturities longer than or equal to 2 years because shorter maturities, 3–months (3M)
10SIC codes between 6000 and 6999
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and 1–year (1Y), contain a lot of noise, have missing values and do not matter as much for the
computation of sovereign losses (short duration). Also, due to data availability, I can match bond
yields to the sovereign exposures of 17 countries only out of the original EEA 30: Austria (AT),
Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR),
Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PO), Portugal
(PT), Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK).
In conclusion, the final dataset contains a bank–level panel with around 90 European banks in
20 countries, matched with both balance sheet variables over 4 years (2009-2012), individual bank–
by–bank sovereign exposure to 17 countries, at five different maturities (2Y, 3Y, 5Y, 10Y, 15Y) and
syndicated interest rate spreads made by 74 EBA banks over the 2010–2012 period.
1.2.1 The Bank–specific Sovereign Shock
The advantage of the EBA data is that it provides a detailed picture of bank exposure to central
governments of all 30 countries of the EEA with a breakdown by maturity, from 3M to 15Y. The
coupon rate for the bonds in the sovereign portfolio is not known. Thus, in order to calculate the
losses I have to make some assumptions on the duration of these bonds. The maturity detail is also
important for the calculation of losses, as bonds with longer maturities (duration) will have a larger
impact.
I construct a bank–specific sovereign shock for bank b at time t, SovShockb,t as:
SovShockb,t =
S∑
s=1
15Y∑
m=2Y
Durations,m,t ∗∆yields,m,t ∗ Exposureb,s,m,t−1
Total Assetsb,t−1
(1.1)
where s is the sovereign country whom bank b is exposed to; m is the residual debt maturity, in years,
and t is the end of year t, from 2010 to 2012. Essentially, this shock represents the potential capital
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loss (gain) incurred by bank b during year t because of the depreciation (appreciation) of sovereign
bonds. In other words, it is the marked–to–market value of the total exposure to sovereign bonds on
banks’ balance sheets. Although banks do not necessarily need to mark–to–market these exposures,
especially if they are held in the Hold–to–Maturity (HTM) banking book, this measure is meant to
capture expected losses on sovereign bonds and identify the banks most vulnerable to the sovereign
shock from the point of view of an outside investor. SovShockb,t is composed of several terms that
I define below. Notice that, as described in the data section, I eliminate maturities shorter than
2Y and keep the exposures to 17 countries (S = 17). Also, since the March 2010 exposure data
are disaggregated by country of exposure but not by maturity, I have assumed that the maturity
structure of the sovereign portfolio has remained constant over the year and I have imputed the
December 2010 maturity proportions to the March 2010 figures.
Durations,m,t is the modified duration and it measures the percentage change in the price of a
bond for a unit change in the yield–to–maturity (yield). If the duration is, say, 10 then the price
falls by 10% for any 1% increase in the yield. Sovereign bonds are coupon bonds and to compute the
exact duration one would need to know the actual coupon value. However, since this information
is not available in the EBA data, I have to assume that sovereigns are either zero–coupon bonds or
par bonds (where the coupon equals the yield). Since the duration is a decreasing function of the
coupon, using the par bond assumption will underestimate banks’ losses, whereas the zero–coupon
bond will overestimate them. Therefore, my preferred measure to calculate the duration is the par
bond, but the main results are not qualitatively affected by this assumption. According to the par
bond assumption, the duration is:
Durations,m,t =
1
yields,m,t
(
1− 1
(1 + yields,m,t)2m
)
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where, given the assumption of semi–annual payments, yields,m,t is the semi–annual yield and thus
the maturity (in years) is multiplied by 2. For the zero–coupon bond, the duration becomes:
Durations,m,t =
2m
1 + yields,m,t
It is important to keep in mind that both measures will contain a measurement error because in
reality a sovereign bond is “in between” a zero–coupon and a par bond, with the latter being a closer
approximation. Thus, in either case and as long as the measurement error is white noise, the OLS
estimate will be biased towards zero as in the case of classical measurement error (Greene(2012)).
An average of the par and zero coupon bond should contain less measurement error: I do find that
this is the case in a robustness test (Table 1.10).
The second term in (1.1), ∆yields,m,t, is simply the change in the average (semi–annual) yield for
the month of December (or in the last quarter) for the sovereign debt of country s at maturity m.
Thus the first part of the expression, Durations,m,t ∗∆yields,m,t, represents the total price change
over the period observed, in this case from December of year t− 1 to year t. This is the aggregate
sovereign shock which is identical for all banks. Once this is interacted with bank b exposure to each
sovereign c and maturity m at the beginning of the period, Exposureb,s,m,t−1, and it is normalized
by total assets, Total Assetsb,t−1, the loss (or gain) for bank j on that specific bond is obtained.
Finally, by summing over each country of exposure s and each maturity m, SovShockb,t calculates
the losses (gains) from the devaluation (revaluation) of all sovereign bonds as a percentage of total
assets. Table 1.3 reports the empirical distribution of the shock in the data using both the par bond
and zero–coupon assumption to compute the duration. Not only the mean and standard deviation
differ substantially, but the entire distribution using the zero–coupon assumption, especially in the
upper tail, is wider. This is consistent with the fact that the zero–coupon bond overestimates the
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losses. In both cases, banks at the bottom of the distribution actually recorded some small gains
on their holdings of sovereign debt, around 0.5% of total assets11. In fact, some Northern European
countries, to which German, Danish, Dutch and Swedish banks have considerable exposures, actu-
ally experienced a decrease in bond yields during the sovereign debt crisis (flight–to–quality).
Table 1.3: Distribution of SovShockb,t
Percentile Loss (if positive)/ Gain (if negative)
Par bond Zero–coupon
10th -0.563% -0.681%
25th -0.16% -0.167%
50th 0.018 % 0.039%
75th 0.350% 0.51%
90th 0.964% 1.449%
95th 2.75% 5.28%
Mean 0.375% 0.848%
std.dev. 1.89% 4.247%
Obs. 240 240
Banks in the 75th and 90th percentile had, respectively, losses accounting for 0.35% (0.51%) and
0.96% (1.45%) of total assets using the par (zero coupon) bond assumption. These numbers are
high: considering that the median capital–over–total asset ratio of around 5% over 2009-2011, losses
in the top decile have the potential to wipe out almost a quarter (or third) of the book value of
equity. Banks facing these heavy losses are mostly headquartered in the GIIPS countries, but in the
top quartile we also also find some banks domiciled in Belgium (Dexia), Germany (Commerzbank
and Hypo Real Estate) and Luxembourg (BCEE).
11SovShockj,t is positive if there are losses and negative if there are gains. This is because duration is defined as
−dP/dyield
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1.3 The Empirical Methodology
The baseline empirical specification is the following:
∆Loansb,c,t = β1SovShockb,t + ηb + λc,t + γ
′Xb,t−1 + b,c,t (1.2)
estimated with either OLS (with bank fixed-effects) or Difference GMM. ∆Loansb,c,t is the annual
growth rate of loans granted by bank b in country c (either domestic or foreign) at the end of year
t; ηb is the bank fixed-effect; λc,t is the country–year fixed–effect that accounts for country-specific
credit demand; Xb,t−1 is a vector of bank balance sheet characteristics at the beginning of the period
(Tier1Ratio, Pre–Tax Profits, Customer Deposits, Non–Performing Loans and Cash, all normalized
by total assets 12). The main coefficient of interest in (1.2) is β1: I expect β1 < 0, so that losses
from the holdings of sovereign debt, all else equal, should have a negative impact on credit growth.
Table 1.4: Mean Differences in Bank Characteristics by GIIPS exposure
2009 2010 2011
diff t-stat diff t–stat diff t–stat
TotAss (ebn.) 330.0 3.05 347.2 3.34 190.7 1.17
Dep/TA -0.064 -1.84 -0.086 -2.745 0.044 1.129
STFund/TA 0.009 0.442 0.012 0.64 0.02 0.889
Tier1/RWA 0.012 2.4 0.014 1.8 0.005 0.584
Tier1/TA -0.018 -3.33 -0.009 -1.59 2.40E-05 0.004
Prof/TA -0.001 -1.43 0.002 1.46 0.011 2.386
NPL/Loans -0.47 -0.886 -0.438 -0.56 -1.33 -0.963
∆ Loans domestic 0.008 0.298 0.022 0.729 0.062 3.74
This table presents the difference of means in bank characteristics by GIIPS exposure. In
particular, for each year, it takes the difference in the average of each characteristic for
banks below the median in GIIPS/Total Assets and for banks above the median.
Given that the identification comes from cross–sectional variation in sovereign exposure, it is
important to describe differences in bank characteristics between more and less exposed banks,
both ex–ante and during the crisis. Table 1.4 examines differences in averages between the banks
12Among these covariates, the Non–Performing Loans ratio controls for the average quality of the loan portfolio
within each bank. This is important because we may worry that sovereign exposures towards GIIPS countries are
correlated with the average loan quality held in banks’ balance sheets, as exemplified by the Cypriot banks case
(A&S (2013)).
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less exposed to GIIPS debt (below the median) and those more exposed (above the median). It
is evident that less exposed banks are much larger on average (e200-300 bn.), as the big, global
banks fall in this category. Importantly, the two groups are almost identical in terms of wholesale
funding, profitability and non–performing loans both before and at the beginning of the crisis (2009
and 2010). More exposed banks, as expected, becomes less profitable (1.1% lower in profits/assets
ratio) and experience lower growth rate of lending (6% lower) at the peak of the crisis, in 2011.
Interestingly, before the crisis, the least exposed banks have a higher regulatory capital ratio (+1.2%
in Tier1/RWA), but also a lower leverage ratio (-1.8% in Tier1/TA): this may be due to the fact
that large banks, that fall in the less exposed category, use internal models for the calculation of
risk–weights and hence can use regulatory leverage more effectively.
Table 1.5: Mean Differences by GIIPS exposure for non–GIIPS banks
2009 2010 2011
Diff t–stat Diff t–stat Diff t–stat
TotAss (ebn.) -83.5 -0.43 -32.16 -1.66 -150.1 -0.68
Dep/TA 0.05 0.95 0.124 2.672 0.074 1.502
STFund/TA 0.038 1.12 0.005 0.197 -0.016 -0.608
Tier1/RWA 0.024 4.64 -0.002 -0.228 -0.001 -0.119
Tier1/TA 0.018 2.6 0.026 4.151 0.018 2.745
Prof/TA 0.002 1.47 0.005 3.6 0.001 0.793
NPL/Loans -0.05 -0.075 -0.646 -0.501 0.952 0.608
∆ Loans domestic -0.09 -1.78 0.058 1.08 0.045 2.358
This table presents the difference of means in bank characteristics by GIIPS exposure
for non–GIIPS banks. In particular, for each year, it takes the difference in the average
of each characteristic for banks below the median in GIIPS/Total Assets and for banks
above the median.
Table 1.5 replicates the same exercise for non–GIIPS banks only. Interestingly, non–GIIPS banks
more exposed to GIIPS debt are now actually larger than the less exposed banks, however the
difference is not statistically significant. Importantly, other than being less capitalized, the most
exposed non–GIIPS banks are similar to the least exposed banks in terms of non–performing loans,
wholesale funding and profitability before and during the crisis. Finally, non–GIIPS banks more
exposed to GIIPS debt have a lower growth rate of domestic loans than the less exposed ones in
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2011. Since demand in non–GIIPS countries is not correlated with the sovereign shock in GIIPS
countries, this is an indication of a supply, rather than demand, effect.
When I look at the effect of the sovereign shock on domestic loans, the identification is particularly
strong for banks headquartered in countries whose bond markets were not under pressure (non–
GIIPS countries), but that nonetheless had high exposure to risky sovereign debt. In fact, the
sovereign shock for these banks is plausibly exogenous with respect to domestic credit demand
condition. For example, Greek sovereign problems should not affect aggregate demand conditions
for German firms 13, but it would affect credit supply in Germany if its banks are highly exposed
to Greek debt. On the other hand, in GIIPS countries aggregate demand conditions are probably
negatively correlated with the rise in bond yields and one may worry that controlling for the country–
period fixed-effects is not enough to take care of the endogeneity bias caused by the home–country
exposure of GIIPS banks. I address these concerns on home–country and other endogeneity biases
in several ways.
First I look at the effect of the sovereign shock on foreign (worldwide) loans of the largest, cross-
border institutions, i.e. loans granted by the international subsidiaries of the largest banking groups.
If, following a negative shock to the balance sheet of the mother bank, we observe that lending is
reduced also abroad (β1 < 0), then it must be a because of a credit supply shock.
Second, I can split the sovereign shock in two parts: one part would account for losses coming
from exposure to the GIIPS, while another for losses, or gains mostly, from non–GIIPS exposure.
Then, I can divide each part of the shock between GIIPS and non–GIIPS banks: if the effect of
sovereign losses coming from GIIPS exposure is present also for lending by non–GIIPS banks then
this is a further indication of a supply, rather than a demand shock.
Third, I can instrument the sovereign shock using the level of government ownership in each
13Germany’s export to Greece are marginal, on average around 1% of total German exports over the last 10 years
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bank. In De Marco and Macchiavelli (2014), we show that the large degree of home bias can in
part be explained by the degree of political connections of each bank with its domestic government,
as measured by the the percentage of bank shares owned by the local or national government pre–
crisis, in 2006. I can use this instrument to predict the domestic exposure in the construction of the
sovereign shock. In particular, recalling that the sovereign shock is constructed as:
SovShockb,t =
S∑
s=1
15Y∑
m=2Y
Durations,m,t ∗∆yields,m,t ∗ Exposureb,s,m,t−1
Total Assetsb,t−1
I instrument only the sovereign exposure part, Exposureb,s,m,t−1/Assetsb,t−1, when bank b is ex-
posed to its domestic sovereign 14, while I let the yield follow its actual path. The implicit assumption
in doing this is that the aggregate shock (Durations,m,t ∗∆yields,m,t) is exogenous with respect to
banks’ conditions, so that it does not need to be instrumented. Hence, the IV for SovShockb,t is
constructed as follows:
SovPoliticalb,t = Duration10Y,t ∗∆yield10Y,t ∗ Politicalb
where Politicalb is the share of government ownership in bank b in 2006; duration and yield are for the
home country where bank b is located and are measured at the 10 year maturity. By construction,
SovPoliticalb,t is time–varying only insofar as the yield of a country is time–varying, however it
does not contain any time–variation at the bank level. Hence, although it will not technically be
absorbed by the bank fixed–effects, it is possible that there is not enough variation to estimate it
precisely. An alternative to the within transformation is the first–differencing estimator, that equally
removes bank fixed–effects. Thus, as additional evidence, I will also be presenting the results from
14Foreign exposures cannot be instrumented with domestic political ownership, hence I treat them as exogenous once
the home exposure has been set. Note that the average (median) home bias across banks in sovereign bonds is
74% (80%), thus the large part of the sovereign portfolio is domestic.
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a cross–sectional IV regression comparing the growth rate of lending before and during the crisis.
The instrument itself may be endogenous, i.e. correlated with the unobserved component in credit
conditions, if we think that “political” banks are poorly managed and have low profitability. It could
also be the case that political banks lend to politically connected firms who could potentially be
doing worse than other firms during the crisis 15. However, if that were the case, political banks
should have a higher share of non–performing loans or lower profits than non–political banks during
the crisis, but that does not seem to be the case (see Table 1.20 in the Appendix). Moreover, I
can specifically look at banks’ loan portfolios in December 2010. In fact, the EBA released data
on the allocation of credit broken down by country of destination and by type of loan in the 2011
Stress Test only 16. For instance, I know the amount of exposure to public sector entities, corporate,
SME and commercial–real–estate by country for each bank. Tables 1.21 and 1.22 in the Appendix
show that government–owned banks only have a higher share of loans to domestic public entities
compared to privately owned banks. This may be a problem for exclusion restrictions for GIIPS
“political” banks, because domestic public sector entities in these countries are likely to suffer more
during the debt crisis. However, it is especially non–GIIPS government–owned banks that tend to
lend more to domestic public entities, even though both GIIPS and non–GIIPS government–owned
banks have a higher home–bias in sovereign bonds compared to private banks (Table 1.22). Thus, the
main difference between non–political and political banks is the higher share of domestic government
bonds for the latter group.
Finally, when I look at loan interest rate spreads (over Libor or Euribor), I can relax the assump-
tion that there are no systematic difference in borrowers’ unobservables once country–wide credit
demand factors (λc,t) are taken into account. In fact, syndicated loan data from LPC Dealscan
reveal the identity, location and industry of the corporate borrowers participating in this market.
15Although this possibility is intriguing, I found no evidence for such behavior by politically connected firms in the
empirical literature.
16These data on Exposures At Default (EAD) are used to calculate RWA.
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Therefore, I can introduce country–industry–quarter fixed–effects, so that I am comparing loans
made to borrowers in the same country, industry and quarter by banks with different sovereign
exposures. Specifically, in equation (1.3) I have:
Spreadb,f,t = β1SovShockb,t + ηb + λc,i,t + φ
′Ff,t + γ′Xb,t−1 + b,f,t (1.3)
where Spreadb,f,t is the all-in drawn spread over the Libor or Euribor of the loan extended by
bank b (Lead Arranger) to firm f at quarter t 17. λc,i,t is a country×industry ×quarter fixed–effect
where borrower f is located. The fixed–effect identification scheme is very solid here because I am
comparing firms in the same industry (2 digit NAICS), in the same country at the same quarter.
Moreover, for those firms that can be matched to Compustat, I can control for a set of the borrower’s
balance sheet variables, Ff,t. Thus in this case I am not only comparing firms within the same sector,
country and quarter, but also those with similar observable characteristics 18. Finally SovShockb,t
is constructed at a quarterly frequency, holding the sovereign exposure fixed at the beginning of the
year ad letting the (average) yield vary in each quarter. Here, I expect β1 > 0: banks with higher
losses from sovereign bonds are going to charge higher interest rates on their loans to make up for
lost profitability.
Finally, note that all standard errors have been clustered at the bank–level. The key identifying
assumption for consistency of cluster–robust standard errors is that there should be no inter–cluster
correlation, although intra–cluster correlation is allowed (Liang and Zeger (1986)). To account for
country–specific correlation among banks headquartered in the same country all models have been
17I use the all-in drawn spread because, according to DealScan, it also takes into account one–time and recurring
fees associated to the loan, so it is a better measure of the overall cost of the loan. Since it is a spread over
the benchmark interbank rates, it also nets out the effects of monetary policy. Finally, I am focusing on Lead
Arrangers because I am assuming that these banks have the pricing power in each loan, but the results do not
dependent on this assumption. See Section 4.2 for a detailed discussion
18The balance sheet variables are Leverage, Ebitda/Sales, Investment/Asset, Fixed Interest Rate Coverage,
log(Assets)
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run through country–time clusters, rather than bank clusters, and the results still hold. However, I
have decided to present the results for bank–clustered standard errors because for consistency one
needs the number of clusters to go to infinity: I have a total of around 90 bank groups, but only 40
country–time pairs in equation (1.2).
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Loan Growth
Table 1.6 reports the results for the baseline regression in (1.2) for domestic loans using the par
bond assumption. The coefficient of interest, β1, is always negative and significant at 5%. It implies
that banks that were more exposed to the sovereign shock and experienced higher sovereign losses
had a lower growth rate of loans. Column (1) and (2) present the results with the GMM estimator
and column (3) and (4) do the same with the OLS within estimator. The choice of instruments for
GMM is the following: all balance sheet variables and the sovereign shock dated t − 1 to t − 3. In
fact, the test for first order serial correlation in the error term in the difference equation (∆b,c,t)
cannot reject the null of no serial correlation: the error term is a random walk. This allows me to
use variables dated at t− 1 as instruments for the equations in difference.
Column (1) estimates the baseline model with the Difference GMM. It implies that for a 1%
increase in the sovereign losses–over–asset ratio, the growth rate of loans would decrease by slightly
less than 4%. In column (2) I re–estimate the model with OLS, introducing a bank fixed effect: the
coefficient is quantitatively almost the same, with a multiplier effect around 4.07. The number of
observations is different from one estimator to the other because the panel has T = 3 (2010,2011
and 2012) and thus I “lose” one cross–section in the difference GMM equations. Finally, column (3)
standardizes the shock by its standard deviation, so to ease comparisons with the robustness spec-
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Table 1.6: Domestic Lending and the Sovereign Shock
∆Loansb,c,t = β1SovShockb,t+ηb+λc,t+γ
′Xb,t−1 +
b,c,t
GMM OLS–FE OLS–FE
(1) (2) (3)
SovShock −3.808∗∗ −4.067∗∗
(1.625) (1.573)
SovShock/std.dev. −7.735∗∗
(2.987)
Tier1/RWA 2.873∗∗∗ 2.928∗∗∗ 2.928∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.408) (0.408)
PreTaxProf/Assets 5.08∗∗∗ 5.223∗∗∗ 5.223∗∗∗
(1.354) (1.443) (1.443)
Impaired Loans/Assets −2.477∗∗∗ −2.353∗∗∗ −2.353∗∗∗
(0.680) (0.695) (0.695)
Deposits/Assets -0.111 -0.531 -0.531
(0.367) (0.557) (0.557)
Cash/Assets -0.231 0.071 0.071
(0.605) (0.648) (0.648)
N 127 217 217
N of banks 78 89 89
bank fixed effects no yes yes
country×year fixed effects yes yes yes
Hansen–Sargan p–val .73
AR(1) p–val .836
Cluster robust s.e. in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: the dependent variable is the growth rate of domestic loans.
Tier1 is the Tier1–Capital–Ratio; Deposits/Assets, Cash/Assets,
PreTaxProfits/Assets, ImpairedLoans/Assets are, respectively: cus-
tomer deposits, cash and other cash equivalents, EBT and non–performing
loans all normalized by total assets. All variables are measured the beginning
of the period (t−1). SovShockj,t is the bank–specific sovereign loss normalized
by total assets too. Column (1)–(2) use the Difference GMM estimator with
instruments dated t − 1 to t − 3; column (3)–(4) use the standard OLS with
bank fixed–effects. All std.err. have been clustered at the bank level.
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ifications that follow 19. In this case the interpretation of the coefficient is that for a one standard
deviation shock to sovereign losses, the growth rate of loans is expected to decrease by 7.7%.
Among the balance sheet variables, the relevant ones are the Tier1 Capital Ratio, the profit–to–assets
ratio and impaired loans–over–assets ratio. Not surprisingly, more capitalized, more profitable banks
and banks with less non–performing loans at the beginning of the year had a higher loan growth
rate during the following year.
Table 1.7: Foreign Lending and the Sovereign Shock
∆Loansb,c,t = β1SovShockb,t + ηb + λc,t + γ
′Xb,t−1 + b,c,t
GMM OLS–FE GMM OLS–FE
Foreign Foreign Both Both
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SovShock −6.061∗∗∗ −4.545∗∗∗ −4.811∗∗∗ −2.233∗∗
(1.263) (1.469) (1.084) (1.127)
SovShock×foreignb 0.484 −2.575∗
(0.893) (1.543)
N 242 382 369 602
N of banks 139 140 217 230
bank fixed effects no yes no yes
country×year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Hansen–Sargan p–val .57 .04
AR(1) p–val .935 .897
Bank controls: Tier1(+), Profits(+)**, NPL(-), Dep(-)***, Cash(+)
Cluster robust s.e. in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: dependent variable is the growth rate of foreign (columns (1)–(2)) or of foreign and
domestic loans (columns (3)–(4). foreignb = 1 if the bank is an international subsidiary, zero
otherwise. All other bank balance sheet variables at the group level are defined as before. All
std.err. have been clustered at the bank level.
Effect on Foreign Loans The results of the baseline specification explore the effect of the
sovereign shock on domestic loans, i.e. the loans issued by the parent bank in its own country. I
now also examine the international transmission of the shock through the loans issued by the inter-
national subsidiaries of the cross–border institutions present in the EBA sample. Controlling for the
19In some of the robustness tests I will change the construction of the sovereign shock, thus altering the whole
distribution. I find the standardization with the standard deviation easy to compare across specifications
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country–year fixed–effect of the country where the subsidiary is located, Table 1.7 shows that the
effect of the shock is still negative and has a similar magnitude to the effect on domestic loans. In
particular, column (1) implies that the GMM estimate of the effect of the sovereign shock is actually
larger (i.e. more negative) for foreign loans than for domestic ones (-6.9% compared -4%). The
OLS–FE estimate, at 4.5% is somewhat similar to the effect on domestic lending. Column (3) and
(4) merge the data on foreign loans with those on domestic loans and it turns out that the difference
between the two (the interaction term with a dummy foreignb equal one if the bank is a subsidiary)
is not statistically significant. There appears to be some evidence of a “flight–to–home” effect, with
banks cutting foreign lending by more than domestic one, according to the OLS estimator. The sum
of SovShock + SovShock × foreign = −4.7∗∗∗ and it precisely estimated, however the difference
between the two, the interaction term, is significant only at 10%. According to the GMM estimate,
instead, the difference between foreign and domestic lending is small and not statistically significant.
In conclusion, the fact that the coefficient of interest, β1, is still negative and significant even for
foreign loans is another indication that SovShockb,t identifies a credit supply channel.
GIIPS and non–GIIPS losses One possible concern with the above estimates, especially those
on domestic lending, is that they are the result of weak credit demand for GIIPS banks, whose effect
is not completely absorbed by the country–time effects. To alleviate this concern, I split the losses
of SovShockb,t between GIIPS (SovGIIPSb,t) and non–GIIPS (SovnonGIIPSb,t) exposure and I
analyze the effect of the two separately for each group of banks, GIIPS and non–GIIPS banks. Table
1.8 and 1.9 show the results for domestic and foreign lending respectively.
First of all, all the coefficients are divided by the standard deviation in each relevant group. This
is to ease comparison across the estimates: losses tend to be higher for GIIPS exposure and higher
still for GIIPS banks. For example, there is only one bank–year observation with GIIPS losses higher
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Table 1.8: Domestic Lending: GIIPS vs non–GIIPS losses
(1) (2) (3)
SovGIIPS/sd -7.323∗∗∗
(2.74)
SovnonGIIPS/sd -1.652
(2.48)
SovGIIPS×GIIPSbanks/sd -7.617∗∗∗ -8.531∗∗∗
(2.620) (2.994)
SovGIIPS×nonGIIPSbanks/sd -4.893∗∗∗ -4.727∗∗∗
(1.824) (1.775)
SovnonGIIPS×GIIPSbanks/sd -1.373∗
(0.725)
SovnonGIIPS×nonGIIPSbanks/sd -0.523
(3.135)
N 217 217 217
N of banks 89 89 89
R2 0.634 0.650 0.653
Cluster robust s.e. in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of domestic loans ∆Loansb,c,t.
SovGIIPS and SovnonGIIPS are the bank–specific sovereign losses on GIIPS and
non–GIIPS exposure respectively. GIIPSbanks and nonGIIPSbanks are dummies
for whether the bank is located in the GIIPS or not. Each coefficient has been di-
vided by the standard deviation in each group, which are: 1.8% for SovGIIPS and
0.2% for SovnonGIIPS in column (1); 2.6% for SovGIIPS × GIIPSbanks and
0.26% for SovGIIPS × nonGIIPSbanks in column (2); 0.02% for SovnonGIIPS ×
GIIPSbanks and 0.25% for SovnonGIIPS×GIIPSbanks in column (3).Other bal-
ance sheet variables are defined as before. All std.err. have been clustered at the
bank level.
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than 1% among non–GIIPS banks, so that the interpretation of the coefficient as an elasticity to
a 1% loss is an extreme scenario for a non–GIIPS bank. Column (1) in Table 1.8 shows that only
losses coming from GIIPS exposure are significantly correlated with domestic lending. It implies
that for a one standard deviation shock to GIIPS losses (1.8%) the growth rate of domestic lending
declines by 7.3%. Column (2) splits the GIIPS losses between GIIPS and non–GIIPS banks and
column (3) adds the same split for non–GIIPS losses too, for a total of four interactions. The key
message of column (2) and (3) is that the coefficient on SovGIIPS×nonGIIPSbanks is also nega-
tive and significant: it implies that there is an effect on domestic lending also in countries not under
stress. If only the coefficient on SovGIIPS × GIIPSbanks were significant, then one may worry
that the results are all driven by credit demand going down for the most exposed GIIPS banks in
GIIPS countries, but this is not the case: there is a supply effect also for non–GIIPS bank exposed
to GIIPS debt. In terms of the magnitude, the elasticity is smaller for non–GIIPS banks, but the
standard deviation of the shock in that group is ten times smaller.
Table 1.9 repeats the same exercise for foreign lending. Once again, only losses coming from
GIIPS exposures have a significant and negative effect on lending: column (1) indicates that a one
standard deviation shock (1.6%) decreases lending by 7.7%. Column (2) explores whether this effect
is differentiated by whether the parent bank is in the GIIPS or not. Differently from the effect on
domestic lending, now only GIIPS parent institutions “export” the effect of a local shock to their
sovereign on foreign lending through their international subsidiaries, whereas non–GIIPS parent
banks do not. But where are the affected subsidiaries of GIIPS banks located? Columns (3)–(5)
provide the answer: the effect of the shock is mostly present for subsidiaries in other European coun-
tries, in particular in Eastern Europe 20. Two large Italian banks (UniCredit and Intesa SanPaolo)
20I only have a few banks (21) with subsidiaries outside Europe in my sample. The results in column (4) therefore are
not surprising in light of the small sample size. Also, given the small number of clusters in this case, the std.err.
are White robust std.err
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Table 1.9: Foreign Lending: GIIPS vs non–GIIPS losses
All All Europe non–Europe Eastern
Foreign Foreign Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SovGIIPS/sd -7.471∗∗∗
(2.38)
SovnonGIIPS/sd 0.635
(1.387)
SovGIIPS× -6.624∗∗∗ -7.157∗∗∗ -9.47 -5.490∗∗
GIIPSparent/sd (2.139) (2.582) (33.5) (2.093)
SovGIIPS× -1.188 -1.652 4.590 0.200
nonGIIPSparent/sd (1.380) (1.528) (4.441) (0.992)
SovnonGIIPS× -0.665 -2.951 202.5 1.961
GIIPSparent/sd (6.301) (6.907) (145.8) (5.540)
SovnonGIIPS× 3.360 -0.412 -38.86 11.12
nonGIIPSparent/sd (8.253) (8.817) (126.2) (6.822)
N 382 382 305 60 182
N of banks 140 140 113 21 68
R2 0.477 0.478 0.454 0.710 0.673
Cluster robust s.e. in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of foreign loans ∆Loansb,c,t. SovGIIPS
and SovnonGIIPS are the bank–specific sovereign losses on GIIPS and non–GIIPS exposure
respectively. GIIPSbanks and nonGIIPSbanks are dummies for whether the bank is lo-
cated in the GIIPS or not. Each coefficient has been divided by the standard deviation
in each group, which are: 1.6% for SovGIIPS and 0.2% for SovnonGIIPS in column (1);
1.4% for SovGIIPS × GIIPSbanks and 0.12% for SovGIIPS × nonGIIPSbanks; 0.2% for
SovnonGIIPS × GIIPSbanks and 1.2% for SovnonGIIPS × GIIPSbanks in columns (2)-(5).
Other balance sheet variables are defined as before. All std.err. have been clustered at the bank
level, but in column (4) where, given the small number of clusters, they are White–robust std.err.
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have significant presence in this area, but also Greek, Spanish and Portuguese banks.
Robustness Tests I will now present a series of robustness test on the main result on the baseline
regression on domestic loans. All the results are presented for the OLS–FE estimator only, but note
that, in most cases, the results hold with the GMM Difference estimator too, both with and without
the lagged dependent variable. I will be pointing out any significant departure in specific cases.
Table 1.10: Robustness to Outliers, Credit Demand Controls and Coupon assump-
tions
No Greek ∆GDPc,t BLSDemc,t Zero Par–Zero
Banks ×Dc ×Dc Coupon Average
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SovShock −3.585∗∗ −4.631∗∗∗ −3.683∗∗∗
(1.796) (0.956) (1.364)
SovShock/std.dev. −7.581∗∗∗ −8.170∗∗∗
(1.776) (2.211)
N 206 217 162 217 217
N of banks 83 89 68 89 89
bank FE yes yes yes yes yes
year FE no yes yes no no
country×year FE yes no no yes yes
Bank controls: Tier1(+)***, Profits(+)*** , NPL(-)***, Dep(+), Cash(+)
Cluster robust s.e. in parentheses
* p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of domestic loans ∆Loansb,c,t. SovShock is the
bank–specific sovereign loss. Column (1) excludes Greek banks; column (2)–(3) substitute the coun-
try*time fixed–effects with, respectively: GDP growth interacted with country dummies and BLS
demand questions (diffusion index, country aggregate) interacted with country dummies. Column (4)
uses the zero coupon bond duration for the calculation of the sovereing shock. All std.err. have been
clustered at the bank level.
Robustness to outliers, credit demand controls and coupon assumption Table 1.10 tests
the robustness of the first set of results. First, I want to make sure that the results are not driven
by a few very large outliers. Accordingly, column (1) excludes Greek banks that had the highest
losses on sovereign bonds: the results are unchanged and the coefficient is only slightly smaller, -3.6
compared to -4.0.
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Columns (2)-(3) verify the robustness of the result to alternative measures of credit demand at
the country level. A popular credit demand control in the bank lending channel literature (Altunbas
et al. (2009), De Santis and Surico (2013)) is the growth rate of GDP in the country where the bank
is lending. Alternatively, the Euro Area Bank Lending Survey (BLS) provides European banks’
perceptions on credit demand conditions for the previous three months at a quarterly frequency.
The BLS data is available, at the aggregate level 21, for most European countries 22. I introduce
these alternative credit demand controls by interacting either measure with the respective country
dummy (columns (4) and (5)). The coefficient is negative and significant in all specifications. The
magnitude is very similar to the baseline model with country–time fixed effects 23. Finally, in column
(4) and (5) I modify the coupon bond duration assumption used in the computation of the sovereign
shock. Column (4) uses the zero coupon bond duration while (5) averages par and zero coupon bond.
Since this alters the entire distribution of the sovereign shock, I divide by the standard deviation to
ease comparison with the baseline result in Table 1.6. The coefficient is remarkably similar to the
one estimated with the par bond, implying that for a one standard deviation shock using the zero
coupon assumption, loan growth decreases by 7.5% vis–a–vis 7.7% with the par bond. The average
of the two, that should contain less measurement error than either of the two since it is a better
approximation to real sovereign bonds, gives in fact an even larger effect (-8.5%), providing some
evidence of an attenuation bias in the other estimates.
Robustness to loan demand homogeneity and simultaneity According to the model in
Section 3, I can identify a credit supply effect of sovereign losses only if loan demand is homogenous
across banks. Specifically, the loan interest rate elasticity (α0), that enters into the reduced–form,
21Unfortunately, bank–by–bank figures are confidential. Individual BLS demand questions would be a good candidate
to control for bank–specific credit demand.
22The exceptions are non Euro countries such as the UK, Denmark, Norway and Hungary. For Greece and Finland
no BLS data exist.
23In these robustness tests, the GMM Difference estimator works everywhere but for the BLS demand questions
regressions. The coefficient on the sovereign shock in that case is not significant at 5% (p–val 8.9%).
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Table 1.11: Robustness to Loan Demand Homogeneity
λc,t× SovShock× 2010Q1
size size Exposure
(1) (2) (3)
SovShock −4.496∗∗ −4.283∗∗∗
(1.784) (1.574)
SovShock×large 0.883
(0.796)
SovShock/std.dev. −3.174∗∗
1.315
N 217 217 209
N of banks 89 89 84
bank FE yes yes yes
country×year FE yes yes yes
Cluster robust s.e. in parentheses
* p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of domestic loans
∆Loansb,c,t. SovShock is the bank–specific sovereign loss. Column (1)
interacts the country–time fixed–effects (λc,t) with a dummy largeb = 1
if the bank is above the median asset size, 0 otherwise; column (2) inter-
acts SovShock with largeb = 1 ; All std.err. have been clustered at the
bank level.
partial effect of the sovereign shock on bank lending (β1 in the regression), needs to be the same
for all banks. Also, the demand shifter elasticity (α1) is the same across banks within the same
country–time. In Table 1.11, columns (1) and (2), I relax these assumptions. I do so by interacting
both the country–time fixed–effect and the sovereign shock with a dummy largeb equal to one if
the bank is above the median size by assets and zero otherwise. The results are largely unchanged
24. Finally, column (3) uses an extra degree of caution in the construction of the sovereign shock,
SovShockb,t, by fixing the sovereign exposure at the pre–crisis level (March 2010) and letting only
the duration and the yield vary over time. The choice of lending to firms and sovereigns are taken
simultaneously, thus the one–year lag in the sovereign exposure as defined in (1.1) may not be suf-
ficient to avoid the endogeneity bias. The results are robust to this specification: the coefficient is
still negative and significant, although smaller in magnitude.
An IV: Political Ownership One concern with the above estimates is that the amount of
24In unreported results, other thresholds for bank size, at the 75th and 25th worked as well.
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sovereign bonds in banks’ balance sheet is endogenous, so that the sovereign shock would be corre-
lated with unobserved credit conditions. Thus, I can instrument the endogenous part of the sovereign
shock, the domestic sovereign exposure over total assets, with the share of bank ownership held by
the domestic government in each bank, as measured in De Marco and Macchiavelli (2014).
Table 1.12: IV: Political Ownership in the Panel
IV: OLS: IV: OLS: IV: OLS:
Par Par Zero Zero Parzero Parzero
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SovShock/std.dev. -2.491 -3.268∗∗ -3.031∗∗∗ -3.511∗∗∗ -2.865∗∗ -3.504∗∗∗
(1.527) (1.496) (1.043) (1.076) (1.175) (1.224)
N 199 217 199 217 199 217
1st stage F–stat 7.046 16.49 12.45
bank FE no no no no no no
country×year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of domestic loans ∆Loansb,c,t. SovShock is the
bank–specific sovereign loss. Columns (1)–(2) use the par bond assumption in the calulation of the
duration; column(3)–(4) the zero coupon bond assumption and finally columns (5)–(6) take an average
of the two. All other bank balance sheet controls are defined as before (not shown). All std.err. are
heteroskedasticity robust.
Table 1.12 compares the estimates of the IV and OLS using different duration assumptions.
Note that all specifications include the country×year fixed–effect, but not the bank fixed–effect.
In fact, since we measure the percentage of political ownership in each bank before the crisis, the IV,
SovPoliticalb,t = Duration10Y,t ∗ ∆yield10Y,t ∗ Politicalb, is time–varying only because the coun-
try yield and duration vary over time. Thus, introducing a bank fixed–effect as in the previous
specifications does not work with the IV. Column (1)–(2) use the par bond assumption, but the IV
estimate is not significant and suffers from a weak instrument problem: the F–stat from the first–
stage is below the rule of thumb of 10. Using the zero coupon assumption or the average of zero and
par bond instead yields significant results with larger first–stage F–stat. An Hausman test of the
equality between the OLS and IV in this case cannot reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients
are the same. The estimates imply that for a standard deviation increase in the sovereign shock
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(4.2% for zero coupon and 3% for the par–zero average) the growth rate of lending would decline
by around 3–3.5%. These numbers are different from those estimated in the above specifications
(around 7.5-8%), because I am not controlling for the bank fixed–effect.
An alternative to the bank within transformation is the first differencing estimator that equally
removes the bank fixed–effects. Since the the bank–year panel is only for 3 years, I can basically
run two separate cross–sectional regression by taking the difference of the growth rate of lending in
2011 against the growth rate of lending in 2010 or 2009. Table 1.13 presents the results.
Table 1.13: IV: Political Ownership in the Cross–Section (differencing)
2011-2010 2011-2009
Par Zero Parzero Par Zero Parzero
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SovShock/std.dev -6.424∗∗ -5.189∗∗ -5.482∗∗ -8.593∗∗∗ -7.149∗∗∗ -7.482∗∗∗
(3.145) (2.087) (2.340) (3.214) (2.751) (2.750)
N (=N of banks) 72 72 72 70 70 70
1st stage F–stat 4.541 14.89 10.48 5.007 13.95 10.79
Cluster robust s.e. errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the difference in the growth rate of domestic loans between 2011 and 2010
or between 2011 and 2009. SovShock is the bank–specific sovereign loss. Columns (1) and (4) use the par
bond assumption in the calulation of the duration; columns (2) and (5) the zero coupon bond assumption
and finally columns (3) and (6) take an average of the two. All other bank balance sheet controls are defined
as before (not shown). All std.err. are clustered at the bank level.
First of all, even in this case the sovereign shock calculated under the par–bond assumption suffers
from a weak instruments problem, as the F–stat is below 10. However, both the zero coupon and
the average of zero and par bond deliver higher F–statistics and have significant coefficients. The
numbers are now much closer to the one estimated with the within–estimator, as expected: a one
standard deviation increase in the sovereign shock reduces the growth rate of lending by around 5
to 7%, depending on the specification.
Effect on Syndicated Loans Volume As a further robustness check, I can run the same regres-
sion model on the volume of syndicated loans as in Popov and Van Horen (2013). The advantage
of using syndicated loan data is that one knows the identity and the location of the borrower, so
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Table 1.14: Volume of syndicated loans by country
log(Loansb,c,t) = β1SovShockb,t + ηb + λc,t +
γ′Xb,t−1 + b,c,t
Country– Country– US & EU
Borrower FE Quarter FE Borrowers
(1) (2) (3)
SovShock/std.dev. −8.735∗∗∗ −5.678∗ −7.628∗∗
(2.354) (3.105) (3.835)
N 5617 5617 3559
N of banks 74 74 74
bank FE yes yes yes
country–borrower FE yes no no
country×quarter FE no yes yes
Bank controls: Tier1(+), Profits(+), NPL(-), Dep(-), Cash(+)
Cluster robust s.e. in parentheses
* p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the volume of syndicated loans of bank b to
country c at quarter t. SovShock is the bank–specific sovereign loss; other
balance sheet variables are defined as before. Column (1) controls for country–
borrower FE; column (2) country×year FE; column (3) country×quarter FE.
All std.err. have been clustered at the bank level.
that the country–time fixed–effects is a better control for credit demand. The disadvantage how-
ever is that the exact loan breakdown for each lender in the syndicate is not available for the vast
majority of loans, so that one needs to create some “artificial” variation. I follow Popov and Van
Horen (2013) and divide the loan equally among syndicate members whenever the exact loan shares
are not available. The loans are then aggregated at the bank–country–borrower pair at a quarterly
frequency. There are a total of 95 country-borrowers, both advanced and emerging markets, for a
total of 12,067 loans made by 74 EBA banks over the 2009-2012 period. The results are provided
in Table 1.14: column (1) controls only for a country–borrower fixed–effects, column (2) adds an
interaction with the quarter dummies: the results imply that, for a one standard deviation increase
in the sovereign shock, lending contracts, on average, by 5% to 8%.
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1.4.2 Loan Interest Rates
So far, I have shown that European banks with larger losses from sovereign debt tightened their
credit supply by reducing aggregate and syndicated lending. However, there is another dimension to
credit supply: loan prices or interest rates 25. If, controlling for credit demand, we see equilibrium
interest rates on loans rising, then it must be because of a negative credit supply shock. Since,
in the model, banks are assumed to be monopolistically competitive, substituting the equilibrium
condition for loans in the downward sloping demand function gives an equilibrium interest rate, rLt ,
as an increasing function of the sovereign shock.
I show that indeed interest rate spreads are on average 40 to 65 bps. higher, depending on the
specification, in deals where lenders are hit with a one standard deviation shock to their sovereign
portfolio. I am restricting the analysis to banks listed as Lead Arrangers (LA), assuming that these
are the relevant lenders with the pricing power in each deal 26. The sample includes deals with
multiple LA, which make up for more than half of the total deals (the median is 2 arrangers per
deal as shown in Table 1.2). Therefore, if I were to run the model using the multiple LA sample,
significance values would be inflated because of repeated values in the dependent variable. In fact,
the all–in drawn spread is the same in each deal even if there are multiple arrangers. To address
this concern, I run the model by constructing an “artificial” average bank, averaging over balance
sheet variables and, especially, the sovereign shock across banks in each syndicated loan. Thus here
the sovereign shock is the average shock across lenders (LA) in each deal.
Table 1.15 presents the results. In column (1) I control for country–quarter fixed–effects, whereas
in column (2) I exploit the finer disaggregation of the loan–level data and control for country–
25A loan has also other non price terms, such as maturity, collateral and debt covenants. However, I do not find
any effect of the sovereign shock on these measures. In particular, I do not find evidence that banks with more
losses increase maturity of syndicated loans or that debt covenants become tighter (using the covenants strictness
measures defined in Murfin (2012)). I do not have good data on the collateral quality.
26Admittedly, this assumption may fail if most of the bargaining power in the syndicate is in the hands of the
“marginal” participant that is needed to close a deal. To address this concern, in a robustness test I run the model
on single–lender deals only.
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Table 1.15: Interest Rate Loan Spreads. Spreadb,f,t =
β1SovShockb,t + ηb + λc,i,t + φ
′Ff,t + γ′Xb,t−1 +
b,f,t
Country– Firm
Country– industry– borrower
quarter FE quarter FE controls
(1) (2) (3)
SovShock/std.dev. 40.78∗∗∗ 40.40∗∗ 65.41∗∗
(10.87) (0.011) (29.21)
Leverage ratio 77.40∗∗
(33.82)
Log(Assets) −40.50∗∗∗
(11.41)
EBITDA/Sales −12.29
(16.51)
Investment/Assets −4.160∗∗∗
(1.158)
N 5147 5147 949
bank FE yes yes yes
country×quarter FE yes no no
country×industry
×quarter FE no yes yes
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the (log of) the all-in drawn spread on
loans made by Lead Arranger b to firm f at quarter t. SovShock is the
bank–specific sovereign loss at a quarterly frequency, divided by its standard
deviaion; other balance sheet variables are defined as before. Column (1)
controls for country–borrower FE; column (2) country×year FE; column (3)
country×quarter FE. All std.err. have been clustered at the bank level.
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industry–quarter fixed–effects 27. Basically, in column (2) I am comparing the interest rate charged
by an (average) bank hit with a one standard deviation shock and a bank not hit by the shock
when they lend to the corporate borrowers in the same sector, country and quarter. In terms of
the model in Section 3, I am allowing for the demand shifter to be not just country–time specific
(λc,t), but country–industry–time specific (λc,i,t). The results suggest that the interest rate loans
made by banks hit with a one–standard deviation shock 28 are 40 bps (one quarter of the standard
deviation of interest rates) higher than banks with no shock. Furthermore, column (3) uses the
DealScan–Compustat sample to control for firm–level characteristics. The effect of the shock is still
positive and significant and it implies an even larger effect of 65 bps increase in spreads for a one
standard deviation increase in the shock. Other firm characteristics have the expected sign: more
levered and smaller firms pay higher interest rate spreads 29.
The regressions in Table 1.15 are robust to changing the various assumptions underlying the
construction of the sample. In particular, to ease concerns that the results are driven by outliers
that skew the shock distribution for the “artificial” average bank, in Table 1.16 column (1) I restrict
the sample to the largest LA by total assets in each deal. These banks are mostly global banks with
smaller shocks and they are more likely to be those with the most pricing power in each deal: the
effect is just slightly smaller, 30 vs 40 bps higher. Furthermore, if one worries that the assumption
of assigning the pricing power to LA is not accurate, column (2) analyzes single–lender deal only,
nearly half of which are listed as non–LA in DealScan: the effect is larger than in the baseline
specification (63 bps.), although significant at around 5% only. In the rest of the columns in Table
27I cannot control for firm– or firm–time fixed–effects because I do not observe many firms borrowing in more than
one deal in my sample. In fact, the average maturity of syndicated loans is 5 years and I am focusing on a 3 year
window, 2010-2012
28The standard deviation of the sovereign shock in this sample is about 0.2% or 20 bps in terms of losses over
total assets. No bank has quarterly losses of 1% of total assets, so I find it more realistic to provide the results
normalizing by the standard deviation
29The result is not driven by the inclusion of firms’ covariates. In an unreported robustness test, running the
regression on the Dealscan–Compustat sample without including borrowers’ balance sheet characteristics yields
the same result.
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1.16 I run other robustness cheks. Column (3) and (4) distinguish between credit lines or term
loans, keeping the average bank assumption. The effect of the shock appears not to be significant
for credit lines, but it is significant and even stronger for term loans. Finally Column (5) adds two
loan characteristics: the (log of) maturity and the (log of) loan amount. As expected, larger loans
and those with shorter maturities have higher interest rate spreads, but the effect of the sovereign
shock is still positive and significant.
Table 1.16: Interest Rate Spreads Robustness Tests
Largest Single Credit Term Loan
LA Lender Lines Loans controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SovShock/std.dev. 30.31∗∗ 63.70∗ 15.57 76.27∗∗∗ 30.89∗∗
(14.57) (32.25) (19.64) (23.38) (13.13)
Log(Loan Size) −26.37∗∗∗
(4.021)
Log(Maturity) 40.40∗∗∗
(4.338)
N 5147 1372 2346 2377 5074
bank FE yes yes yes yes yes
country×industry
×quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster robust s.e. in parentheses
* p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
In conclusion, I have shown that sovereign losses matter for credit supply not only because they
reduced the growth rate of credit, but also because they increase the interest rate spreads charged
on syndicated loans. The effect is not driven by sector specific credit demand, it does not depend on
assumptions on lenders pricing power, loan characteristics and, most importantly, holds also after I
control for borrower specific characteristics.
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1.5 The channels
I have established that the sovereign debt crisis has had a negative effect on the supply of loans
through its effect on banks’ balance sheets. In this section, I will explore two main hypotheses as to
why sovereign exposures matter for credit supply: the capital channel and the funding channel.
According to the first, banks that need to recapitalize during the crisis period prefer to do so by
shedding assets (loans) than by raising new equity. The regulatory capital target in Europe, the
Core–Tier1 ratio (CT1), is defined as common equity, including government support measures, over
Risk–Weighted Assets (RWA). Notably, government bonds receive a 0% risk weight in the calculation
of RWA. When a negative equity shock (losses on the sovereign bond portfolio in this case) occurs,
banks may go below the minimum level of regulatory capital. They can get back to the target ratio
by either raising equity or by reducing risky assets, especially in the loan portfolio. However, we
know that equity is a relatively costly source of finance (Myers and Majluf (1984)), so that a bank
may be reluctant to issue new shares, especially at a time of low stock prices 30. If this is the case,
and capital constraints are binding, cutting off loan supply, thus reducing RWA, seems the only
viable alternative to increase the capital ratio 31. Therefore, this channel may not be at work if
capital constraints are not binding and the potential sovereign losses are not realized on bank books.
It is difficult to ascertain whether capital constraints are binding in practice, because theoretical
models (Repullo and Suarez (2009)) predict that banks would hold capital buffers well in excess of
the minimum requirement, but could still find the constraint binding in their optimization problem.
As I discuss at the end of this sections, there are reasons to believe that capital constraints were
not binding over this period. Regarding the accounting value of sovereign losses, it is true that
30Other ways to increase equity without issuing new shares include: increase retained earnings (difficult to do in the
short term), debt–to–equity and hybrid shares conversion (widely used according to EBA and BIS (2012) reports).
31According to EBA and BIS Quarterly reports (2012), another way to reduce RWA without asset shedding is to
change the risk weights used in internal models. Apparently, these changes were pre–agreed with regulators and
they were used extensively during the sovereign debt crisis. I take this into account normalizing equity by total
assets as well as RWA.
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on average 40% of banks’ sovereigns are in the HTM banking book, where they are not marked–
to–market. However, according to the EBA September 2011 recommendation, capital had been
assessed net of valuation losses on the sovereign portfolio. Banks had to mark–to–market their
whole sovereign portfolio, including the HTM banking book. Thus, in principle, these losses had to
appear on banks’ books and banks had to put up capital against it 32.
The funding channel, on the other hand, suggests that losses on sovereign bonds matter for credit
supply because they impair banks’ ability to refinance on the wholesale market, especially in the
secured interbank market (repos). Government bonds are the preferred source of collateral used for
interbank repos, where the size of the haircut, the repo rate and the maturity depend on the perceived
risk of the collateral 33. When tensions on sovereign markets reached high levels in 2010–2012, banks
lacked an important source of funding and this could have reduced the capacity to provide credit
to the real economy (Gonzalez–Paramo (2011)). For example, Figure 1.5, which I obtained from
the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) survey, shows that by June 2012 virtually
no European bank could use Greek, Irish or Portuguese debt as collateral for interbank repos 34.
My measure of the sovereign shock represents a proxy for the average quality of the collateral that
banks can post on the interbank market. Admittedly, since the ECB eligibility criteria and haircuts
for collateral have been less stringent than market ones throughout the debt crisis, the total effect
on the funding channel may be ambiguous. In fact, if banks could not refinance on the open market,
they could always resort to the ECB marginal lending facility that switched to a fixed rate auction
with full allotment in late 2008 or, especially, participate in the 3–year longer–term refinancing
32Sovereign exposures in the AFS book are measured at fair–value and exposures in the HTM are valued “in a
conservative fashion, reflecting market prices as of 30 September 2011” (EBA, Methodology for Recap Exercise
2011).
33The European repo market is fundamentally different from the US one. Mostly it is bilateral and traded via a
central clearinghouse. The haircuts are set by the clearinghouse and not by market participants, however they are
still affected by market developments (see Boissel et al.(2014)).
34The absence of “bad” banks with “bad” collateral has led some (Mancini et al. (2013)) to conclude that the repo
market was very resilient, even in crises periods. Boissel et al. (2014), using micro data on bilateral repos broken
down by country, show instead that average repo rates in GIIPS countries increase with the sovereign CDS.
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operations (LTRO) in December 2011 and February 2012 that injected a total of e1.1 tn. in the
banking system (Drechsler et al. (2012)).
Table 1.17: The Capital and the Funding Channel
Capital Capital Funding Funding Both
Channel: Channel: Channel Channel: Channels
Regulatory Leverage 2008Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lowT ier1/RWA -0.00265 -0.0401
(0.019) (0.033)
lowT ier1/TA 0.00204
(0.051)
highShortTermFund -0.0246 -0.0194
(0.042) (0.042)
SovShock −4.049∗∗ −3.504∗ −3.538∗∗ −3.521∗∗ −3.240∗
(1.612) (1.81) (1.681) (1.714) (1.667)
SovShock× 0.157 0.624
lowT ier1/RWA (0.509) (0.438)
SovShock× -1.243
lowT ier1/TA (1.597)
SovShock× −1.707∗∗∗ −2.938∗∗ −2.106∗∗∗
highShortTermFund (0.788) (1.276) (0.749)
Shock+Shock× −3.892∗∗ −2.615
lowT ier1/RWA (1.79) (1.799)
Shock+Shock× −4.743∗∗∗
lowLeverageRatio = 1 (1.719)
Shock+Shock× −5.235∗∗∗ −6.459∗∗∗ −5.347∗∗∗
highShortTermFund = 1 (1.387) (1.648) (1.347)
N 217 216 216 216 216
N of clusters 89 89 89 89 89
bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
country*time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Bank controls: Tier1(+)***, Profits(+)*** , NPL(-)***, Dep(-), Cash(+)
Cluster robust s.e. in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of domestic loans ∆Loansb,c,t. lowTier1 nogovhelpb,t takes
value 1 if the bank is below the 25th pct. of the level of Tier1 ratio in year t, 0 otherwise; lowLeverageRatiob,t
is equal to 1 if the bank is below the 25th pct. of the level of the leverage ratio (CommonEquity/Total Assets)
in year t, 0 otherwise; highShortTermFundb,t takes value 1 if the bank is above the 75
th pct. in short–
term funding over total funding in year t, 0 otherwise; other balance sheet variables (Tier1, Deposits/Assets,
PreTaxProfits/Assets, Cash/Assets) are defined as before. Standard errors are clustered at the bank–level.
Table 1.17 explores the capital and the funding channel in greater detail. The dependent variable
in all regression is the growth rate of domestic loans, as in the baseline results. Column (1) tests
for the presence of the capital channel by interacting the sovereign shock with a dummy variable,
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lowT ier1/RWAb,t, that takes value one if the bank, in each year, has a low regulatory capital
(below the 25th pct.) and zero otherwise. The slope coefficient on the sovereign shock is significant
and negative for all banks, regardless of the level of regulatory capital, but there appears to be no
additional negative effect for poorly capitalized banks. If anything, in the subtable I show that the
total impact of a 1% increase in the sovereign losses over assets ratio on loan growth seems to be
smaller in absolute value for low capitalized banks (-3.9%) than for the other banks (-4.7%), but the
difference is not statistically significant. Using other thresholds to define the dummy lowT ier1b,t
(either higher (50th), lower (10th) or fixed thresholds imposed by the EBA (5% in 2010 9% in 2011))
give similar results (not shown in the table).
Column (2) explores the capital channel using another definition of bank capital, the actual
leverage ratio, defined as Tier1 equity over Total Assets (not RWA), as it appears in Basel III rules.
In fact, even though sovereign losses may not have an impact on regulatory equity, the bank may
still decide to de–leverage so to ease investors’ concerns on the solvency of the bank. In fact, even
though market participants may not care about regulatory equity and the results of stress tests,
they are still interested in the overall solvency of the institution. Accordingly, the dummy used in
the interaction in column (2), lowT ier1/TAb,t, is equal to one if the bank is below the 25
th pct.
of the distribution of the leverage ratio in each year and zero otherwise. The interaction term is
not statistically significant and the baseline effect for the banks with a leverage ratio above the first
quartile is significant only at around 5%. However, if I compute the total effect of the sovereign
shock on credit growth for banks that have a low leverage ratio, I find that it is larger (-4.73%) than
the total effect for banks with low regulatory capital ratio (-3.8%) and it is significant at the 1%
level. This suggests that indeed some of the de–leveraging happened because of banks’ sovereign
losses, although not as a consequence of regulatory action.
Column (3) turns to the funding channel. Here the interaction is with a dummy highShort −
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−TermFundb,t that takes value 1 if the bank is above the 75th pct. in short–term funding over total
funding 35. The interaction term is negative and significant, implying that for banks with a higher
dependence on short term funding there is an additional negative effect of sovereign losses on bank
lending. The total effect of the sovereign shock for these banks is a decrease in the growth rate of
loans of 5.089% compared to 3.203% for other banks. It is also very precisely estimated. Note that
this effect is present only for banks highly dependent on this source of funding: other thresholds at
90th pct. work, but not at the 50th.
A possible concern with the regression in column (3) is that the dependence on short term funding
is endogenous, especially during a crisis: distressed banks could be forced to substitute long–term,
stable source of funding (such as customer deposits) with short term debt. So it could be that
the dummy highShortTermFundb,t is picking up solvency rather than funding liquidity concerns.
One way to address the issue is using the dependence on short term funding at the beginning of
the sample, at the end of 2008, to see if banks that “normally” fund themselves with short–term
debt have been differentially impacted by the sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, column (4) defines
highShortTermFundb,t to be the dependence on short term funding before the sovereign debt crisis,
at the beginning of 2009 (2008Q4). The dummy itself, not being time varying, cannot be included
in the fixed–effect regression. I still find an additional negative kick for banks highly dependent on
short term funding, the total effect is even larger than before, implying a decrease in domestic loan
growth of around 6.5%.
Finally, column (5) tests the joint hypothesis that both the regulatory capital and funding channels
are working at the same time. Similar results, not shown, apply with the leverage ratio as a measure
for the capital channel. It appears that the funding channel largely dominates the capital channel.
35Bankscope provides a variable called Other Deposits and Short–Term Funding that captures all short term funding
not classifiable as customer deposits. This includes interbank repos, but also short term certificates of deposits
and all non depository sources of funding. So it is only an imperfect measure of interbank funding, but it should
nonetheless capture the extent to which a bank is exposed to a short–term funding shock.
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In fact, the estimate of the sovereign shock for the low capitalized banks is much attenuated (-2.6%)
and less precisely estimated. On the other hand, the effect for those highly dependent of short term
funding is more negative (-5.3%) and significant.
In conclusion, the data seem to support the hypothesis that high sovereign debt exposure to risky
sovereign debt affected banks’ cost of funding rather than the cost of capital, consistent with the
simple theoretical model provided in Section 3. I interpret the absence of the capital channel as
a sign that capital constraints were not binding over this period. In fact, the forbearance by the
EBA in enforcing the capital requirements may be responsible for this: banks were given plenty
of leeway into how they could address regulatory capital shortfalls. According to EBA and BIS
(2012) reports, almost a third (28%) of the aggregate shortfall in capital by EBA banks could
be fulfilled with debt–to–equity and other hybrid shares conversion, rather than by issues of new
equity. Notably, Banco Santander of Spain was allowed a e6.83 bil. debt–to–equity conversion vis–
a–vis a capital shortfall of e15.3 bil. Another 10% would come from changes to internal models to
calculate risk–weights, which were pre–approved by regulators. This type of regulatory (in–)action
is perfectly understandable given that risk based capital requirements tend to be pro–cyclical (they
rise during recessions), regulators may be reluctant to impose additional capital buffers that would
just exacerbate the crisis. On the other hand, market discipline would make funding problems
unavoidable for banks. If participants in the interbank market believe that the government bonds
posted as collateral by a bank are not of sufficient quality or other lenders in general perceive the
bank as risky, they may reduce the amount of money they lend to that bank (i.e. an increase in
the haircut) or increase the repo rate. There would not be any forbearance on part of other market
participants and the bank, unable to borrow on the market, has to cut loan supply .
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1.5.1 Bank–specific Cost of Funding: Bond Issuance
In the previous section I have provided evidence that sovereign losses matter for banks’ cost of
funding. Government bonds are special in this respect because they provide a source of collateral
for secured interbank transactions (repos). Ideally, in order to test the hypothesis that sovereign
losses increased banks’ cost of funding, I would look at bank specific repo rates, but unfortunately
these data are not available at the bank level and are anonymized (Boissel et al. (2014)). However,
the results above are consistent with a broader view of the funding channel. In fact, banks with higher
exposure to risky sovereign debt are perceived as more risky by all types of lenders, not only other
banks. Therefore, it could be that other sources of funding are also affected by sovereign exposures.
One such source for which data are available are banks’ bonds issuance from SDC Platinum.
I focus on fixed–rate 36 coupon bonds issued by European banks and their subsidiaries. There is a
total of 2,343 bonds with coupon rate data issued by EBA banks or their subsidiaries between 2009
and 2012 available on SDC Platinum. There are 110 different issuers, 49 of which are subsidiaries
of 61 EBA banks. A third of the sample (787 bonds) comes from banks in the UK, another half
(1,062 bonds) from Dutch, German, French and Italian banks, while non–European banks affiliated
to banks in the EBA sample only issued 186 bonds. Table 1.18 contains some summary statistics
for the SDC sample. The bonds issues are quite large, with an average of $373 bil., they are quite
skewed towards the right (the median is $63 mil.) and they have an average coupon rate of 3.7%.
The average maturity, which is also the median and the mode, is five years, with very few bonds
(27 issues) with maturities shorter than one year. Finally, the ratings, which are available for 75%
of the bonds, are very high: the top 25% are of the highest quality (Aaa), but even the bottom 25%
is of a high–quality grade (Aa3).
It is important to keep in mind that this source of bank funding is not short–term, as the average
36Floating or Indexed bonds do not have a coupon rate
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Table 1.18: SDC Platinum Bonds Issuance Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min 25th 50th 75th Max
Coupon (%) 2343 3.73 2.14 0.01 2.12 3.5 5 11.25
Maturity (years) 2327 4.79 2.38 0 3 5 6 10
Principal ($ mil.) 2343 373.4 648.3 0.046 12.9 62.9 399.4 658
Moody’s rating 1750 Ba3 Aa3 Aa2 Aaa Aaa
bond maturity is around five years. Thus it is very different from repos, which are mostly overnight
or with maturity less than a week (ECB (2012)). Nonetheless it could still be true that banks with
higher sovereign losses are perceived as more risky and they need to offer higher coupon rates for
medium and long–term bonds. I test this hypothesis below.
The empirical specification I employ in this section is very similar to the one used so far in the
paper, but with bond coupon rates as the dependent variable. Specifically:
Couponb,k,t = β1SovExpb,t + γ
′Xb,t−4 + α′Xk,t + ηb + λb,c,t + b,k,t
where Couponb,k,t is the coupon rate of bond k issued by bank b (which could be an EBA bank
or a subsidiary) in quarter t; SovExpb,t is the sovereign shock for an EBA bank b measured on a
quarterly basis, as in the analysis for syndicated loans. Therefore, even if the bond is issued by a
subsidiary the sovereign shock is measured at the parent bank level, as in the analysis of foreign
loans. Xb,t−4 are group b characteristics at the beginning of the year and Xk,t are bond–specific
characteristics, such as maturity and rating. I also control for λb,c,t, a set of country–quarter (or
year) fixed–effects for the country of the parent bank (or issuer, either parent or subsidiary) and a
set of bank (i.e issuer) fixed–effects, ηb. Table 1.19 presents the results.
An increase in the sovereign shock by one standard deviation (20 bps.) increases the coupon rate
by 25 to 50 bps., depending on the specification. All specifications include bank controls, issuer and
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maturity (in years) fixed–effects, but use a different set of country–time fixed effects. Columns (1)
and (2) have country–year effects, either for the country of the parent bank or for the country of the
issuing bank: the coefficient implies that for a 20bps. increase in the sovereign shock, the coupon
rate increases by 20–25bps, which is equivalent to one tenth of a standard deviation of coupon rates.
Column (3) uses country–quarter fixed–effects (for the country of the parent bank) and the coefficient
is quite stable, while in column (4), which also includes Moody’s ratings, the effect doubles to 52 bps.
for a one standard deviation of the sovereign shock. The sign of the coefficient on Moody’s ratings
is positive, as expected: on average, a decrease in the quality of the bond by one notch implies an
increase in the coupon rate by 30bps. Finally, column (5) includes a set of country–quarter fixed–
effects for the countries where the issuers are located, either a subsidiary or a parent bank. The
coefficient is no longer significant. This may be the result of limited variability in the independent
variable across countries and quarters, since five countries (UK, Germany, Netherlands, France and
Italy) make up 80% of the sample.
1.6 Conclusions
In this paper, I have shown that the sovereign debt crisis has had a negative real effect on credit
supply through its impact on banks’ balance sheets. Using bank–by–bank exposure data to sovereign
debt, I calculate the exact sovereign losses in banks’ portfolio and I use them as an explanatory
variable for the growth rate of loans and loan interest rate spreads. The results suggest that banks
hit by a large sovereign shock (a one standard deviation increase) had a growth rate of domestic
loans around 7.7% lower than a bank not hit by the shock. The results are robust to the elimination
of outliers (Greek banks), to differences in unobservable borrowers’ characteristics between large
and small banks, to the exclusion of the home sovereign exposure and to the assumption used to
compute the duration (zero–coupon or par bond). To provide conclusive evidence that the sovereign
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debt crisis represented a negative credit supply shock, I have also shown that global European banks
reduced lending abroad, through their international subsidiaries especially in Eastern Europe, by
the same amount as domestic loans. Moreover, I find that for a one standard deviation increase in
sovereign losses-over-total assets (15–20bps.), banks charge interest rate spreads 40 to 65 bps. higher,
even after controlling for industry unobserved heterogeneity and corporate borrower characteristics.
I also attempt to shed some light on the mechanisms as to why sovereign losses matter for bank
lending. I find evidence for a funding channel over a capital channel : sovereign losses affect dis-
proportionately more the growth rate of credit for those banks with a higher share of short term
funding rather than those with low level of capitalization. I interpret the results as forbeareance
from the European regulator (EBA) in enforcing capital requirements in a time of crisis, but market
discipline from market participants.
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Table 1.19: Fixed Coupon Rates and the Sovereign Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SovShock/std.dev. 24.66∗∗∗ 21.62∗∗∗ 30.35∗∗∗ 52.39∗∗ 25.19
(7.664) (7.159) (11.43) (20.54) (22.42)
Moody’s 0.319∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗
(0.118) (0.126)
Bank Controls: Tier1(–), Profits(+), NPL(–), Dep(–), Cash(–)**
Issuer FE yes yes yes yes yes
Years of maturity FE yes yes yes yes yes
Countryparent–year FE yes no no no no
Countryissuer–year FE no yes no no no
Countryparent–quarter FE no no yes yes no
Countryissuer–quarter FE no no no no yes
N 1876 1876 1876 1391 1391
N of issuers 105 105 105 90 90
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: the dependent variable is the coupon rate of fixed–coupon bonds. All specifications include
a bank (issuer) fixed–effect, a set of dummies for the maturity of the bond (in years) and bank
controls. Column (1) includes a country–year FE for the country of the parent bank; column (2) a
country–year effect for the country of the issuing bank (either a subs or the parent); column (3)–(4)
a country–quarter effect for the country of the parent bank and finally column (5) a country–quarter
effect for the country of the issuing bank. Moody’s ratings are in a scale from 1 (Aaa) to 5 (Ba3).
All std.err. have been clustered at the bank (issuer) level.
Table 1.20: Political banks and Performance. Dependent variable: Political ownership (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2010 2010 2011 2011
NPL/TAb,t 0.0171
∗ 0.0233 0.00766 0.0180∗
(0.00945) (0.0147) (0.00743) (0.0105)
Profits/TAb,t -3.237
∗ -2.758 2.904∗ 0.723
Assets (1.791) (3.488) (1.512) (2.626)
Log(Assets) -0.0485∗∗ -0.0567∗ -0.0694∗∗∗ -0.0694
(0.0185) (0.0286) (0.0237) (0.0466)
Cash/Assets -6.909∗∗∗ -6.584∗∗∗ -1.625 -0.231
(1.640) (2.458) (1.204) (1.634)
Tier -0.122 -0.873 -0.694 -1.369
(0.826) (1.114) (0.836) (1.287)
Dep/Assets -0.0515 -0.0691 -0.325 -0.345
(0.322) (0.468) (0.327) (0.418)
N 87 87 78 78
Country fixed–effects no yes no yes
White standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.21: Political Banks and Credit Portfolio Breakdown
Corporate Retail RetailSME RetailResMtg CRE Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Politicalb -0.0440 -0.120
∗ -0.0224∗ -0.0892 -0.0267∗ 0.116∗∗
(0.0475) (0.0624) (0.0131) (0.0615) (0.0142) (0.0437)
log(TAb,t−1) 0.00895 -0.0225 -0.00947∗ -0.0171 -0.00166 -0.00381
(0.0121) (0.0151) (0.00527) (0.0168) (0.00382) (0.00761)
T ier1/RWAb,t−1 -1.024∗ 0.335 0.251 -0.0726 -0.203 0.398
(0.535) (0.621) (0.442) (0.653) (0.233) (0.449)
Dep/TAb,t−1 -0.0723 0.418∗∗∗ 0.0250 0.287∗∗ -0.00146 -0.281∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.120) (0.0702) (0.135) (0.0418) (0.104)
Cash/TAb,t−1 0.669 1.341 -0.404 1.005 -0.551∗ -1.062
(0.876) (1.179) (0.425) (1.174) (0.317) (0.726)
NPL/TAb,t−1 0.582 -2.181∗∗ 0.539 -2.538∗∗∗ 0.259 -0.645
(0.764) (0.931) (0.414) (0.895) (0.291) (0.613)
Prof/TAb,t−1 5.313∗∗∗ -0.854 1.347 -2.539 -0.628 0.220
(1.791) (2.160) (1.527) (2.416) (0.772) (1.422)
N 78 78 78 78 78 78
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: this table shows the differences in the credit portfolio between government–owned and private
banks using EBA data on Exposures at Default (EAD) from the 2011 Stress Test, referring to December
2010. The dependent variables are the shares of the total EAD to all countries in the following portfolios,
as classified by the EBA: Corporate excluding Commercial Real Estate, Retail excluding Commercial
Real Estate, Retail of which Small–Medium–Enterprises (SME), Commercial Real Estate, Institutions
(public entities).
Table 1.22: Political Banks and Credit to Institutions
Home Foreign Home DomSov
Institutions Institutions Institutions /TotSov
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Politicalb 0.0995
∗∗∗ 0.0160
(0.0323) (0.0215)
Politicalb×non–GIIPSbanks 0.123∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0695)
Politicalb×GIIPSbanks 0.0418∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(0.0235) (0.107)
N 78 78 78 78
Other Bank Controls: log(TA),Tier1/RWA,Dep/TA,Cash/TA,NPL/TA,Prof/TA
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: this table shows the differences in the Institutions (public entities) credit port-
folio between government–owned and private banks using EBA data on Exposures at
Default (EAD) from the 2011 Stress Test, referring to December 2010. The dependent
variables are the share in lending to domestic public institutions over the total (column
(1) and (3)), the share to foreign public institutions (column (2)). Finally, column (4)
has the share in domestic sovereign bonds over total sovereign bonds.
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A Simple Model of Bank Lending This section describes a simple model of bank lending.
The purpose of the model is to help understanding the identification assumptions underlying the
empirical strategy. In particular, it spells out the assumptions on loan demand under which, as a
result of sovereign losses, a credit supply shock can be identified using banks’ balance sheet data.
The baseline model is a modified version of Stein (1998)’s paper on banking with adverse selection
and it is similar to Ehrmann et al. (2003).
Bank b needs to satisfy the following balance sheet constraint at time t: Lb,t+Sb,t = Eb,t+Bb,t+Dt.
On the asset side, Lb,t is loans and Sb,t represents (risky) sovereign bonds. For simplicity, banks
hold no other security. These assets are funded through equity, Eb,t, short–term, interbank funding
Bb,t and customer deposits Dt. Deposits are exogenous. They pay zero interest and are demanded
by households as a mean of payment. Their demand is given by Dt = c− δrft with c, δ > 0 and rft
the risk free rate. Bank capital, under the Basel II regulation, is determined as a fraction of risky
assets (loans): Eb,t = κLb,t with κ < 1. Thus the balance sheet can be conveniently rewritten as:
Bb,t = (1− κ)Lb,t + Sb,t + c− δrft (1.4)
The interbank funding rate is:
rBb,t = r
f
t + µ1X(Sb,t−1) + µ2f(Xb,t−1) with ∂x/∂S > 0, µ1 > 0, µ2 >> 0 (1.5)
where X is an increasing function of the level of lagged sovereign exposure and f is a function of
other predetermined bank characteristics (Xb,t−1 is a k× 1 vector). µ1 is a positive constant and µ2
is a k × 1 vector of positive constants. Thus, if the bank is more heavily exposed to risky sovereign
debt Sb,t, it will face a higher cost of funding for short–term sources of funds. The partial derivatives
of the function f(·) with respect to the components of the vector Xb,t−1 are negative if the element
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of the vector is a “good” bank characteristic, positive otherwise 37. These characteristics are not
explicitly modeled here. One should think about these as endogenous, but predetermined variables
that determined the bank’s cost of funding. Likewise, sovereign bonds are an endogenous choice
variable, but they are predetermined in determining the bank funding rate for short term funds.
I acknowledge this fact in the empirical strategy by estimating the model through the dynamic
panel GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)). Additionally, I can address the endogeneity of
sovereign exposure via instrumental variable techniques. I use the percentage of political ownership
in each bank as an instrument for its domestic sovereign exposure. Section 4 explains the IV strategy
thoroughly.
Thus, in the model, the sovereign shock matters for banks because it increases the cost of funding,
but it does not directly affect equity. Any negative equity shock is ruled out because the amount
equity is simply tied to the level of risky assets (loans) through the Tier 1 capital ratio. The data
seem to support this assumption, as there is evidence that banks with higher dependence on short
term funding, and not undercapitalized banks, were more negatively affected by the sovereign shock.
Section 7 analyzes this aspect in greater detail.
Banks are monopolistically competitive in the loan market and they all face a downward sloping
loan demand when they lend in country c:
LDb,c,t = −α0rLb,t + α1,c,tλc,t with α0, α1,c,t > 0 (1.6)
where λc,t is an aggregate demand shifter in country c at time t and r
L
b,t is the loan interest rate
charged to borrowers, α0 is the loan interest rate elasticity and α1,c,t is the impact of the country
demand shifter which is allowed to vary over country and time. Notice that c is not necessarily
37In the empirical part, the “good” characteristics are going to be capitalization, profitability and liquidity while the
“bad” one is the average quality of the loan portfolio
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the country where the bank is headquartered, as banks can lend internationally through their sub-
sidiaries. However, in the empirical section, I assume that no bank directly lends to more than one
country: the international subsidiaries are part of the group, but are independently managed.
There are several assumptions behind this loan demand schedule. First of all, since it contains
only the loan rate, it implicitly assumes that substitution with other forms of finance is impossible.
This may be extreme, but it is nonetheless a good approximation for many corporate borrowers in
Europe for which bank funding is the predominant form of credit. Bank debt over total external
financing for non financial firms is, on average, well above 80% in most European countries (see
Altomonte et al. (2011)). Second, it assumes that loan demand is homogeneous across banks within
the same country. In fact, the demand shifter is at the country–aggregate level and it is not bank–
specific. Its impact (α1,c,t) is the same for all banks within a country. Also, notice that the interest
rate elasticity (α0) is the same for all banks. This rules out, for instance, that borrowers of large and
small banks have different interest rate sensitivities. I can somewhat relax this set of assumptions
in the empirical exercise. For example, I allow the elasticity α1,c,t and α0 to vary between large and
small banks. When analyzing loan interest rates, the demand shifter is not only country specific,
but country and sector specific.
Banks maximize the future discounted value of dividends (see Appendix for detail) by choosing
sequences of loans Lb,t and sovereign holdings Sb,t:
max
Sb,t,Lb,t
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi(rLb,t−1+iLb,t−1+i + r
S
t−1+iSb,t−1+i − rBb,t−1+iBb,t−1+i − κLb,t+i − φ(Lb,t+i))
s.to (1.5) and (1.6). Note that Bt is determined residually from (1.4) once Lb,t and Sb,t are chosen.
rS is the rate of return on risky sovereign (exogenous to the bank) and φ(Lb,t) represent costs
associated to banking activities, such as evaluation of credit rating of the customer, administering
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and monitoring the loan. I assume a quadratic cost of servicing the loans plus a bank–specific
component: φ(Lb,t) = b0/2L
2
b,t + ηbLb,t.
Imposing loan market clearing and substituting in (1.4) and (1.5), the FOC for loans and sovereigns
are:
(L) : Lb,t =
1
2β + b0α0
(−(1− κ)α0µ1X(Sb,t−1)− (1− κ)α0µ′2f(Xb,t−1) + α1,c,tλc,t
− (1− κ)βα0rft − α0(ηb − κ))
(S) : rst −
∂x
∂Sb,t
((1− κ)Lb,t + Sb,t))− (rft + µ1X(Sb,t) + µ′2f(Xb,t)) = 0
The main empirical specification is a modified version of the first FOC 38. The level of sovereign
exposure and other balance sheet characteristics are endogenous but predetermined variables. I will
take this into account in the estimation by using the GMM Difference estimator. This dynamic
panel data estimator employs a set of lagged internal instruments for endogenous, predetermined
variables.
The coefficient in front of the sovereign shock in the first FOC is negative: it implies that as
losses on sovereign bonds increase, equilibrium loan quantity decreases. The interest rate elasticity,
α0, which is assumed to be homogenous for all banks, enters into the coefficient of the sovereign
shock. In the empirical strategy, I will somewhat relax the homogeneity assumption by interacting
the shock with bank characteristics, such as size category (large vs. small) Aggregate factors λc,t
and rft have natural proxies in country–time fixed–effects and ηb is a bank fixed–effect.
Note that, by substituting the solution for loan quantity into the loan demand schedule (1.6), a
similar equilibrium condition for the loan interest rate (rLb,t) can be found. In this case, the sign of
the coefficient in front of the sovereign shock (X(Sb,t−1)) is positive: an increase cost of funding for
38The only difference is that the regression will have ∆Lb,t rather than Lb,t as dependent variable.
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banks translate into an increase in the cost of capital for firms. This motivates the regression of the
interest rate spread on syndicated loans.
To summarize, in this section I showed that, in a simple model of bank lending, tensions on
the sovereign bond market, by increasing banks’ cost of funding, decrease the loan quantity at
equilibrium. According to this model, in order to identify a credit supply channel of banks’ exposure
to sovereign debt, loan demand needs to be homogenous across banks within the same country and
time. Specifically, the demand shifter is at the country–time level or country–sector level in the
empirical specification with loan interest rates. The loan interest rate elasticity is assumed to be the
same for all banks or, at best, the same by size category (large vs. small).
57
Chapter 1 Bank Lending and the Sovereign Debt Crisis
Figure 1.1: GIIPS Sovereign Exposures, March 2010. EBA Stress Test 2010
Figure 1.2: GIIPS Sovereign Exposures over Total Assets, March 2010. EBA Stress Test 2010
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Figure 1.3: Domestic Loans Growth Rate to Non–Financial Corporations. ECB, MFI Aggregate
Statistics
Figure 1.4: Average Interest Spread (on ECB Policy Rate) for New Loans to Non–Financial Corpora-
tions. ECB, MFI Aggregate Statistics (Narrowly Defined Effective Rates, all maturities
and amounts).
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Figure 1.5: Share of GIIPS Collateral in Private GC Repo Market
Source: International Capital Market Association (ICMA) Survey, June 2013
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Table 1.23: List of EBA banks
EBA CROSS 2009Q4
CODE BANK NAME BORDER (2010Q1) 2010Q4 2011Q4
AT001 Erste Bank Group (EBG) Y Y Y Y
AT002 Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI) N Y Y Y
AT003 Oesterreichische Volksbank Y N Y N
BE004 Dexia Y Y Y N
BE005 KBC Bank Y Y Y Y
CY006 Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki) Y Y Y Y
CY007 Bank of Cyprus N Y Y Y
DE017 Deutsche Bank Y Y Y Y
DE018 Commerzbank Y Y Y Y
DE019 Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg N Y Y Y
DE020 DZ Bank Y Y Y Y
DE021 Bayerische Landesbank N Y Y Y
DE022 Norddeutsche Landesbank N Y Y Y
DE023 Hypo Real Estate Holding AG N Y Y Y
DE024 WestLB N Y Y N
DE025 HSH Nordbank N Y Y Y
DE026 Helaba N Y N Y
DE027 Landesbank Berlin N Y Y Y
DE028 DekaBank N Y Y Y
DE029 WGZ Bank N Y Y Y
DE N/A Deutsche Postbank N Y N N
DK008 Danske Bank Y Y Y Y
DK009 Jyske Bank N Y Y Y
DK010 Sydbank N Y Y Y
DK011 Nykredit N N Y Y
ES059 Banco Santander Y Y Y Y
ES060 BBVA Y Y Y Y
ES061 BFA-Bankia N Y Y N
ES062 La Caixa N Y Y Y
ES N/A BASE N Y N N
ES083 CAM N N Y N
ES063 Effibank N N Y N
ES064 Banco Popular Espanol Y Y Y Y
ES065 Banco De Sabadell N Y Y N
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ES066 DIADA - CatalunyaCaixa N Y Y N
ES067 BREOGAN - NovaCaixaGalicia N Y Y N
ES068 Mare Nostrum N Y Y N
ES069 BankInter N Y Y N
ES070 Espiga N Y Y N
ES071 Banca Civica N Y Y N
ES072 Ibercaja N Y Y N
ES073 Unicaja N Y Y N
ES074 Banco Pastor N Y Y N
ES N/A Caja Sol N Y N N
ES075 Grupo BBK N Y Y N
ES076 UNNIM N Y Y N
ES077 Kutxa N Y Y N
ES078 Grupo Caja3 N Y Y N
ES N/A Caja de Cordoba N Y N N
ES079 Banca March N Y Y N
ES N/A Banco Guipuzcoano N Y N N
ES080 Caja Vital N Y Y N
ES081 Caja de Ontinyent N Y Y N
ES082 Colonya N Y Y N
FI012 OP-Pohjola Group N Y Y Y
FR013 BNP Paribas Y Y Y Y
FR014 Credit Agricole Y Y Y Y
FR015 BPCE N Y Y Y
FR016 SocGen Y Y Y Y
GB088 RBS Y Y Y Y
GB089 HSBC Y Y Y Y
GB090 Barclays Y Y Y Y
GB091 Lloyds N Y Y Y
GR030 EFG Eurobank Ergasias Y Y Y N
GR031 National Bank of Greece Y Y Y N
GR032 Alpha Bank Y Y Y N
GR033 Piraeus Bank Group Y Y Y N
GR034 ATE Bank N Y Y N
GR035 Hellenic Postbank N Y Y N
HU036 OTP Bank. Y Y Y Y
HU N/A FBH N Y N N
IE037 Allied Irish Banks Y Y Y Y
IE038 Bank if Ireland Y Y Y Y
IE039 Irish Life and Permanent N N Y Y
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IT040 IntesaSanPaolo Y Y Y Y
IT041 Unicredit Y Y Y Y
IT042 Monte dei Paschi N Y Y Y
IT043 Banco Popolare N Y Y Y
IT044 Ubi Banca N Y Y Y
LU045 BCEE N Y Y Y
LU N/A Banque Raiffeisen N Y N N
MT046 Bank of Valletta N Y Y Y
NL047 ING Bank Y Y Y Y
NL048 Rabobank Y Y Y Y
NL049 ABN AMRO N Y Y Y
NL050 SNS Bank N Y Y Y
NO051 DnB NOR Bank ASA Y N Y Y
PL052 PKO Bank N Y Y Y
PT053 Caixa Geral de Depositos Y Y Y Y
PT054 Millennium Bcp Y Y Y Y
PT055 ESFG Y Y Y Y
PT056 Banco BPI Y Y Y Y
SE084 Nordea Bank Y Y Y Y
SE085 SEB Y Y Y Y
SE086 Svenska Handelsbanken N Y Y Y
SE087 Swedbank Y Y Y Y
SI057 NLB Bank Y Y Y Y
SI058 NKBM N N Y Y
TOTAL 36 91 90 61
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The Political Origin of Home Bias: the
Case of Europe
2.1 Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis has emphasized the importance of banks’ exposure to sovereign
debt. Banks’ sovereign portfolios in Europe consist almost entirely of domestic government debt.
The average (median) own exposure, defined as the proportion of domestic debt over the total
sovereign portfolio, was 74% (86%) at the end of 2010. Figure 2.1 reveals that there is a significant
degree of heterogeneity in banks’ holdings of domestic debt within Europe: the median own exposure
is in general higher in the periphery (PIIGS) than in Northern Europe, with Germany (DE) being a
notable exception. The level of domestic exposures is well in excess of what standard finance theory
would predict: there is significant home bias (Figure 2.2) 1. In general, the home bias in sovereign
bonds among European banks is quite persistent over time (Figure 2.3) and it tends to be higher
1The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that, in frictionless financial markets, homogenous investors
would hold a share of financial asset equal to the share of the financial assets of that country in the world portfolio
(see Cochrane (2005), page 155, and Coeurdacier and Rey (2012)). In the context of sovereign bonds, we use the
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in the periphery than in Northern Europe 2. The sovereign exposures have important implications
for the real economy. During the sovereign debt crisis, banks incurred losses owing to the decline
in market value of the sovereign debt in their balance sheets and some recent papers have shown
that these potential losses are responsible for a sizable portion of the decline in lending.3 Given that
the riskiest bonds during the sovereign debt crisis were those issued by the PIIGS, the large degree
of home bias is especially troubling among PIIGS banks and it may have exacerbated the recent
recession.
In this paper, we investigate why European banks display a significant home bias in sovereign
bond holdings. We believe that certain banks hold a disproportionate amount of their own country’s
sovereign debt because they are controlled by domestic politicians. In fact, many European banks
have an explicit political participation through a block of shares owned by either the regional state in
which the bank is headquartered (Germany) or the national government (Spain, Sweden, Portugal)
or an indirect control exerted through private foundations whose directors are appointed by local
or national politicians (Italy). These politicians may be interested in financing discretionary public
spending to maximize their own objectives. These objectives may be increasing the chances of re–
election or diverting public funds to friends, relatives or controlled firms. They would then persuade
the politically controlled banks to finance national or local state borrowing by purchasing government
bonds 4.
We define our “political influence” variable as the total percentage of shares held by central or
home bias measure as defined in Coeurdacier and Rey (2012):
HomeBias = 1− Share of Foreign Sovereigns in Bank i Sovereign Holding
Share of Foreign Sovereign Bonds in the Global Portfolio
When the home bias measure is equal to zero there is perfect diversification; when it is equal to one there is perfect
home bias. Anything in excess of zero indicates some level of home bias.
2Ireland is a noticeable exception, with an extremely volatile home bias. We believe this may be due to the fact that
these are raw data that do not take into account changing composition at the bank level (mergers & acquisitions
and bank failures).
3See Bofondi et al.(2013), Popov and Van Horen (2014).
4The European Banking Authority (EBA) data we use unfortunately do not distinguish between central and local
government debt. The sovereign exposure we refer to in this paper are the sum of the two.
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local governments or by political foundations in the pre–crisis period (2006 or 2009). The reason
for using pre–crisis data is twofold: first we want to avoid biases given by bank nationalizations
that occurred in 2010–2011. In fact, during the crisis, many governments, especially in Germany,
Spain and the UK, were forced to intervene to recapitalize or bail–out insolvent banks. Thus, if we
were to measure “political influence” in 2011, we would largely overestimate the state’s presence in
the banking sector. Second, we claim that, although clearly endogenous, public ownership of these
banks is a historical, predetermined presence, thus unlikely to be correlated with the error term in
our main regression. The hypothesis we take to the data is that a bank that has a historically strong
political presence among its shareholders will purchase more domestic sovereign bonds relative to a
bank that does not receive any political pressure. We find evidence for this hypothesis both before
and during the European sovereign debt crisis: a bank above the median political control has, ceteris
paribus, a home bias of 10 to 19 percentage points higher than a bank below the median.
Moreover, we exploit the fact that there have been plenty of equity injections by each member
State in the domestic banking system in both 2010 and 2011 to document the extent of political
pressure/moral suasion on the controlled banks. We show that, during the sovereign debt crisis
and upon receiving government support, banks significantly increased their exposure to domestic
sovereign bonds only if they have strong political affiliations. The effect is twice as large for “po-
litical” banks located in the periphery (+8.9%) than for other “political” banks located elsewhere
in Europe (+4.2%). These results are not explained by other country–time factors such as higher
sovereign yields in the periphery, that would encourage purchase of sovereign bonds bonds from
peripheral banks.
But government equity injections may be specifically targeted to political banks. If this were the
case, it would not be surprising that only political banks buy domestic bonds after receiving gov-
ernment help. However, this does not appear to be the case: in 2010 and 2011, equity injections
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were not directly targeted to banks that have larger political affiliations, but rather to banks that
performed worse in the previous year in terms of lower profitability and a larger pool of non per-
forming loans. In other words, although governments seem to “twist arms” of politically controlled
institutions into buying domestic debt, they also provide financial aid to those that actually need it.
The political channel/moral suasion hypothesis is not the only explanation for the home bias in
sovereign bonds, both before and during the sovereign debt crisis. Standard information asymmetries
arguments, where the local investors are better informed about the domestic sovereign than foreign
investors, or other hedging motives may still be present. More recently, several papers explain the
increase in home bias in the PIIGS countries during the sovereign debt crisis with creditor discrim-
ination theories (Broner et al. (2014) and Brutti and Saure (2013) or as arbitrage opportunities
fueled by the ECB LTROs (Acharya and Steffen (2014)). We do not challenge these hypotheses, we
only show that politics also plays a role.
There is yet another reason for banks to hold sovereign bonds, which is sometimes refer to as
capital arbitrage. Under Basel II, government bonds are considered almost risk free5 so that banks
would load their balance sheets with sovereigns to reduce risk–weighted assets and increase capital
ratios. We argue that while the regulatory framework has certainly been a key factor in the excessive
sovereign exposure among European banks, it cannot explain home bias. In fact, the zero risk weight
applies not only to domestic sovereign debt, but to all countries in the European Union.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the related literature. In Section III, we highlight
some country-specific institutional details that are relevant to our analysis; Section IV describes the
data and the methodology used in the paper. Section V presents the results and Section VI concludes.
5According to Basel II regulation, in order to compute Risk Weight Assets (RWA), banks can use two approaches: the
Standardized Approach and the Internal–Ratings Based (IRB) approach. According to the first, government bonds
receive a 0% risk weight as in Basel I. Under the IRB instead, the weight should be strictly positive, because,
even though the model may assign a very low probability of default (PD) to a sovereign issuer, the loss given
default (LGD) is positive. In practice, PD on sovereign debt are equal 0.1% for 201 major international banks
(BIS Quarterly Review, December 2013). Moreover, in the European Union, there is a loophole that allows banks
using the IRB to switch back to the Standardized Approach when evaluating sovereign bonds (“IRB permanent
partial use”).
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2.2 Literature Review
The relationship between home bias in sovereign holdings and political influence at the bank level,
is, to the best of our knowledge, not been established in the literature.
First, we contribute to the enormous international finance literature pioneered by French and Poterba
(1991) that studies home bias in portfolio holdings. Most papers in this area have documented home
bias in equity rather than bond holdings. A few exceptions are Bertaut et al. (2013), who show
the decline in financial bonds’ home bias among U.S. investors and Lane (2006), who shows that
member countries of the European Economic and Monetary Union disproportionately invest in one
another and especially towards their trade partners. Several recent papers analyze the increase in
sovereign home bias among banks during the recent sovereign debt crisis. Battistini et al. (2014)
document that only PIIGS banks respond to increases in country risk by increasing their exposure
to domestic sovereign bonds, while banks from core countries do not, suggesting that redenomina-
tion/repatriation risk, i.e. the risk that the liabilities of banks would be renominated in the local
currency, is the driving force behind the increase in home bias. Becker and Ivashina (2014) docu-
ment a positive correlation at the country level between domestic government holdings by national
banks and aggregate measures of state ownership in the banking system. Brutti and Saure (2013)
analyze cross–country evidence in favor of the secondary market theory suggested by Broner et al.
(2014). According to this hypothesis, in a crisis period, domestic banks would buy domestic debt
in the expectation that the government will not default on domestic creditors. All these papers
analyze country level data, which ignores the cross–sectional heterogeneity at the bank level. Using
a bank-level panel, and constructing a measure of direct government ownership at the bank level,
we are able to dig deeper and provide an explanation for why some banking institutions hold a
disproportionately large amount of domestic sovereign bonds over total sovereigns.
Some theoretical papers also explore the home bias issue. Diamon and Rajan (2011) advance
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the hypothesis that banks are keen to load up with illiquid assets because the states of nature in
which these assets default is the same in which the bank itself goes bankrupt; in other words, banks
rationally put all their risk in a state of the world that would be catastrophic for them anyways
(risk synchronization). Their argument has a natural application if one considers sovereign bonds
an illiquid asset. Acharya and Rajan (2013) and Crosignani (2014) show that myopic governments
have incentives to increase risk synchronization. The evidence we find suggests that, upon receiving
liquidity injections, only the “political banks” boost their exposure to domestic government bonds
relative to foreign ones, thus synchronizing even more their default risk with that of their respective
domestic country.
Our findings also contribute to the literature on the performance of state-owned banks and to the
literature on related lending. Barth (2001) provide a broad overview on the effects of regulation and
ownership structure on the performance of the banking system. In general, they find that greater
state ownership of banks tends to be associated with less developed banks and financial markets.
Sapienza (2004) finds that firms located in areas where the party of affiliation of the bank’s chairman
is stronger receive more favorable loan conditions; Cun˜at and Garicano (2010) show that banks whose
chairman held a political position in the past perform worse than other banks. La Porta et al. (2003)
find evidence that loans extended to related parties, either family members or controlled firms, have
on average lower rates, lower collateral requirements and are more likely to default than unrelated
ones. Finally, Khwaja and Mian (2005) document that in Pakistan government banks extend a
preferential treatment to politically connected firms.
2.3 Institutional Details
There are three European countries that stand out for the pervasive and systematic role of politicians
and local governments in the management of banks: Italy, Germany and Spain. In what follows we
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provide some key features that distinguish each of these countries in terms of political presence in
the banking system. We also discuss the case of France as an example of a banking sector without
any direct political influence, at least in the last decade.
Italy
Following the wave of liberalizations and privatizations that started at the European level in the
1980s, the Bank of Italy and the government made an attempt to privatize the numerous state-owned
banks. In 1990, the Amato–Carli law transformed the state-owned banks into private entities; these
were controlled by Foundations (non–profit organizations), that would have had to place their shares
on the market at a later date to complete the privatization. In 1998, however, the Amato–Ciampi
law superseded the 1992 law, reiterating that Foundations are non-profit organizations, but adding
that these should operate under private law and not under public law as in the previous regime. As
they became private entities, they could no longer be forced to progressively sell off their shares on
the market. Thus, Foundations were able to maintain their controlling stakes in most Italian banks
to the present day.6 Importantly for our purposes, even though they became private, non-profit
entities, they are still under the influence of political groups. The members of the board of directors
in the Foundations are often appointed by local or national politicians.
Apart from one specific bank, MPS, the other four Italian banks in our dataset present more than
one Foundation among their shareholders. Moreover, most of the times, within each Foundation
there are members coming from both left and right wing parties. This degree of heterogeneity should
convey the idea that, in the majority of the cases, banks with a large concentration of Foundations
are influenced by a wide range of political parties.
6Boeri (2012) http://www.lavoce.info/i-politici-ai-vertici-delle-fondazioni-bancarie/ (in Italian)
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Germany
The German banking system is organized in three different “pillars”: private banks, such as Deutsche
Bank and Commerzbank; cooperative banks, based on a member-structure where each member has
one vote and, finally, public banks.
The latter are financial institutions, typically owned by the regional states (Lander) or by admin-
istrative districts or cities in which they are headquartered. Among these there are savings banks
(Sparkassen) whose shareholders are usually local municipalities and the regional banks (Landes-
banken), that are mostly owned by their respective Lander through a regional savings bank associ-
ation.
Thus, in the case of Germany the definition of “political banks” is clear: those that have a direct
state participation among their shareholders. In the EBA dataset, the political banks will mostly
be the Landesbanken.
Spain
Savings banks represent a fundamental pillar of the Spanish banking system: founded in the 18th
century with the objective of channeling private savings towards socially beneficially investments,
savings banks accounted for 40 percent of Spanish banks’ total assets in 2010.
They became financial institutions that do not distribute profits, that have no formal owner, but
several governing bodies representing two different classes of stakeholders: insiders and outsiders.
Insiders are employees, depositors and private founders; outsiders are the regional governments and
other public entities. The relative voting power of the two groups in each bank depends on the
specific regional law. Around a decade ago, in 2002, a national reform capped the representation of
public entities, including regional governments, at 50 percent of the voting rights in each bank 7.
7In July 2010, the ceiling on voting rights of public entities was reduced to 40 percent and professional expertise was
required to sit in a governing bodies.
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Since outsiders, i.e. the public entities, are focused on achieving socially oriented goals, improving
profitability has not always been the main objective of savings banks. In this regard, ? document
that Savings banks were more likely to open new branches and extend new loans in provinces that
were politically close; additionally, ? provide some evidence that savings banks whose chairman has
political affiliations performed worse than other banks.
France
A different path has been followed by France.8 After World War II and up to the late 1980s, almost
all banks, both investment and commercial, were either state-owned or co-operatives. The Chirac
government changed the situation when, in 1987, he privatized several major banks, including Societe
Generale and Paribas. Another wave followed few years later in 1993, with the privatization of BNP
among others. The complete privatization of the banking system was accomplished in 2001.
2.3.1 Theory of Inter-Party Support
Whereas the political influence in the case of direct state ownership (Germany, Spain) is clear, the
case of foundations’ ownership (Italy) requires a more careful analysis: certain banks are affiliated
with only one political party that is not necessarily in power at any given point in time. Monte Dei
Paschi (MPS) in Italy is an example of such a bank: it is affiliated with the centre–left municipal
government and it has a strong home bias (96%) even in 2010, when the national government is from
centre–right. For these institutions, it is not clear why a political party that is not ruling the country
would be interested in buying sovereign bonds and finance public spending of their opponents. It
may be interested in doing quite the opposite in order to destabilize the incumbent government.
We claim that there are two main reasons that may explain that behavior. First of all, local
8Alain Plessis (2003), The history of banks in France, Federation Bancaire Francaise.
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politicians can sustain a central government of the opposite political affiliation in exchange for
monetary transfers to the respective region or local municipality. There is suggestive evidence, for
the case of Italy, that regional transfers are not primarily dictated by shared political affiliation; a
more crucial determinant is the political strength of the party in the specific region, regardless of
political affiliation.9
Second, a theory that supports inter-party funding is borrowed from the political science literature.
Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) are the first to document that political parties in a wide range of
developed countries have started to behave like a cartel. Instead of competing against each other on
relevant issues, they transfer more and more competences upward to technocratic and non-partisan
commissions. Perhaps more importantly, they decided to alter the structure of payoffs: they agreed
on the introduction of public financial subventions to political parties that are guaranteed regardless
of whether a party wins or loses. This last piece of regulation severely limits the incentives to
compete in order to win the elections, as the monetary payoffs are not linked to the election’s
outcome. Hence, the concern that a bank affiliated with a leftist party would have the incentive to
destabilize the governing right wing party is clearly downsized in light of the findings of Katz and
Mair.
2.4 Data and Methodology
Data
The dataset is the result of the merger of three different sources: detailed bank level data on the
exposure to sovereign bonds and liquidity injections from the EU–wide Stress Test and Recapitaliza-
tion Exercises; information on the pre–crisis degree of political presence for each bank is collected
9Greco (2009) (mimeo).
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from Annual Reports whenever available; other balance sheet data comes from Bankscope.
The key dataset contains the information on political influence. Specifically, we want to create a
variable that captures the degree of government or politicians’ control within each bank. We also
want this measure to be dated prior to the sovereign debt crisis so as not to bias the degree of
political control with any bail out or nationalization policy that occurred in 2010–2011. Hence we
collect 2006 Annual Reports for all banks, except Spanish ones. It is in fact difficult to find Annual
Reports at earlier dates for some small Spanish Savings banks, because many were recently acquired
or merged with other banks. For this reason, we resort to IMF data, which list for each savings bank
the percentage of voting rights held by local governments prior to 2009.10 We construct the variable
Political as the sum of any participation held by the local or central governments and by political
foundations in each bank; we then normalize it by its standard deviation. We sometimes find useful
to use a dummy variable, 1(Political), which takes value of one if the degree of political control in
a specific bank is above the median of the domestic country and zero otherwise. We also create
a dummy variable, 1(Cooperative), which takes value of one if the bank is a cooperative and zero
otherwise. It is important to distinguish between a non–cooperative and cooperative bank, since the
latter display certain features that are similar to those of highly politicized banks even though they
are not owned by the state (diffuse ownership among cooperative members). Notably, cooperative
banks display a high degree of home bias in sovereign bonds, similar to political banks, probably
due to the very “local” nature of their business model.
Sovereign exposure data have been collected by the EBA in the context of the EU–wide Stress
Test and Recapitalization Exercises. Specifically in an effort to enhance transparency and restore
confidence in the financial system, the EBA decided to disclose bank-by-bank result for both the
2010 and 2011 Stress Test Results and the so-called 2011 and 2012 Recapitalization Exercises. These
10?
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exercises contain information on the capital composition, including government aid in the form of
equity support measures, credit risk exposure and sovereign debt exposure to each of the 30 members
of the European Economic Area (EEA 30) for all the participating banks. The sample consists of
90 European banks in March 2010, which we will refer to as end–of–year 2009, and December 2010;
61 banks in December 2011 and June 2012, covering at least 60% of banking assets in Europe and
at least 50% in each Member State. For December 2010 only, a breakdown of the credit portfolio
by categories of borrowers is available. For instance, we know the amount of credit granted to
private corporations, public institutions, small and medium enterprises, the exposure to residential
mortgages and the amount of defaulted loans.
Finally, we match the EBA dataset with banks’ balance sheet data obtained from Bankscope.
Empirical Methodology
To measure the effect of political presence in a bank on its degree of home bias in sovereign bonds,
we run a set of cross-sectional regressions for 2009, 2010, 2011.11 For each year we employ the
following specification:
HomeBiasi = β1Politicali + γ
′Xi + 1(Cooperativei) +Di + εi (2.1)
where HomeBiasi is one of two measures: i) the ratio of domestic bonds held by bank i over the
total European debt (OwnTS )
12 or ii) the home bias measure in Coeurdacier and Rey (2012). The first
measure is the most intuitive, but it ignores the nominal size of each country’s debt. For example, it
is reasonable for Italian and German banks to have a larger exposure to their home country’s debt
11The main variable of interest Politicali,j does not vary over time, so we cannot use panel regressions with bank
fixed effects.
12The EBA sovereign exposure data contains only countries belonging to the European Economic Area (EEA30), a
group of 30 countries which broadly coincides with the European Union. Only in December 2010 exposure to US
and Japan was disclosed, but we drop these countries from our analysis as they are only available for one year.
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than Belgian and Dutch banks because Italian and German public debt are much larger. However,
this does not pose a problem in estimation because we control for country fixed effects that also
absorb the size of a country’s debt.The second measure, on the other hand, explicitly takes this into
account. It is defined as follows in Coeurdacier and Rey (2012):
HomeBias = 1− Share of Foreign Sovereigns in Bank b Sovereign Holding
Share of Foreign Sovereigns in the Global Portfolio
where Global is represented by the EEA30 countries in our data. This measure is bounded between
zero (perfect diversification) and one (perfect home bias), while anything in excess of zero indicates
some level of home bias.13 Comparing Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.2 reveals however that the difference
between the two measures is negligible: neither the country ranking nor the level of home bias is
very much affected. For example, Italian and German banks have high positive values in both cases.
Politicali is also one of two measures. It is either the percentage of shares owned by the domestic
government or other domestic political entities (Foundations in Italy, for example) divided by its
standard deviation; or it is a dummy, 1(Politicali), equal to one if the bank is above the median of
the distribution of government ownership in each country.
Other explanatory variables we use are: Xi, a set of lagged bank balance sheet characteristics
(log of total assets, Tier1 ratio, Leverage, Deposits over Total Funding, ROAA, Non Performing
Loans over Gross Loans) and 1(Cooperativei) a dummy equal to one if bank i is a cooperative
bank. We allow for a different intercept in home bias for cooperative banks because these banks are
characterized by dispersed ownership among members (one–head–one–vote) and no share directly
owned by the domestic government: nonetheless, they usually exhibit a large home bias given by
the very “local” nature of their business model. It is also possible that others, more indirect forms
13Note that the first measure of home sovereign bonds over total sovereigns does not exactly replicate this: it is also
equal to one in case of perfect home bias, but it is equal to zero if the bank does not own any domestic debt, not
if the bank is perfectly diversified. This difference turns out not to matter in the regression analysis.
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of political influence are at play in cooperative banks: it is often the case, in Italy for example, that
cooperative firms have strong ties with political parties. Finally, Di a country dummy where the bank
is headquartered. Country dummies are important because they control for country specific factors;
more specifically, they take into account i) institutional characteristics and ii) optimal portfolio
considerations.
The first motivation pertains to countries’ institutional heterogeneity; for example, we need to
control for the fact that in Spain the government participation in each bank, by law, cannot exceed
50%, whereas in Germany the local government can hold any number of shares. German Landers
very often holds around 85% of shares in the Landesbanken. Since we are interested in evaluating
whether a certain political ownership is large or small in a given country, a set of country–specific
intercepts in the above regression is appropriate.
The second consideration has to do with asset pricing theory. The CAPM implies the following
pricing equation: 1 = Et [Mj,t+1Ri,t+1] = Covt [Mj,t+1, Ri,t+1] + Et [Mj,t+1]Et [Ri,t+1]. Mj,t+1 is
the stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel of country j at time t+1 and Ri,t+1 is the real rate of
return on asset i at time t+ 1. The above equilibrium condition implies that the optimal holding of
any asset, sovereign bonds included, depends on the covariance between a country specific factor and
an asset specific component. Therefore, each bank in country j should have the same exposure to
the set of sovereign bonds. For this reason, the set of country dummies also reflects country specific
portfolio aspects. We use country dummies with both dependent variables, the home exposure over
the total and the Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) home bias measure.
In our second specification, we exploit the time dimension of the panel to investigate how home
bias varied during the crisis. We want to test the hypothesis that, upon receiving an equity injec-
tion from the domestic government, only political banks increase their home bias relative to other
banks, especially if they are located in the periphery. This would be consistent with a political
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pressure/moral suasion hypothesis, where the domestic government calls on banks to buy sovereign
debt at a time of low demand. Therefore, we run the following panel regression:
∆HomeBiasi,t = β1GovHelpi,t−1 + β2
(
1(PIIGS)× 1(Politicali)
)
GovHelpi,t−1+
+ β3
(
1(NOPIIGS)× 1(Politicali)
)
GovHelpi,t−1 + γ′Xi,t−1 + ηi + λt + εi,t
(2.2)
where ∆HomeBiasi,t represents the change in home bias of bank i at time t, GovHelpi,t−1 is
the amount of equity injection given by the domestic government to bank i at the beginning of
the year as a fraction of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA). 1(Politicali) is a non–time varying dummy
if bank i is above the median political control in each country and 1(PIIGS) 1(NOPIIGS) are
dummies for whether bank i belongs to PIIGS or not. In this regression we allow for the effect of
equity injections to differ depending on whether a bank is politically influenced and at the same
time whether or not it belongs to the PIIGS. Finally we control for bank fixed–effects, ηi, and for
either year– or country–year fixed–effects λt.
Table 2.1 below reports some summary statistics of the dataset.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics at December 2010
N Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Political ownership in 2006, (%) 90 21.3 31.3 0 100
1(Politicali) in 2006 90 0.34 0.47 0 1
Home Bias (Own/TotSov), (%) 90 74 26.4 9.8 100
Home Bias (CR(2012)), (%) 87 71.7 29 .05 100
Gov Help/RWA, (%) 90 1.4 3 0 21.85
1(GovHelp > 0) 90 .38 .46 0 1
Gov Help/RWA if > 0, (%) 35 3.6 4 .32 21.84
Tier1/RWA, (%) 90 11 3.7 4.3 34.7
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On average, the pre–crisis (2006) ownership by domestic government or political entities in Eu-
rope is at 20% among the 90 banks participating in the European Stress Test in 2010. However,
only 48 banks (53% of the sample) have at least some level of political ownership and the dummy
1(Politicali) shows that only 34% of the sample can be classified with an above the median political
control in each country. Home bias is high on average according to both measures, however there is
also a large heterogeneity, as was evident from Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Also, 38% of the banks in our
sample received some form government help at the end of 2010, with an average, conditional on the
help being positive, of 3.6% of RWA. These are big numbers considering that, on average, the Tier1
over RWA ratio is at 11% for all banks.
2.5 Results
Table 2.2 above reports the results for the main set of cross-sectional regressions. In the first three
columns we regress the exposure to domestic sovereigns over total sovereigns in 2009, 2010 and 2011
on our continuous variable for political influence, Political, and a set of controls. In the last three
columns we repeat the exercise but now we use a dummy variable, 1(Political), to capture political
influence within each bank.
From the first two rows we notice that the coefficients of interest are always positive and significant
at 5%.14 This implies that banks that are more politically influenced display greater home bias
in sovereign bond holdings. If we take a look at the first column, which we can think of as a
pre-sovereign debt crisis regression, we have that a one standard deviation increase in the level of
political influence (30 pct.points) is associated with an increase in the domestic composition of the
sovereign bond holdings by 8%, which is about one third of a standard deviation of OwnTS .
14Only in one out of six cases, the coefficient on 1(Politicali) is significant at 10%. Notice how it is significant at 1%
using the Politicali/std.dev measure in 2009 too.
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Table 2.2: Home Bias (Own/TotalSovereign) and Political Presence.
HB2009 HB2010 HB2011 HB2009 HB2010 HB2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Politicali/std.dev. 7.747
∗∗∗ 5.867∗∗∗ 5.717∗∗∗
(3.34) (2.71) (3.28)
1(Political)i 11.86
∗ 10.19∗∗ 15.89∗∗∗
(1.95) (2.41) (4.11)
1(Cooperative) 18.11∗∗∗ 16.38∗∗ 10.16 18.51∗∗ 16.74∗∗ 12.42∗∗
(2.92) (2.67) (1.68) (2.54) (2.62) (2.20)
log(Asset)t−1 -7.241∗∗ -10.13∗∗∗ -14.47∗∗∗ -7.779∗∗∗ -10.24∗∗∗ -14.99∗∗∗
(-2.47) (-3.94) (-4.38) (-3.95) (-4.25) (-5.40)
Tier1t−1 1.426 -2.520∗∗ -0.902 1.014 -2.256∗ -0.973∗
(0.88) (-2.12) (-1.63) (0.64) (-1.85) (-1.89)
Leveraget−1 -0.350∗∗∗ 0.0892 -0.248 -0.398∗∗∗ 0.0495 -0.224
(-3.26) (0.69) (-1.61) (-3.51) (0.39) (-1.55)
(Dep/TF)t−1 -0.513∗∗ 0.134 0.0195 -0.556∗∗ 0.141 0.0213
(-2.14) (0.62) (0.05) (-2.06) (0.60) (0.05)
ROAAt−1 -0.113 5.995 -0.0235 -0.0733 4.018 -1.633
(-0.03) (1.18) (-0.01) (-0.02) (0.84) (-0.52)
(NPL/GL)t−1 3.540∗∗ -0.816 -1.139 4.091∗∗ -0.613 -1.054
(2.35) (-0.68) (-1.64) (2.34) (-0.54) (-1.66)
N 71 77 57 71 77 57
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: set of cross–sectional regressions of banks in 2009, 2010, 2011. The dependent variable is the ratio
of domestic sovereign over total sovereign. Politicali/std.dev is the ratio of political ownership over its
standard deviation; 1(Political)i is a dummy equal to one if the bank is above the median of the distribution
of political ownership in each country; 1(Cooperativei) is a dummy equal to one if bank i is a cooperative;
log(Assetst−1), Tier1t−1, Leveraget−1, (Dep/TF )t−1, ROAAt−1, (NPL/GL)t−1 are, respectively, the
log of total assets, the Tier1 ratio over RWA, the ratio of total assets and common equity, the deposits to
total funding ratio, the average return on assets and the ratio of non–performing loans over total loans, all
lagged by one year. Std.err. are White HAC robust.
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On the other hand, by looking at the fourth column, the coefficient on the political dummy implies
that a bank that moves from the bottom 50% to the top 50% of the distribution of political influence
displays on average 12% more weight to domestic sovereigns relative to the total, which is about
half of a standard deviation of OwnTS .
A covariate that is always highly significant is bank size, as measured by the log of total assets. The
coefficient is a semi–elasticity and it implies that for a 1% increase in total assets, the own exposure
is expected to decline by 0.1 percentage points on average across all the years. The punchline is
that larger banks have a smaller home bias in sovereign bonds: the sovereign portfolios of larger
institutions are more diversified. Also cooperative banks, on average and all else equal, have a
own exposure 13 to 17 percentage points higher than other banks, at least before 2011. Note that
cooperative banks have no direct political or state ownership, but the significant degree of home bias
may be explained by the very “local” nature of their business model. Or, possibly, it indicates that
cooperative banks may be subject to other forms of indirect political influence, that our measure of
political control cannot capture. It is often the case, at least in Italy, that cooperative savings bank
have strong political ties to political parties.
Table 2.3: Home Bias (Coeurdacier and Rey (2012)) and Political Presence
HB2009 HB2010 HB2011 HB2009 HB2010 HB2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Politicali 10.09
∗∗∗ 7.527∗∗∗ 7.220∗∗∗
(3.81) (3.01) (4.05)
1(Political)i 15.71
∗∗ 12.45∗∗ 18.81∗∗∗
(2.27) (2.67) (4.59)
N 69 75 58 69 75 58
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other: Log(TA)(-)***, Coop(+)***, Tier1(-), Lev(-), NPL(-), Dep(-) and ROAA(+)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: set of cross–sectional regressions of banks in 2009, 2010, 2011. The dependent variable is the ?
measure:
HomeBias = 1− Share of Foreign Sovereigns in Bank b Sovereign Holding
Share of Foreign Sovereign Bonds in the Global Portfolio
Other bank controls defined as before.
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Next, in Table 2.3, we run the same regression but changing the dependent variable to the ? mea-
sure. The main results are basically unchanged, if anything both the magnitude and the significance
of the coefficients is larger in this specification.
2.5.1 Panel Regression: Political Pressures during the Sovereign Debt
Crisis
Now we ask whether politicians exerted pressures on controlled banks during the sovereign debt
crisis; more specifically, we want to test whether, upon receiving equity injections, political banks
increased their exposure to domestic sovereign bonds. We expect the effect to be stronger for banks
in the PIIGS, where the respective governments had an incentive to encourage the purchase of
government bonds so as to lower the yields.
Table 2.4 below summarizes this heterogeneous impact of liquidity injections of banks’ portfolio
decisions. It displays the panel regression of changes in exposure to domestic relative to total
sovereigns. Government help here is defined as any form of equity injection, measured as a fraction
of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA), given by the respective governments. The data come from the
EBA Stress Tests and Recapitalization exercises, where either purchase of ordinary bank shares by
the government or government support measures count as government help in the calculation of
common equity of the bank. Column (1) suggests that receiving government help by itself does not
affect the bank’s choice between buying domestic or foreign sovereigns. However, a political bank
that receives liquidity injections by the local government would increase its exposure to domestic
sovereigns. The effect is larger if the bank is located in particularly distressed countries, namely
the PIIGS. Column (2) indicates that an additional equity injection of 1% of risk weighted assets is
associated with an increase in domestic relative to total sovereign exposure by almost 9%, compared
to 4% for non PIIGS banks. The two coefficients are sufficiently precisely estimated so that a simple
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hypothesis test rejects the null that the two effects are the same at the 5% level. The results would
look very similar if we used the alternative definition of home bias in Coeurdacier and Rey (2012).
These results suggest that sovereign countries, especially the PIIGS, use domestic political banks
to purchase the bonds they issue when there is a lack of demand. Indeed, upon receiving freshly
injected equity, only the politically controlled banks increase their degree of home bias.
Table 2.4: Political Pressure on the Banks. Panel regression.
(1) (2)
∆HomeBiasi,t ∆HomeBiasi,t
Gov Helpt−1 -.746 -0.739
(-1.13) (-1.12)
1(Political)×GovHelpi,t−1 7.877∗∗∗
(5.51)
1(Political, P iigs)×GovHelpi,t−1 8.981∗∗∗
(8.15)
1(Political,NoP iigs) ×GovHelpi,t−1 4.192∗∗
(2.08)
N × T 187 187
N of banks 77 77
Bank + Year FE yes yes
Other Bank Controls: Tier1(-)***,Log(TA)(-)*,Lev(-),NPL(-),Dep(-)
P-Value of the Test
1(Pol,Piigs)Gov = 1(Pol,NoPiigs)Gov 0.0337
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Panel regressions. The dependent variable is ∆HomeBiasi,t defined as the change in the
ratio of domestic sovereign bonds over total sovereigns between 2010Q4–2010Q1, 2011Q4–
2010Q4, 2012Q2–2011Q4. GovHelpi,t−1 is the government equity injection as a percentage
of RWA given to bank i at the beginning of the period. Other variables are defined as
before. Std.err. are clustered at the bank–year level.
The panel regressions in Table 2.4 are not controlling for the fact that, during the crisis, we may
observe an increase in home bias because of country and time specific factors. In particular, it is
conceivable that PIIGS banks may have decided to increase their home bias because of the very high
yields in PIIGS sovereign bonds. Investing in these bonds was risky, but for PIIGS banks it may
be perfectly rational to put all risk in a state of the world, a sovereign default, that corresponds
to banks’ defaulting themselves (risk synchronization). Also, these risky behaviors may have been
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funded by the ECB 3 year Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) in December 2011 and
February 2012 that injected large amounts of liquidity, borrowed at 100 and 75 bps. respectively,
into participating banks (part of the carry trade hypothesis advanced by ?). We test these hypotheses
and the robustness of our results in Table 2.5 below.
Table 2.5: Political Pressure on the Banks: Robustness
Yields Country– LTRO Yields Country– LTRO
and CDS time FE and CDS time FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Y ield 220.3 295.8
(0.77) (0.98)
∆CDS5Y -254.9 -408.9
(-1.15) (-1.49)
LTRO/TotalAssets -2.877 -3.360
(-0.81) (-0.93)
Gov Helpi,t−1 -1.149 0.369 0.489 -0.719 0.685 0.179
(-1.62) (0.48) (0.66) (-0.89) (0.87) (0.30)
1(Political)× 5.050∗ 10.94∗∗ 12.17∗∗
Gov Helpi,t−1 (1.85) (2.05) (2.47)
1(Political, Piigs)× 7.343∗∗∗ 16.53∗∗ 16.53∗∗
Gov Helpt−1 (2.26) (2.42) (2.08)
1(Political, NoPiigs)× 4.096 4.814 11.15∗
Gov Helpi,t−1 (0.72) (1.36) (1.67)
N 155 187 176 155 187 176
N bank 66 77 76 66 77 76
Bank + Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country–time FE no yes yes no yes yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Panel regressions. The dependent variable is ∆HomeBiasi,t defined as the change in the ratio of
domestic sovereign bonds over total sovereigns between 2010Q4–2010Q1, 2011Q4–2010Q4, 2012Q2–
2011Q4. GovHelpi,t−1 is the government equity injection as a percentage of RWA given to bank i
at the beginning of the period. ∆Y ield, ∆CDS5Y are the growth rates of sovereign yields for 10
year bonds and 5 years CDS rates over the relevant periods. LTRO/TotalAssets is the borrowing
from the 3–year LTRO operation in December 2011 and February 2012 at the bank level (47 banks)
over total assets. It is equal to zero for all banks before 2012Q2 and equal to the LTRO amount
for the 47 banks for which information on the borrowed amount was found and missing otherwise.
Other variables are defined as before. Std.err. are clustered at the bank–year level.
Columns (1)–(3) and (4)–(6) have the same set of controls, but the latter three split the effect of
the interaction between government help and political banks among PIIGS and non–PIIGS banks.
In particular, column (1) and (4) control for the change in the sovereign yield and CDS in each
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period.15 We would expect the increase in the yield to increase home bias, but the increase in
CDS, a proxy for risk of default, should offset it. The estimated coefficients are in fact positive and
negative, respectively, but they turn out to be non–significant. Column (2)–(3) and (5)–(6) use a
set of country–time FE that absorb all unobserved heterogeneity that is country and time specific,
including yields and CDS. Finally, column (3) and (6) include bank specific usage of LTRO funds
divided by total assets. Bank by bank figures on LTRO usage have not been released by the ECB,
however we have collected data from banks’ annual reports and industry reports for 47 major EBA
banks. These banks borrowed e514 bn. in both LTROs, around half of total gross funds.16 Figure
2.4 reveals that the LTRO have been dominated by Italian and Spanish banks (50% of the LTRO 1+2
funds), although, admittedly, the disclosure for French and German banks has been poor. In some
cases we had to rely on industry estimates by Morgan Stanley Research (2012), because although it
is known that a bank has participated, the actual amount was not disclosed on annual reports. Since
both 3 year LTRO operations took place in December 2011 and February 2012, the LTRO variable
takes a value of zero before 2012Q2 for all banks and then it is equal to the amount borrowed only
for the 47 banks for which information is available (it is missing in 2012Q2 for the other banks).
The results in all columns show that our hypothesis is robust even controlling for country–time
specific trends and the LTRO interventions: the coefficient on the interaction term between govern-
ment help and political banks is significant in all specifications. Moreover, it appears that, after we
take into account country–time characteristics, the political banks in the PIIGS are the only ones
that increase home bias after receiving government help. It makes sense that the significance of the
coefficient survives only for PIIGS banks, because these are the countries whose governments have
15The periods are: 2010Q4–2010Q1, 2011Q4–2010Q4, 2012Q2–2011Q4. The number of observations is differentin
column (1) and (3) because Bloomberg does not provide data for the sovereign yields and CDS in all countries.
We do not have information on Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Slovenia.
16According to industry reports by Morgan Stanley Research (2012), only around half of gross funds were actually
new net funding, as banks rolled over existing ECB facilities into the LTRO. The data we have collected are mostly
on gross funds usage.
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a higher incentive to pressure banks into buying domestic government bonds during the crisis.
2.5.2 Determinants of Government Help: Not just for Political Banks
One could think that our previous set of results, the fact that political banks buy more domestic
government bonds during the crisis, could be explained by the fact that only political banks received
government help during the crisis. In that case it would not be surprising that only political banks
increase their respective own exposure to domestic governments. In Table 2.6 we show that this is
not the case. We estimate the relationship between the amount of equity provided by local govern-
ments to each bank and a set of regressors, including past performance and political influence. The
punchline is that equity injections are targeting banks with low prior profitability and larger pools
of non-performing loans, not political banks directly. However, upon receiving these injections, only
politically controlled banks increase their holdings of domestic sovereigns.
The first two columns report OLS regressions while the last two use the Tobit estimator (we report
the slope coefficients in both cases). The last approach is more appropriate for this scenario because
we should think of government help as a censored variable. It is equal to zero if the bank is in good
shape and the government decides not to extend support or any positive value otherwise. The right
specification that takes in to account both the discrete choice of whether or not to support a bank
and the magnitude of the liquidity injection is the Tobit model.
The qualitative outcome of the OLS and the Tobit regressions are the same: political influence has
not played any additional role in attracting more support from the government. The two main
factors associated with greater government help are lower profitability (Return on Average Assets,
ROAA) and more non-performing loans over gross loans (NPL/GL).
By looking at the marginal effects (not reported in the table) for 2010, we see that a decrease in
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Table 2.6: Determinants of Government Help
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
Gov Help2010 Gov Help2011 Gov Help2010 Gov Help2011
1(Political)i -0.572 -0.560 -0.462 -0.000265
(-0.86) (-0.62) (-0.37) (-0.00)
ROAAt−1 -1.880∗∗∗ -1.361∗∗∗ -5.222∗∗∗ -1.928∗∗∗
(-3.16) (-6.81) (-4.96) (-3.95)
(NPL/GL)t−1 0.300∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗
(2.60) (2.01) (2.90) (2.84)
1(Cooperative) -2.360∗∗∗ -1.100 -6.226∗∗ -2.210
(-2.71) (-1.58) (-2.46) (-0.88)
1(PIIGS) 0.172 1.488 -0.0145 0.653
(0.37) (1.56) (-0.01) (0.30)
log(Asset)t−1 0.114 -0.160 0.753∗ -0.316
(0.56) (-0.63) (1.73) (-0.47)
Tier1t−1 0.164 0.463∗∗∗ 0.202 0.683∗∗∗
(1.11) (5.27) (0.57) (4.77)
(Dep/TF)t−1 -0.0401 -0.0248 -0.0288 -0.0130
(-0.82) (-0.74) (-0.42) (-0.16)
N 77 57 77 57
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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lagged return on assets by 1% is associated with an increase in the probability of receiving positive
government support by 41% while an increase in non-performing loans over gross loans by 1% is
associated with an increase in the probability of receiving support by 7.4%; all these effects are
significant at 1%. The marginal effects are around two to three times smaller for the 2011 case but
still significant at 1%. These effects may seem large at first, especially that on profitability. However,
it has to be kept in mind that a change in ROAA of 1% is quite big, almost one standard deviation,
while a change in non-performing loans over gross loans by 1% is relatively small if compared to its
standard deviation which is 4%.
For 2010, conditional on receiving support, a decrease in ROAA by 1% is associated with an increase
in liquidity injection over risk weighted assets by 1.5%, around one third of its standard deviation;
the effect of an increase of non-performing loans over gross loans by 1% is an increase in liquidity
injections over risk weighted assets by about one tenth of its standard deviation.
2.5.3 Cross Validation: Allocation of Credit and Political Influence
Next, we ask whether politically influenced banks tend to facilitate their respective governments in
more general terms, not only through purchasing more domestic sovereigns, but also by extending
more loans to domestic government institutions. To this purpose we take advantage of the fact that,
in 2010 only, the European Banking Authority released data on each bank’ s allocation of credit
broken down by country of destination and by type of loan; for instance, we know the amount of
credit that each bank issued to small and medium enterprises (SME) and to government institutions
broken down by the country in which the borrower is located. We then call DomSME the share of
domestic SME credit over total SME credit and DomINST the share of loans to public institutions
given to the domestic government.
Table 2.7 indeed shows that the effect of political influence of banks’ behaviors is not specific to the
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purchase of domestic sovereign, but it is valid in more general terms: politically controlled banks
extend more credit to domestic public entities than other banks do.
Contrary to our expectations, there is not strong evidence that political banks systematically extend
more credit to small and medium enterprises; what seems to count to this regard is bank size. This
suggests that small banks may proxy for regional banks which tend to lend more locally to small
and medium enterprises.
Table 2.7: Allocation of Credit and Political Influence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DomSME2010 DomINST2010 DomSME2010 DomINST2010
Politicali/std.dev. 4.874
∗ 5.751∗∗
(1.87) (2.06)
1(Political)i 8.687 17.17
∗∗
(1.60) (2.15)
1(Cooperative) 0.483 3.552 0.361 5.232
(0.04) (0.37) (0.03) (0.54)
log(Asset)t−1 -5.646∗∗∗ -7.592∗∗∗ -5.813∗∗∗ -7.346∗∗∗
(-2.90) (-3.49) (-2.95) (-3.46)
(Dep/TF)t−1 -0.425∗∗ -0.363∗ -0.392∗ -0.332∗
(-2.10) (-1.86) (-1.86) (-1.72)
Tier1t−1 0.432 -0.297 0.294 -0.482
(0.39) (-0.18) (0.27) (-0.29)
N 70 79 70 79
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.6 Conclusion
We investigate why European banks suffer from a significant home bias in sovereign bond holdings.
We believe that certain banks hold a disproportionate amount of their own country’s sovereign debt
because they are coerced by domestic politicians. In order to test this, we analyze recently collected
data from Stress Tests on European banks and we find evidence supportive of this hypothesis:
political banks hold more domestic sovereign bonds and they increase their home bias in sovereign
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holdings conditional on receiving liquidity injections by the respective local governments; this effect
is more than twice as big for political banks belonging to the PIIGS than for other European banks.
Interestingly, these equity injections seem to be directed towards banks that need it rather than to
political banks in particular.
Moreover, we find that politically influenced banks tend to facilitate their respective governments in
more general terms, not only through purchasing more domestic sovereigns, but also by extending
more loans to domestic government institutions.
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Figure 2.1: Median Sovereign Home Bias by country, December 2010
Source: EBA Stress Test 2011. Home Bias defined as the ratio of domestic sovereign by bank b over the
total: HomeBias = Ownb/TotalSovereignb. Country codes are the following: Belgium (BE), France
(FR), Netherlands (NL), Great Britain (GB), Sweden (SE), Austria (AT), Finland (FI), Ireland (IE),
Denmark (DK), Slovenia (SI), Portugal (PT), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Greece (GR), Spain (ES).
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Figure 2.2: Median Sovereign Home Bias by country, December 2010
Source: EBA Stress Test 2011. Home bias measure as defined in ?:
HomeBias = 1 − Share of Foreign Sovereigns in Bank b Sovereign Holding
Share of Foreign Sovereign Bonds in the Global Portfolio
The Global portfolio in our case is the EEA30 portfolio, as we have sovereign exposure data for these
countries only. When the home bias measure is equal to zero there is perfect diversification; when it is
equal to one there is perfect home bias. Anything in excess of zero indicates some level of home bias.
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Figure 2.3: Aggregate Sovereign Home Bias by country, Sept 1997 – Sept 2014
Source: ECB Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) aggregate statistics: ratio between Home and Total of
“Securities other than shares” on the Government portfolio (MFI assets). These statistics are given at the
country level for all financial institutions (excl. European Central Banks) with a changing composition
(i.e. this is the raw data that does not take into account mergers&acquisitions and bank failures).
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Figure 2.4: LTRO(1+2) 3 year
94
Chapter 3
The Real Effects of Capital Requirements:
Evidence from the UK
3.1 Introduction
Current financial reform proposals focus on the introduction of counter-cyclical capital buffers to
maintain financial stability and increase the resilience of financial institutions to adverse shocks.
Yet the impact and transmission mechanism of these tools is still not well understood (Galati and
Moessner, 2013). This should not be surprising, since Basel III has not been fully implemented yet
and in the past, in accordance with Basel I, regulators in most countries imposed a constant capital
requirement, by bank and over time. But as extensively documented in Francis and Osborne (2012),
Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014a,b,c) and Turner (2009), UK regulators adjusted bank-specific
capital requirements over time 1. In this paper we exploit this unique regulatory regime to test if
1In principle, these to address legal, operational and interest rate risks, which were not allowed for in Basel I. In
practice, the regulatory decisions on capital requirements for each bank were based on organization structures, IT
systems and reporting procedures, rather than financial and balance sheet analysis. Aiyar et al. (2014a,b,c) argue
that these institutional characteristics allow to treat changes in capital requirements as exogenous with respect to
credit supply.
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changes in bank-specific capital requirements affect the asset growth of the SME that borrow from
the affected banks. For comparison, we examine the impact of unexpected monetary policy shocks
on asset growth and test if these tools reinforce each other. We also study whether certain bank
characteristics, such as capital buffers and liquidity, multiple firm-bank relationships or sectoral
characteristics on the sources of external finance affect the transmission of this regulatory change.
For capital requirements to be an effective macroprudential policy instrument and affect the
aggregate loan supply and have real effects, three conditions need to be satisfied: i) Bank equity
needs to be more expensive than bank debt; ii) Capital requirements need to be a binding constraint
on a bank’s choice of capital and iii) there needs to be only limited substitution from other sources
of finance for the borrowing firms. The first condition implies a failure of the Miller-Modigliani
(1958) theorem for banks, as otherwise changes in the capital requirement do not need to affect a
financial institution’s balance sheet. But economic theory provides good reasons for why condition
i) should be satisfied, such as asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the difference
in tax treatment between debt and equity 2. Similarly, empirical work documenting the impact of
adverse shocks to capital on loan growth, as in Bernanke (1983) and Peek and Rosengren (1997,
2000) implicitly provides support for this assumption. Regarding condition ii), several empirical
studies, namely Ediz et al (1998), Alfon et al (2005), Francis and Osborne (2009), Aiyar, Calomiris
and Wieladek (2014a,b,c) and Bridges et al (2014), also demonstrate that capital requirements were
a binding constraint on UK banks’ capital choices during the 1998-2007 period.Requirements are
likely to be especially binding when capital buffers are tight: Banks with small amounts of capital,
relative to the requirement, may not be willing to delay the adjustment. This appear to be true in
the data: average capital requirements and capital ratios for banks in the bottom quartile of the
buffer move almost one-to-one contemporaneously, with a correlation of 0.94, whereas banks in the
2See Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014a) for an extensive discussion of economic theory and empirical evidence
in support of the validity of the first assumption.
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top quartile do not appear to be affected by movements in capital requirements (see Figure 1) 3.
This suggests that the second condition is likely to be satisfied as well, especially for banks with low
capital buffers.
If conditions i) and ii) hold, the affected bank will have to either raise capital from outside
investors, grow capital through retained earnings or cut back on risk-weighted assets, which implies
a fall in lending to firms. But the fall in lending need not to have an effect on the borrowing firms
if these have alternative sources of funding available (condition iii)). For this reason, in this study
we focus mostly on SME firms, which are more likely to be bank dependent. Moreover, we find that
our results are stronger for SME with single-bank rather than multiple banking relationships, as the
former cannot easily substitute funding away from the affected bank. Also, we have information on
the sources of external finance used by firms at the sector level and hence we can figure out which
sectors are most likely to be affected by changes in capital requirements. For example, we know
the amount of lending in a sector provided by UK resident banks, which are subject to UK capital
regulation, vis–a`–vis lending done by branches of foreign banks, which are not regulated by the FSA.
Intuitively, the higher the ratio of non-regulated lending to regulated lending in a sector, the smaller
the impact of capital requirement changes should be. Our results support this hypothesis.
Several studies use the same underlying FSA capital requirements data to test whether UK bank-
specific capital requirements lead to a decline in lending over this period. All of them consider the
impact on loan growth to the private non-financial corporate (PNFC henceforth) sector at the bank
level. Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014a), Bridges et al (2014) and Francis and Osborne (2012)
find a loan contraction of 5.7%, 5.6%4 and 5%, following a 1% increase in capital requirements,
respectively. There is also related work on dynamic provisioning, an alternative macroprudential
3This does of course not mean that banks in the top quartile do not adjust at all, but probably with a lag.
4To make their results comparable to the other studies, the authors kindly provided us with a figure that refers to
the effect over one year and is a weighted average of their results for the commercial real estate and other PNFC
lending categories.
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instrument, in Spain. In particular, Jimenez et al. (2014a) provide evidence for the impact of
dynamic provisioning on lending growth with a detailed loan-level dataset on loans granted and
applied for by firms operating in Spain. They find that in good times, 2001Q2-2000Q1, although
credit committed declines, there is no change in credit available to firms and hence there is no effect
on total assets or employment. They do find some effect on employment growth for the borrowing
firms, but only after 2008. Brun et al (2014) use similar credit-registry data from France to examine
the impact of the introduction of Basel II in 2007-2008 on French firms and banks. Yet because
it coincides with the global financial crisis of 2008, the identification of the real effects of such
regulatory change is more difficult.
We examine the effect of changes to bank-specific capital requirements on firm-level asset growth
of the borrowers for the period of 1999-2006. In contrast to previous work with this UK dataset,
we explore the real economy impact on non-financial firms’ balance sheets. As inference in our
study is based on many thousands of firm-level observations per financial institution and capital
requirement change, econometric bias due to reverse causality is much less likely than in the other
studies. More importantly, following the approach in Kwhaja and Mian (2008) and Aiyar, Calomiris,
Hooley, Korniyenko and Wieladek (2014), geographical-sector-time dummies allow us to control for
loan demand better than in most previous work 5. Compared to previous work on macroprudential
policy tools that use loan-level data, all of our regulatory changes occurred before the global financial
crisis. This makes it easier to attribute any effect we find to regulatory changes, as other major
bank shocks were absent during our time period. Moreover, we contribute to the discussion on the
interaction between monetary policy and prudential regulation. Economic theory provides no clear
5The nature of our data does not allow us to use the firm*time fixed-effect pioneered by Kwhaja and Mian (2008),
i.e. comparing the lending done to the same firm by differently affected banks (see data section 2.2 for details).
However, like in all studies that employ this methodology (Jimenez et al (2012,2014a,2014b), Iyer et al. (2014),
Brun et al. (2013) among others), we find that going from an aggregate time effect to a very heterogenous sector-
,area-,time effect does not significantly alter any of the baseline results. This suggests that highly disaggregated
unobserved heterogeneity is usually not a concern in most partial equilibrium, reduced-form regression settings.
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prediction on whether these two policies reinforce or dampen each other (Borio and Zhu (2008),
Thakor (1996), Van den Heuvel (2002, 2005)) and empirical evidence on their interaction is scant
(Aiyar et al. (2014c)). The UK experience is helpful in this respect, because banking supervision and
monetary policy were undertaken by two independent institutions, the FSA and Bank of England
respectively. The UK monetary policy did not explicitly take into account capital requirements of
individual institutions 6. It is therefore unlikely that national authorities used capital requirements
and monetary policy in conjunction to affect real activity. This means that we can use the narrative
measure of UK monetary policy provided in Cloyne and Huertgen (2014) to test if these two policy
tools reinforce each other. Finally, we also test if bank characteristics, such as buffers and liquidity,
the presence of multiple bank relationships or sectoral characteristics on the dependence on external
finance affect the transmission of these regulatory changes.
We find that a rise in an affected banks capital requirement of about 100 basis points, conditional
on all observable firm and bank-level characteristics, leads to a decline in asset growth of an SME
borrower of about 3.5 to 6.9%, depending on the specification, in the first year of new bank-firm
relationship. This effect then declines over time 7 . We find a reduction in current liabilities of a
similar magnitude, which suggests that the reduction in asset growth is the result of decrease in
funding. A 100 basis point unexpected rise in the monetary policy short-term interest rate leads
to an asset growth reduction of -4.9%. If both prudential and monetary policy tools are used
simultaneously, they amplify each other, but only in the case of a monetary policy expansion. In
the case of a tight monetary policy, the two actually attenuate each other. This is consistent with
the theory of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu (2008)). Moreover, we
find that SME borrowing from banks with tight capital buffers are more affected by the regulatory
change: this result is very intuitive because banks with tight capital buffers will probably find
6The UK also had an inflation-targeting monetary policy regime at that time.
7Admittedly, this could also be because the firm has already repaid its debt in the first few years. In fact, our data
contain loans made at origination and we do not know, in the vast majority of cases, the maturity date.
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capital requirements to be binding, whereas banks with larger buffers probably do not. We also
find, consistent with evidence from banks’ balance sheet in Bridges et al. (2014), that firms in the
commercial real estate sector experience the largest reduction. Moreover, SME with multiple (two)
bank relationships are not affected by changes in capital requirements, as they can offset the fall in
lending from one bank with the other. However, a tightening in monetary policy affects all firms,
regardless of the number of their bank relationships. This suggests that while prudential policy
tools such as capital requirements affect single-bank firms only, i.e. those that cannot easily find
alternative sources of external finance, monetary policy shocks can “get in all the cracks”. Finally,
Aiyar et al. (2014a) find that the presence of competing foreign branches, that are not subject to
UK capital regulation, can offset loan contractions associated with greater capital requirements on
regulated banks by about 33%. Consistent with their work, we also find that firms in sectors with
greater foreign branch presence experience a smaller asset growth reduction of about this magnitude.
Given the lack of previous studies at this highly disaggregated level, it is not straightforward to
compare our estimates to those reported in previous work. The closest studies are those by Jimenez
et al (2015) and Brun et al (2014). The first study finds no effect of capital requirements (dynamic
loan provisioning) on firms total assets growth in either good (2001-2000) or bad times (2010-2008)
and only some small effect on employment growth. Brun et al. (2013) find an elasticity of capital
requirements on firms total assets growth ranging from -0.88 to -2.74, but in the crisis period only
(2012Q4-2008Q1). But we can compare them to estimates from time-series studies of the aggregate
effect of capital requirement shocks on output. Meeks (2014) finds that a 100 basis point rise in
capital requirements leads to a peak decline in real GDP of about 1%. How does this compare
to our effect? The average fraction of new relationships every year is about 16%, which means a
rough translation of the impact reported in this paper is about 7%*0.16=1% of GDP. Similarly
for monetary policy, our results are comparable to the impact reported in Cloyne and Hurtgen
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(2014). Overall this suggests that our estimates are in line with previous studies. Nevertheless,
the effect could still be bigger still, since unlike other micro-level studies, we do not have both
loan application and loan outcome data. Quantifying the extent of loan rationing after a rise in
capital requirements is therefore not possible. The advantage of our framework is that it is easier to
interpret changes in capital requirements, as what they actually are, during a time period without
any other major shocks to the banking system. We examine the impact of microprudential capital
requirement changes in a partial equilibrium regression framework. The results may of course not be
generalizable to macroprudential regulatory changes to capital requirements in a general equilibrium
framework. Regardless, in the absence of other evidence, we argue that the estimates provided in
this paper could still be informative for policy makers and economic theory.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the UKs regulatory regime
and the data. Section 3 describes the empirical approach for each of the proposed hypotheses,
presents the results and examines them for robustness. Section 4 explores the transmission channels
in greater detail. Section 5 examines the interaction with monetary policy and Section 6 interactions
with other sources of funding. Finally Section 7 concludes.
3.2 UK capital requirement regulation and data
In this section we describe the UK’s regulatory regime and the detailed firm-level database that
make our investigation possible.
3.2.1 Bank–level Data
Bank-specific capital requirements in most countries were set at a fixed value at or above the mini-
mum of 8 per cent of risk-weighted assets since the introduction of Basel I in 1988. But in the UK,
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regulators varied bank-specific capital requirements, otherwise known as minimum trigger ratios 8,
to address operational, legal or interest rate risks, which were not accounted for in Basel I (Francis
and Osborne, 2009). Individual financial institutions were subject to different capital requirements
over time and these were subject to review either on an on-going basis or every 18-36 month. This
regulatory regime was first implemented by the Bank of England, with the Financial Services Au-
thority (FSA) taking over in 1997. The FSA based regulatory decisions for banks on a system of
guidelines called ARROW (Advanced Risk Responsive Operating frameWork), which covers a wide
array of criteria related to operational, management, business as well as many other risks. The
ARROW approach also encompassed prudential risks, but this was not one of the core supervision
areas. Indeed, in his high-level review into UK financial regulation prior to the financial crisis of
2008, Lord Turner, the chief executive of the FSA, concluded that: “Risk Mitigation Programs set
out after ARROW reviews therefore tended to focus more on organisation structures, systems and
reporting procedures, than on overall risks in business models” (Turner, 2009). Similarly, the inquiry
into the failure of the British bank Northern Rock concluded that “under ARROW I there was no
requirement on supervisory teams to include any developed financial analysis in the material pro-
vided to ARROW Panels” (FSA, 2008). Hence, one can argue that capital requirement changes are
plausibly exogenous with respect to banks’ credit conditions 9 Econometric analysis supports the
anecdotal evidence. Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014a) show that, while bank size and write–offs
appear to be important determinants of the level of capital requirements in the cross-section – with
smaller banks with higher write–offs and lower deposit share having a higher capital requirement –
bank balance sheet variables cannot typically predict quarterly changes in capital requirements. If
8A trigger ratio is the technical term for capital requirement, since regulatory intervention would be triggered if the
bank capital to risk-weighted asset ratio fell below this minimum threshold.
9Of course, we are not claiming that capital requirement changes are the result of a randomized experiment. we do
not need such a strong statement for our analysis to work. All we need is that the regulatory changes are not
affected by the behavior of firms borrowing from these banks.
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anything, contemporaneous increases in write–off rates predict a lower capital requirements 10, but
these only explain 1% of the total variation in capital requirements. Moreover, Aiyar, Calomiris
and Wieladek (2014b) estimate a panel VAR on PNFC lending and changes in capital requirements
at bank balance sheet level. They only find evidence of causality running from changes in capital
requirements to PNFC lending growth, but not vice versa. Hence, both anecdotal and econometric
evidence therefore suggest that changes in capital requirements were not determined by lending
growth and balance sheet characteristics under this regulatory framework. This makes it uniquely
suitable to study the impact of changes to capital requirements on the firms that borrow from the
affected banks.
The Bank of England has kindly made these regulatory returns data, collected from the BSD3
form, available for our investigation. We collect data on a total of 62 regulated banks’ lending to UK
PNFCs. Our study covers the time period 1999 to 2006, for two reasons. First, the data after 2006
may have been affected by the start of the UK banking crisis associated with failure of the bank
Northern Rock in 2007Q3. Furthermore, prior to 2008Q1, UK regulators relied on the risk-weights
associated with Basel I. Unlike the Basel II risk weights, which were adopted after 2008 and can
be calculated using banks’ Internal Risk Based (IRB) models, these risk weights assigned a weight
of 100% to PNFC loans, regardless of individual loan characteristics. This additional regulatory
margin would add a further layer of complexity to our analysis. To better isolate how changes in
capital requirements affect bank behaviour, we choose the sample period to finish in 2006. Regulated
institutions were affected by 100 capital requirement changes during this time, all of which are shown
in Figure 2, with summary statistics provided in Table 2. All of the other lender level balance sheet
data was provided by the Bank of England’s Statistics and Regulatory Data Division 11. The control
10Loan losses (write–offs) are typically recognized on banks’ books with some lag, hence the contemporaneous change
in write–offs rate correspond to past bad loans. It is then possible that regulators decide to reduce capital
requirements at a time when uncertainty about the bank’s future losses has been resolved.
11All banks operating in the United Kingdom are legally required to provide this information to the Bank of England
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variables we derive from these data are described in greater detail in Table 1, with the corresponding
summary statistics provided in Table 2.
3.2.2 Firm–level Data
Firm level data come from the Bureau Van Dijk Financial Analysis Made Easy (BvD FAME)
database, based on companies’ filings with Companies House, the UK’s firm registry. The key
aspect of this dataset is that it contains the names of the banks (chargeholders) that have secured
loans (charges) against each firm. According to Companies House, a charge is defined 12 as the
security, such as land, property or financial instruments a company provides as collateral for the
loan. While technically the charge is the collateral to the loan, we will use the term as a synonym
for the loan itself. The bank-firm relationships in BvD FAME are obtained from the charges regis-
tered with Companies House. Charges are legally required to be registered with Companies House
twenty-one days after the loan has been created. It is in the interest of the lender to register the
charge within the deadline, as otherwise it would not be able to seize the collateral if the company
became insolvent. Indeed, the Bank of England surveyed one of the UK’s 5 largest lenders in 2013
to examine whether these data actually reflect bank-firm relationships. This was the case for 99.8%
of the firm-bank relationships in this dataset, which suggest a high degree of accuracy. Finally, it
is important to point out that we only observe the initial charge: Additional funds or re-financing
against the same asset later in time does not appear in the dataset. Similarly, we do not observe
when firms repay their loans.
There is are some important dimensions in which the data are different from the Credit Registry
data used in other work (Jimenez et al. (2012, 2014a, 2014b), Iyer et al. (2014), Brun et al. (2013),
Gobbi and Sette (2012)); in particular, they do not contain information on the amount of credit
12http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/about/gbhtml/gp3.shtmlch9
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provided by each bank, nor the interest rate charged on each loan. The maturity date of the loan is
often missing too. Therefore, we cannot use the firm*time fixed-effects identification pioneered by
Khwaja and Mian (2008), as we do not have data on the loan amounts each bank provides to each
firm 13. However, the most important feature of the data is that it allows us to link the banks in
our sample to individual firms. Moreover it does so at a specific point of time, which means that we
can calculate the length of the bank-firm relationship based on actual transactions rather than on
survey data (Petersen and Rajan (1995)). Finally, in orde to examine our results for robustness, the
firm-bank panel nature of the data also allows us to include bank-time effects, which fully control
for omitted variable bias at the bank, time–varying level
There is a total of 331,000 private, non-financial firms (PNFC) with charges registered in BvD
FAME (June 2007 version) and financial data for 1998 to 2006 14 . We match a total of 252,992
firms to 67 banks with capital requirements data. The matched sample is broadly consistent with
the 331k sample of firms with registered charges (see Table 1 in the Appendix). Most of the firms
in our sample are small: 92% have assets below £2.8mil, the official threshold for small companies
as defined by Companies House 15. This generates some missing items in the firm-level data, as
firms classified as small do not need to report a Profit and Loss (P&L) account and only need to
file an abridged version of the balance sheet. Indeed, an examination of the summary statistics
in Table 2, reveals that, other than age and the length of the relationship, Total Assets is the
most highly populated balance sheet variable, while Turnover and Employees are under-represented.
But information on the sector, postcode, date of incorporation and relationship characteristics are
13Most of the companies in our sample (88%) have single bank relationship anyways.
14Note that a charge may have been registered before 1998 and still show up in BvD FAME. We exclude those charges
created before 1990, thus the maximum observed length of a bank-firm relationship in our data is 16 years.
15According to Companies House, to be a small company, at least two of the following conditions must be met:
• annual turnover must be £5.6 million or less;
• the balance sheet total must be £2.8 million or less;
• the average number of employees must be 50 or fewer
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available for all firms, including small ones. We also have a very good coverage of current liabilities,
which include short–term debt, trade credit and taxes, and of credit scores, as these are calculated by
an external credit rating agency, CRIF Decisions Ltd, on the basis of both financial and non-financial
information (directors’ and shareholders’ history, County Court Judgements)
Figure 3 shows that a single-bank relationship is dominant, which is not surprising in light of the
fact that most of the firms in our sample are small 16 . However, even if only 12% of firms have
a banking relationship with multiple institutions, given our large sample size we still have 26,800
firms with two banks and 2,700 firms with three banks. The number of multiple banking firms is
therefore sufficiently large to allows us to run separate regressions on these entities. Given their
access to multiple banks, we would expect these firms to be less affected by a change in the capital
requirement of only one of their relationship banks, relative to single-bank firms, as the other bank
can provide a source of credit substitution. The results confirm this expectation. In general, UK
firms as whole are less reliant on public debt and equity – and more on bank lending – than the US
corporate sector: bank lending represents 65% of total corporate debt in the UK and only 25% in
the US (BoE (2011)). This high degree of bank dependence makes the UK’s PNFCs relatively more
susceptible to bank-level shocks.
Another characteristic of the UK banking system is that it is very concentrated: Figure 4 shows
that the top 5 banks provide credit to 91% of firms in our sample. This naturally begs the question
of whether we have enough variation in our independent variable of interest, the change in banks’
minimum capital requirements, given that most of the sample is dominated by five institutions. One
may also wonder if the results are driven by one of these large banks. We show that the results are
robust to dropping one of the large banks at a time or all of them at once. Next, Figure 5 shows the
16This is different from Braggion and Ongena (2014), who document that UK firms used to have single bank rela-
tionship before banking deregulation in 1971 and since then engage in multiple banking. Whereas Braggion and
Ongena (2014) focus on listed firms, which tend to be larger and more transparent, we mostly have data on small
firms, who are not listed and tend to have single banking relationship.
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distribution of firms by sector. The Commercial Real Estate (CRE) sector is the most numerous
(37%) followed by Wholesale and Retail Trade (17%), Construction (13%) and Manufacturing (12%).
Together these sectors comprise 79% of the companies in our sample. The table below shows the
growth rate of firms’ total assets broken down by sector. All sectors exhibit positive asset growth
on average, consistent with the growth in the UK economy over this period. Among the top five
sectors by size, the sectors involved in the UK housing bubble of 2008, the CRE and construction
sector, have the higher average growth. However, it is important to notice that even in these sectors,
a substantial number of firms (more than 25%) have negative asset growth.
Table 1: Growth Rate of Total Assets by Sector
Sector Observations Mean Std.Dev. 25th 50th 75th
Comm.Real Estate 325,360 0.097 0.461 -0.059 0.028 0.242
Wholesale&Retail 174,746 0.061 0.338 -0.068 0.033 0.171
Manufacturing 141,283 0.05 0.322 -0.086 0.025 0.168
Construction 127,708 0.093 0.437 -0.096 0.065 0.275
Recr.&Pers.Services 72,226 0.059 0.406 -0.088 0.02 0.191
Transportation,Storage,Comm. 38,527 0.076 0.369 -0.079 0.044 0.209
Hotel&Restaurant 34,469 0.064 0.367 -0.055 0.006 0.125
Agric., Hunting, Forestry 17,119 0.033 0.275 -0.051 0.011 0.103
Health and Social Work 13,633 0.128 0.395 -0.033 0.034 0.203
Education 5,843 0.116 0.426 -0.045 0.045 0.225
Mining, Quarrying 1,587 0.114 0.43 -0.057 0.059 0.251
Fishing 1,571 0.034 0.33 -0.074 -0.002 0.112
Public Admin. 567 0.165 0.454 -0.066 0.109 0.347
Utilities 536 0.123 0.453 -0.067 0.061 0.279
Not Available 10,929 -0.058 0.528 -0.131 0 0.042
In conclusion, our dataset contains 252,000 UK PNFC firms, borrowing from 67 different banks
with capital requirement changes between 1998-2006. Most firms are small, meaning that they
borrow from a single bank, especially one of the big 5, and they are concentrated in the CRE,
Wholesale and Retail, Construction and Manufacturing sector. We know both the age of the firm
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and the length of the relationship with each bank. We have good coverage of firms’ credit scores
and share of current liabilities over total assets, but not of turnover, profits or number of employees.
Finally, the 4digit SIC code and postcode area where these firms operate, allows us to construct
sector*area*year fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity among firms.
3.3 Empirical Approach and Results
In this section we describe the empirical framework to test each of the proposed hypotheses and
report the results.
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
In this section we examine whether changes in capital requirements affect the asset growth rate of
the borrowing firms with the following regression equation:
∆ lnYi,t = αi + δ1∆KRj,t + δ2∆KRj,t
1
1 + Li,j,t
+ φFCi,t + γBCj,t + Th,k,t + i,j,t (3.1)
where ∆ lnYi,t is the change in the natural logarithm of total assets (or current liabilities) at time
t of firm i that took out a loan from bank j. ∆KRj,t is change in the minimum capital requirement
ratio of bank j lending to firm i at time t 17 . Li,j,t is the length of the relationship between firm
i and bank j in years 18. FCi,t is a vector of firm characteristics for firm i at time t. BCj,t is a
vector of bank characteristics for bank j at time t, all of which are listed in Table 1. αi is a lender
fixed effect to account for lender unobservable time-invariant characteristics. Th,k,t is a vector of
sector-area–year effects to account for unobservable geographical and sector differences, in particular
17In the case of multiple bank relationships, this is averaged over the change in capital requirements for all banks.
18This variable takes the value of zero in the first year of the relationship, the value of one in the second year of the
relationship and so forth.
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in loan demand and unobservable firm characteristics, among the approximately 134 areas and 400
sectors that UK firms operate in over time. To avoid perfect multi–collinearity, we drop the first
variable from each group of fixed effects. Finally i,j,t is assumed to be a normally distributed error
term. All standard errors are clustered by firm in each regression specification.
In this empirical model, changes in capital requirements, ∆KRj,t, can affect the growth rate of
assets at the firm level, ∆ lnYi,t, via two different channels: They can affect the dependent variable
directly and also through the inverse of the length of the relationship, 1/(1 + Li,j,t), between firm
i and bank j. This specific convex and decreasing functional form for length is chosen so that the
effect of capital requirements changes reaches its maximum in the first year of a new bank-firm
relationship (Li,j,t = 0) and then quickly declines over time, with the curvature allowing for the
impact of capital requirement changes to be larger at the beginning of the bank–firm relationship.
Economic theory suggests that this could be important for at least two reasons: Gobbi and Sette
(2012) and Bolton et al (2014) find that relationship banks attenuate negative shocks to individual
firms. This would imply a negative value of δ2, as the impact of changes to capital requirements,
which have a negative elasticity on bank lending, on firms’ growth rates would become smaller over
time 19. Finally, there is also a mechanical reason for why it is important to allow a smaller impact
over time: firms can repay their loans over time, which we cannot observe, but this would also make
the impact on the average asset growth of the borrower smaller 20.
While capital requirements are available at a quarterly frequency, we examine the impact of the
change within a year. This is because banks might start to change loan conditions several months
before the implementation of regulatory action, due to anticipation, and we cannot observe when
19There is also a “dark” side to relationship lending: once the relationship is established, banks extract monopoly
rents from their borrowers (Sharpe (1990)). Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), using data on the Bolivian credit
registry, find that banks charge a lower interest rate at the beginning of the relatinship and eventually increase it
sharply. Our estimate of δ2 < 0 is consistent with the “positive” view of relationship lending.
20The Bank of England surveyed one of the largest five lenders in the UK in 2013 to examine whether their 2012 loan
book entries correspond to those in our database. This exercise suggested that about 30 percent of firms paid the
debt back within a year. Note that our specification, using a convex and decreasing functional form for length,
allow for a much sharper decline after a year, to allow for relationship lending to have an impact as well.
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the loan agreement was signed, only when it was recorded. Furthermore, due to adjustment costs,
it is quite likely that the reaction to changes in capital requirements occurs with a lag. This is why
Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) and Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko and
Wieladek (2014) include the contemporaneous value as well as 3 lags of the capital requirement ratio
in their exploration of these data. In other words, even studies that exclusively examine quarterly
data allow capital requirements to affect the dependent variable of interest within a year and this is
exactly the convention that we follow in this study.
In this study we aim to identify the loan supply effect of changes in capital requirements, and
hence it is important to control for loan demand. This is a challenging task in most empirical
studies. But the detail of the dataset in this paper allows us to follow the approach presented in
Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, Korniyenko and Wieladek (2014), who exploit geographical information on
the loan destination and use geographical time dummies to control for loan demand. To the extent
that loan demand varies over time and across geographical boundaries, this allows them to interpret
their estimates as supply effects. Kwhaja and Mian (2008) adopt a very similar approach, except
that they observe multiple loans for each firm, unlike in this paper. The information on the sector
and location of the firm is very detailed: we know the full 4-digit Standard Industry Classification
(SIC) code and the full postcode for all our firms. There is a total of 499 4-digit sectors and 2,757 full
postcodes which we group in 122 postcode areas. For example, we can distinguish between farming
of cattle in Birmingham and farming of poultry in Coventry. This high level of granularity allows
us to construct 4digitSIC*postcodearea*year fixed-effects (150,753 fixed effects) to control as much
as possible for sector specific loan demand and compensate for the lack of firm level controls 21.
To the extent that loan demand shocks differ across UK areas and sectors over time, the regression
estimates on the change in capital requirements can thus be interpreted as a supply effect.
21We will see that the difference between controlling for aggregate, year level fixed effects and the 4digSIC*area*year
fixed effect is usually not important in our regressions. This is common with other papers: for example, in Jimenez
et al. (2012) the difference between year and firm*year fixed effects is minimal.
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Given that equity is expensive and capital requirements are a binding constraint on an individual
lender’s choice of capital, we expect a decline in the asset growth of a borrower following a rise in
capital requirements of the main relationship bank. At firm level, this can happen in two different
ways. The affected bank can either reject the application of a borrower that requires a large loan
and lend to one with a smaller loan instead or just offer a smaller loan. Unfortunately our dataset
does not have information on loan applications, which means that we cannot formally distinguish
between these two adjustment channels.
Previous work has examined the impact of changes in capital requirements to PNFC loan supply,
but not to the actual asset growth of the firms that borrow from banks affected by capital require-
ment changes. Francis and Osborne (2012), Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014a) and Bridges
et al (2014) examine the impact of bank-level changes in capital requirements on lender-level loan
growth. An additional advantage of the dataset, compared to previous work, is that it contains
many thousand firm-bank observations per capital requirement change. Econometric bias from re-
serve causality is therefore unlikely. In other words, we argue that equation (1) is substantially
better identified than the approaches used in previous work.
3.3.2 Results
Table 4 presents estimates of equation (1) for the growth rate of assets. All specifications include
firm fixed effects. Column (1) and (2) only include year or sector × area × year fixed-effects,
respectively. The coefficient on the interaction term ∆KRj,t × 1/(1 + Li,j,t) is negative: it implies
that the negative effect of a change in capital requirements for the bank(s) j associated to firm
i declines as the length of the relationship increases. This is consistent with a “positive” view of
relationship lending whereby an affected bank would not cut lending to its long-time customers, but
rather offer worse credit conditions to the new customers. Similarly, it is also consistent with the
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idea that some firms repay their loans within the year, and that hence the average impact of future
capital requirement changes will become smaller. Interestingly, coefficients barely change when the
aggregate time effect (7 fixed effects) is replaced with a more highly disaggregated sector×area×year
effect (around 150,000 fixed effects): the stability of the main coefficient of interest is consistent with
the findings in other empirical banking papers (Jimenez et al. (2012,2014a,2014b) etc).
One concern with the regressions in columns (1) and (2) is the lack of firm characteristics. In
particular, one may worry that our result is not picking up an effect on new borrowers, but rather
the fact that banks may decide to cut lending or offer worse credit conditions to young, risky firms.
In column (3) and (4) we therefore control for firms credit ratings, the share in current liabilities over
total assets (as a proxy for short-term debt exposure) and the age of the firm . These characteristics
enter either contemporaneously or lagged. The coefficient on the interaction term is remarkably
stable in column (3) compared to columns (1) and (2). Column (4) is our preferred specification in so
far as contemporaneous firm characteristics at time t are simultaneously determined with the growth
rate of assets at time t and thus more likely to be endogenous than the lagged characteristics. One
concern with the regressions in columns (1) and (2) is the lack of firm characteristics. In particular,
one may worry that our result is not picking up an effect on new borrowers, but rather the fact that
banks may decide to cut lending or offer worse credit conditions to young, risky firms. In column
(3) and (4) we therefore control for firms credit ratings, the share in current liabilities over total
assets (as a proxy for short-term debt exposure) and the age of the firm . These characteristics enter
either contemporaneously or lagged. The coefficient on the interaction term is remarkably stable in
column (3) compared to columns (1) and (2). Column (4) is our preferred specification in so far as
contemporaneous firm characteristics at time t are simultaneously determined with the growth rate
of assets at time t and thus more likely to be endogenous than the lagged characteristics.
Figure 6 plots the partial effect of a change in ∆KRj,t on the growth rate of total assets
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(δ1 + δ2/(1 + Li,j,t) ) for the estimates in column (4) of Table 4. The negative effect of an in-
crease in capital requirements is greatest during the first year of the impact at -.076 and then
dissipates quickly over time, with an effect that is not significantly different from zero by the time
3 years have passed from the beginning of the relationship. As explained previously, this could be
either because banks cut back lending by less to firms that they already know, or because firms have
already repaid their debt, which could make the average impact much smaller.
Robustness Table 5 explores the robustness of our estimates to both sample selection and mod-
elling choices.
Econometric Assumptions Our presentation of the regression coefficients clearly depends on
interpreting Li,j,t as the length of the bank-firm relationship. An alternative interpretation would
be that this actually reflects the age of the firm. In that case our regression estimates would imply
that older, perhaps safer, firms are less affected by changes to capital requirements. We explore this
in the first row of Table 5 by replacing Li,j,t with age in our baseline regression. Now the results
are not statistically significant anymore. This supports our interpretation of Li,j,t as the length of
the firm-bank relationship. In row (2) we show that our results also seem broadly robust to more
aggressive windsorisation, indicating that the results are not driven by outliers.
An important assumption of our regression model is that changes in capital requirements can affect
the asset growth of the borrowing firm, even after the relationship has been established (∆KRj,t
can be different from zero in any year of the bank–firm relationship). Our data does not allow us
to observe re-financing and changes in loan terms after the beginning of the relationship, but we
wanted to explicitly allow for the possibility that loan terms are adjusted together with changes in
capital requirements at any time during the relationship. But this may not be the right assumption
to make if loan terms are not frequently re–adjusted. An alternative modeling approach would be
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to only allow capital requirement changes at the beginning of the relationship (∆KRj) to affect the
asset growth rate of the borrower. In that case, the presence of ∆KRj×1/(1+Li,j,t in the regression
means that the initial loan supply impact becomes smaller over time. We re-estimate our baseline
model in this way in row (3) of Table 5. The estimates are very similar to the previous results. We
also note that this specification is essentially a restrictive version of the baseline model. Because the
results do not change, which implies that this restriction does not appear to be binding, we proceed
with our baseline model.
Sample Selection: Firms A possible concern related to our results is about the size of the firm in
our sample. As it can be clearly seen from the summary statistics in Table 2, our sample is dominated
by small firms: the median firm has total assets for £350,000. The risk is that our sample might
contain entities which exist purely on paper, but do not actually engage in any economic activity
(shell companies). To explore if this is an issue, we exclude the smallest bottom half (£350,000)
and three-quarters (£914,000) in rows (4) and (5) of Table 5. In this case the results, if anything,
become slightly stronger. To explore whether ownership structure matters, we estimate the baseline
regression separately for firms where either more or less than 50% belongs to the same owner in the
following two rows ((6) and (7)). This does not seem to make a difference to our results.
Sample Selection: Banks As shown in Figure 4, 91% of the firms in the sample have rela-
tionships with 5 large UK banks. The remaining 9% have relationships with 57 different banks.
There is clearly a worry that the presence of these large banks may distort our results in one way
or another, especially if one believes that large banks, because of their importance, are not subject
to frequent changes in capital requirements. To examine if this is the case, we dropped each large
bank from the sample in rows (8) through (13). The main coefficient of interest remains very similar
throughout and rises only when all of the large banks are excluded at once (row (14)), which is not
at all surprising.
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Endogeneity: Omitted Variable Bias The main identification assumption in this paper, which
we discussed extensively in section 2 is that changes in capital requirements were not determined
by the quality of individual banks balance sheets. And although there is anecdotal and econometric
evidence to support this assumption, it is plausible that this assumption is not valid. In that case
our results could be the result of a third omitted variable. The firm-bank nature of our data allows
to us examine if this is an issue. In row (15) of Table 5 we include bank × year effects in our
specification, along with the sector × area × year effects as before. The regression estimate on
∆KRj,t×1/(1+Li,j,t) is -.051, which is very similar to the baseline regression. Rows (16)–(18) take
this even further by allowing the bank–year effects to vary with the sector (bank× sector× year) or
area (bank×area×year) where the bank is lending or both simultaneously (bank× sector×area×
year). The results are remarkably stable to the inclusion of all these fixed–effects. Overall this
suggests that omitted variable bias at the bank-balance sheet level, and hence endogneity from that
source, does not seem to be significant issue in this study, consistent with our main identification
assumption.
Overall, Table 5 suggests that the results obtained with the baseline model are robust to sample
selection issues at firm and bank level, more aggressive windsorisation, more restrictive econometric
modelling choices and omitted variables bias.
Table 6 presents the results of the baseline specification on the growth rate of current liabilities
instead of total assets. The results are qualitatively similar and they suggest that the decline in
total assets comes from a reduction in short–term liabilities, such as bank debt 22. Finally, Table
7 includes other bank characteristics such as size (log total assets), liquidity (cash and government
bonds over total assets), core funding (retail deposits over total assets), capital buffer and the change
in loan write–offs (at time t or t + 123) both independently (column (1)) and in interaction with
22Current liabilities also include trade credit and taxes, so they are a somewhat noisy proxy for short–term bank
debt.
23The change in loan write-offs are a proxy for the quality of the loan portfolio (UK banks do not report non-
115
Chapter 3 The Real Effects of Capital Requirements: Evidence from the UK
1/(1+Li,j,t (columns (2)–(3)). The coefficient of interest on ∆KRj,t×1/(1+Li,j,t) is still significant
and if anything gets larger, highlighting the fact that the change in capital requirements we analyze
are not driven by specific bank balance sheet characteristics.
3.4 Transmission Channels
Capital requirements will only affect firms through the loan supply channel only if they are binding
for. If banks were subject to a higher capital requirement, but had large capital buffers to start
with, they may always just choose to hold a smaller buffer. Banks with very tight capital buffers,
on the other hand, do not have this luxury: they have to bear the brunt of the adjustment through
a reduction in risk-weighted assets. This is confirmed visually by inspecting Figure 1: capital
requirements and capital ratios for banks in the bottom quartile move almost one–to–one and have
a coefficient of correlation of 0.94, suggesting that banks with low buffers probably find capital
requirements changes to be binding. However, banks in the top quartile do not seem to be affected
by changes in capital requirements. Similarly, banks with a lot of liquid assets, such as cash and
government bonds, should be less affected by changes in capital requirements. In fact, although
these assets carry a risk-weight of zero and thus selling them will not directly affect risk-weighted
assets, if they are sold at profits they can increase retained earnings and therefore allow to rebuild
capital organically.
We explore these hypotheses, by interacting the main coefficients of interest with a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if a bank’s capital buffer or liquidity ratio is in the top or bottom quartile
of the distribution, and zero otherwise, in Table 8. The bottom panel shows the partial derivative of
total asset growth with respect to changes in capital requirements for different values of these dummy
performing loans). Since loan losses at time t usually refer to loans from year t-1, we introduce the lead change in
write-offs as an alternative control.
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variables. Column (1) suggests that banks with high capital buffers are not affected by changes to
capital requirements. On the other hand, banks in the middle (lower) quartiles of the distribution
are more (most) affected, consistent with the economic theory. A similar pattern applies to the
corresponding dummy variables for liquid assets: banks with high (medium) [low] liquidity ratios
are not (more) [most] affected. These effects are robust when interaction terms for both capital and
liquidity, are included jointly in column (3).
Tables 9 and 10 explore whether our baseline effects vary by either firm characteristic or sector
in an economically meaningful way. Table 9 shows estimates of the baseline model for different
economic sectors separately. This exercise suggests that the effects are strongest in the commercial
real estate sector. This is consistent with the evidence in Bridges et al. (2014) that use bank balance
sheet data and find the largest impact on the loan supply in the commercial real estate sector. In
Table 10, we present estimates for a regression model where the main coefficients of interest have
been interacted with dummy variables in a similar fashion to Table 8, but using firm rather than
bank characteristics. In particular, these dummies that take the value of 1 if firm age (column (1),
the credit rating (column (2)) or the current liability to total asset ratio (column (3)) or all together
(column (4)) are in either the top or bottom quartiles of their respective distributions. These do not
suggest a significant degree of variation by individual firm characteristics, as opposed to the strong
results by bank characteristics.
3.5 Do Monetary and capital requirement policy reinforce
each other?
A recent issue of interest in central banking is whether monetary and capital requirement policy
should be co-ordinated. Clearly if each instrument has one target, and the effects of both instruments
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are completely orthogonal, no co-ordination is necessary. In that world monetary policy would
only focus on price stability, while capital requirement policy would only address financial stability.
However, if one instrument affects the transmission of the other, then this will need to be taken into
account by the corresponding policy committee to avoid under or overshooting of the target, which
can have socially undesirable consequences. Whether co-ordination is desirable or not therefore
depends on whether these instruments reinforce the effects of each other. Economic theory suggests
that these two instruments should affect the transmission of each other, but the direction of the
effect is unclear. The theory has explored the extent to which these two instruments affect the
transmission of each other through three different channels: the bank capital channel, the risk-taking
channel and the term-structure channel of monetary policy.
The bank capital channel of monetary policy predicts that monetary policy and changes in capital
requirements reinforce the effects of each other. Van den Heuvel (2002) shows that an unexpected
monetary policy contraction can lead to smaller capital buffer, as a result of realised interest rate
risk. This happens because of the maturity mismatch on banksbalance sheets between assets (long
duration) and liabilities (short duration), so that an increase in the interest rate causes profits and
hence capital to decline. This means that a coincident rise in capital requirements will have a larger
impact on the loan supply, as it is likely to be more binding.
The risk-taking channel of monetary policy suggests instead that the sign of the interaction may
be asymmetric, depending on the sign of monetary policy. In an environment where banks target
a fixed nominal return, a monetary policy expansion and the associated reduction in interest rates
may lead to a search for yield and a rise in bank leverage (Borio and Zhu (2008), Adrian and
Shin (2011)). Empirical evidence from Spain (Jimenez et al. (2014b)) and Bolivia (Ioannidou et
al. (2014)) points out that a lower overnight rate induces lowly capitalized banks to take on more
risk than highly capitalized banks, where the risk is measured with the presence of a bad credit
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history with nonperforming loans and a higher subsequent probability of default. This may further
lead banks to reduce capital buffers. Given that banks with tight capital buffers are more likely to
cut back risk-weighted assets, a change in capital requirements will have a greater impact on loan
supply in this situation. On the other hand, during periods of monetary policy tightening, it is not
clear how capital buffers would respond. In that situation a rise in capital requirement may be less
binding on the actual capital ratio and therefore have a smaller impact on the loan supply. In other
words, it is plausible that the sign of the interaction between these two instruments depends on the
sign of the monetary policy action.
Finally, Thakor (1996) argues that the sign of the interaction between these two instruments will
depend on the reaction of the term structure of interest rates. If, following a monetary expansion,
long rates fall by more (less) than short rates, implying a decrease (increase) in the interest rate
term premium, long–term government securities will become less (more) profitable, compared to
lending. Since in the presence of risk–based capital requirements government securities have a zero–
risk weight, the incentive to shift to lending (bonds) increases. In that case, a coincident decline
in capital requirements will lead to a smaller (greater) impact on the loan supply. Whether or not
monetary policy reinforces or counteracts changes in capital requirements therefore depends on the
yield curve reaction.
Despite this rich body of economic theory, empirical work that attempts to test these different
transmission mechanisms is still scarce. Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014c) are one of the first
studies to undertake this task with UK bank-level balance sheet data. Across a large variety of
many different specifications, they do not find any statistical evidence that these two tools reinforce
each other. In this paper, we repeat this exercise, but with two important differences. We have
more granular data and a more exogenous measure of UK monetary policy. Specifically, we use the
measure proposed in Cloyne and Huertgen (2014), which is the equivalent of the Romer and Romer
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(2004) series of exogenous monetary policy shocks for the UK. From an econometric modelling
perspective, we assume that monetary policy affects asset growth of the borrowing firms through
exactly the same channels as changes in capital requirements. That is we again assume that firms
will be less affected by monetary policy changes as the bank-firm relationship becomes longer over
time.
The results from this specification are shown in Table 11. Column (1) shows that once monetary
policy is included, a 100 basis points rise in monetary policy leads to an asset growth contraction
of about 4.9%, slightly smaller than the 6.9% contraction following a 100 basis points rise in the
capital requirement ratio. Column (2) adds the interactions between the monetary policy and
capital requirement terms. Neither ∆KRj,t ×MPshockt nor ∆KRj,t ×MPshockt × 1/(1 + Li,j,t)
have a significant effect on the growth rate of assets. This suggests that, at first sight, there is no
interaction as in Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014c) and contrary to the bank capital channel
in Van den Heuvel (2002). Column (3) introduces a triple (and quadruple) interaction term of
capital requirements and monetary policy shocks with annual changes in the term premium (and
1/(1 + Li,j,t)) to examine to which extent the term premium channel (Thakor (1996)) operates.
All the interaction terms between the monetary policy shock and capital requirements changes
are not significant, suggesting that the term structure does not matter in this case. Column (4)
allows the interactions to vary with the sign of the monetary policy surprise, by interacting the
corresponding coefficients with a dummy variable (TIGHTt) that takes the value of one during a
monetary policy tightening and zero otherwise. First of all, notice that the monetary policy shock
has an independent and significant negative impact on the growth rate of assets only for a monetary
policy tightening (-12.8%) and not for a loosening. Further, all the interaction terms (triple or
quadruple) between capital requirements and the monetary policy shock are now significant. In
particular, they indicate that there is an additional negative effect of monetary policy and capital
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requirements in the case of a monetary policy expansion (+0.0364-0.157=-12%), so that the two
policies reinforce each other. During a monetary policy contraction, on the other hand, the sign of the
monetary policy capital requirement interaction switches (+0.0364-0.157-0.077+0.348=+15%), so
that the two policies attenuate each other if used simultaneously. Overall, these results are consistent
with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, that suggests that the two policies reinforce each
other only in the case of a monetary policy expansion.
3.6 Credit Substitution: Multiple Relationship and Other
Sources of Funding
So far we have examined to which extent changes in capital requirements on individual banks affect
the asset growth rate of the borrowing firms within a partial equilibrium framework. But in general
equilibrium, alternative sources of credit, such as other banks, capital markets or trade credit, which
are not affected by capital requirement changes, may offset these effects. As a result, it is not clear
if micro-prudential policy actually affects the loan supply. Previous work has used bank-level data
to test for the presence of such credit substitution for PNFC firms operating in the UK from 1999
-2006. Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014a) and Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014b) find
evidence for credit substitution from foreign branches, but less from capital markets.
In Table 14, we interact the fraction of either foreign branch lending (BLnonreg), that are not
suject to UK capital requirements, or capital markets finance (equity + bond issuance, Nonbank)
over the lending done by UK residents bank (BLreg), that are subject to capital requirements, at
the sector level with our main coefficients of interests. The bottom panel of Table 14 shows the
partial derivative of total asset growth with respect to changes in capital requirements for a zero
or one standard deviation increase in either BLnonreg/BLreg or Nonbank/BLreg. We can see
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that for firms with a one standard deviation increase in lending by foreign branches over regulated
lending the effects of capital requirements is attenuated by 1.5% without including lagged firm char-
acteristics (column (1)) and by 3% including these (column (3)). Increasing capital markets finance
over regulated lending (columns (2) and (4)) has no significant effect instead. These regression
results overall confirm the previous findings in Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014b) that credit
substitution from foreign branches, in these data, is substantially stronger than that from capital
markets.
However, given that we analyse bank-specific capital requirement changes and that these are
mostly uncorrelated in the cross-section, our data allow for a much more powerful test of the credit
substitution hypothesis. If financial entities, which were not affected by changes in capital require-
ments, truly are a source of credit substitution, then firms with multiple bank relationships should
not be affected by capital requirement changes to only one of their relationship banks, as these firms
can substitute funding away from the affected bank. In regression model (1), ∆KRj,t is the change
in the capital requirement of bank j at time t for single bank-firm relationships. For multiple bank-
firm relationships, ∆KRj,t is the average of the capital requirement changes of all banks related
to one particular firm. In this section we allow the capital requirement of each bank to affect the
asset growth of the related firm individually, rather than as an average. We can only undertake
this exercise for those firms which have exactly two relationship banks, as there are too few banks
with three relationships banks or more. The results from this exercise are presented in Table 12,
either without firm controls (column (1)), with contemporaneous controls (column (2)) or lagged
(column (3)). That clearly suggests that for a firm with two relationship banks, changes in capital
requirements do not affect asset growth, as they do instead for firms with single banking relationship
(column (4)).
Table 13 repeats this exercise for monetary policy. Estimated on the same sample, monetary
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policy affects all of the firms through the length of the relationship, regardless whether the firm is a
single or multiple relationship bank. This is consistent with the idea that since monetary policy is
an aggregate policy instrument, it affects all firms and banks regardless of whether they have access
to alternative sources of credit or not. This is a novel result in the empirical literature and it carries
important policy implications for the use of monetary versus prudential policy.
3.7 Conclusion
Countries around the world have introduced macroprudential regulation to increase the resilience
of the financial system to socially costly financial crises. One proposed instrument, which is also
embedded in Basel III, is a time-varying capital requirement. But, to date, there is only little under-
standing of how this instrument will affect the real economy. The UK’s unique regulatory regime,
where banks and building societies were subject to time-varying capital requirements, together with
a new firm-bank level database, covering all reporting real economy firms in the UK between 1998
to 2006, allows us to provide a first empirical examination of this important question. The purpose
of this paper is to examine the impact of changes to capital requirements on the asset growth rate
of the borrowing firms. UK Banks were subject to time-varying capital requirements, which varied
by institution and over time. Economic theory suggests that if an increase in capital requirements
is binding and the Miller-Modgliani (1958) theorem fails, then the affected institution will either
need to raise capital or reduce risk-weighted assets to satisfy the new requirement. Previous work,
such as Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014a), Francis and Osborne (2009) or Bridges et al (2014)
tests this last implication on balance sheet level PNFC lending. In this paper we examine whether
this loan supply effect carries through the to the asset growth rate of individual firms. We also
compare our effect to monetary policy and examine to which extent credit substitution can offset
some of these effects. Our results suggest that that a rise in a banks capital requirement of about
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100 basis points leads to a decline in the asset growth rate of borrowing firm of about 3.9% to
6.9%. A 100 basis point unexpected rise in the monetary policy short-term interest rate leads to
an asset growth reduction of -4.9%. If both tools are used simultaneously, they amplify each other,
but only in the case of a monetary policy expansion. SME borrowing from banks with tight (loose)
capital buffers are more (less) affected by the regulatory change. Consistent with evidence from
banks’ balance sheet in Bridges et al. (2014), firms in the commercial real estate sector experience
the largest reduction. SME with multiple bank relationships are not affected by changes in capital
requirements to only one of their relationship banks. But a tightening in monetary policy affects
all firms, regardless of the number of their bank relationships. This suggests that while prudential
policy tools such as capital requirements affect single-bank firms only, i.e. those that cannot easily
find alternative sources of external finance, monetary policy shocks “get in all the cracks”. Finally,
Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014a) find that the presence of competing foreign branches, that
are not subject to UK capital regulation, can offset loan contractions associated with greater capital
requirements on regulated banks by about 33%. Consistent with their work, we find that firms in
sectors with greater foreign branch presence experience a smaller asset growth reduction of about
this magnitude.
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APPENDIX – Data 
 
BvD FAME data come from the June 2007 CD-ROM. The search strategy filters firms according to 
the following criteria: 
 Exclude Financial and Insurance companies (2003 SIC codes from 6500 to 7000) 
 At least one year of Total Assets 
 At least one registered charge 
This yields a total of 331,996 companies operating in the UK. Note that the search strategy 
deliberately does not consider filters on turnover, employees or other variables, as this would create a 
reporting bias in favour of medium and large companies. 
We match a total of around 252k firms to 67 banks for which we have capital requirements data. 
Notice that we do not match all of the 331k firms because either the chargeholder is a non-bank 
(private citizens, finance companies or other funds) or because the chargeholder is a branch of foreign 
bank, not subject to UK capital regulation.  
In a few cases the name of a bank is listed under chargeholder for a charge with a firm although the 
bank is only acting as an agent for another lender. Large banks often times act as agents for another 
lender to monitor and screen the borrower in exchange for a fee. Therefore, it may not be correct to 
match a firm to these agent-acting banks, as capital requirements changes at the agents’ level should 
not affect credit conditions for the borrower (although sometimes the bank is listed as “Agent acting 
for itself”). Other such non clear roles are “security trustee”, “agent trustee”. There are only 2,581 
firm-year observations with such unclear roles: we can safely exclude them from the regressions and 
the results are not affected. 
 
Table 1 - Appendix: Comparison between matched and non-matched sample 
Variable Observations Mean 10th  50th  90th  
331k non matched sample 
Total Assets 1,921,170 3.56 .02 .26 1.9 
Turnover 471,825 8.7 .02 .37 8.3 
Employees 185,720 183.6 3 37 234 
252k matched sample 
Total Assets 1,1485,854 2.47 .053 .35 2.37 
Turnover 286,789 7.69 0.036 0.52 10.8 
Employees 126,575 156 3 45 243 
Table 1A shows some summary statistics for the two samples, the 331k non matched sample 
and the 252k matched sample. Rather than looking at the means, which are not robust to 
outliers, we can look at the other percentiles of the distribution to see that the two samples 
are broadly consistent across the two 
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Figure 1: Capital Requirements and Capital Ratios by Bank Buffer 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Capital Requirement Changes 
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Figure 4: Market Shares by Bank 
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Figure 5: Number and Percentage of Firms by Sector 
 
Figure 6: Marginal Effect of ∆𝑲𝑹 on ∆𝒍𝒏(𝑻𝑨) as a function of length 
 
This figure contains the plot of the marginal effect of a change in capital requirement on the growth rate of assets for the 
baseline specification including lagged firm controls. The partial derivative is a function of length and the vertical red lines 
represent the 25th (2years), median (4) and 75th (7) percentiles of the distribution of the firm-bank relationship length in 
years. Dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval around the point estimate. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Variable Description 
 
Variable Definition Notes 
Firm and bank-firm relationship data (BvD FAME) 
∆ln(TA) Growth rate of Total Assets  
CredScore 
 
Credit Score (QuiScore) 
From 0 (worst credit score) to 100 (best).  
Calculated  by CRIF Decision Solutions 
Ltd., see Table 1a for details. 
Currliab/TA 
Current Liabilities over Total Assets 
ratio 
Current liabilities include: Short Term 
Loans & Overdraft, Trade Creditors and 
Taxes & Dividends 
Age Years since date of incorporation  
Length Years since creation of the loan  
BvD 
Independence 
Indicator 
 
Description of ownership structure 
From A (no shareholder with more than 
25% ownership) to D (one shareholder 
with >=50%) 
Turnover Turnover (Sales) in £ mil.  
Employees Number of Employees  
Bank level data (BSD3 and QFS forms) 
𝐾𝑅𝑡 
Minimum ratio for capital-to-risk 
weighted assets (RWA) for the 
banking book. 
The BSD3 form provides this information 
for Banks. QFS provides it for Building 
societies. 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑡 Yearly change in KR   
∆𝑊𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡 
 
Yearly change in writeoffs rate: 
nbpa550t/nhd510 
 
nbpa550t – Loan writeoffs 
nhd510 – Total Risk Weighted Assets 
Bank Size Natural log of  (BT40) BT40 – Total Assets 
Bank Liquidity 
 Liquid to Total Assets ratio: (BT21+ 
BT32D)/BT40 
BT21 - Cash ; BT32D – Holdings of 
Government Stock 
Core Funding 
Deposits to Total Assets ratio: 
(BT2H +BT3H)/BT40 
BT2H – Retail Sight Deposits, BT3H – 
Retail Time Deposits 
Buffer 
Actual Capital Ratio 
(nhd40/nhd510) - KR 
nhd40 – Total Eligible Capital, nhd510 - 
RWA 
Sector level data on external finance 
BLreg 
Regulated Lending  Lending by UK resident banks and UK 
subsidiaries of foreign banks 
 Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
25th  50th  75th  
Firm and bank-firm relationship data (firm-year panel BvD FAME) 
Total Assets(£mil.) 1,146,711 2.12 53.75 0.137 0.351 0.914 
∆ln(TA) 967,551 0.076 0.406 -0.072 0.029 0.204 
Turnover (£mil.) 285,434 4.54 13.42 0.143 0.522 2.431 
Employees (#heads) 125,453 146.5 1049.6 11 44 103 
CredScore 1,107,154 50.2 22.60 35 48 64 
Currliab/TA 1,139,230 0.63 0.553 0.307 0.547 0.809 
Age 1,413,935 12.57 13.68 4 8 16 
Length 1413944 4.82 3.922 2 4 7 
Bank level data (bank-year panel) 
𝐾𝑅𝑡 (%) 520 11.55 3.07 9 10 13 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑡 (bps.) 520 -4.1 57.2 0 0 0 
∆𝑊𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡 (bps.) 516 1.655 97.5 -3.972 0 6.365 
Size (in £mil.) 520 32,590 89,367 710 4,104 15,100 
Liquidity (bps) 520 161 271 1 43 220 
Core Funding (%) 520 51.04 30.79 21.92 53.52 79.57 
Buffer (%) 517 16.58 33.32 3.1 6.8 14.4 
External Finance Dependence data (sector-year panel) 
BLnonreg/BLreg 126 0.52 0.65 0.04 0.26 1.18 
Nonbank/BLreg 126 1.29 2.7 0.006 0.2 4.4 
BLnonreg 
Non-regulated Lending Lending by UK branches of foreign banks 
 
Nonbank 
 
Non bank external finance  
Sum of equity and corporate bonds 
outstanding 
 
Table 4 – Capital Requirements and Firms’ Growth Rate of Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.008*** 0.007** 0.009** 0.013*** 
 (0.00266) (0.00368) (0.00367) (0.00437) 
1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 0.425*** 0.425*** 0.412*** 0.459*** 
 (0.00411) (0.00571) (0.00590) (0.0113) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) -0.0340*** -0.0352*** -0.0369*** -0.0721*** 
 (0.00946) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0197) 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡   0.001***  
   (5e-5)  
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡   -0.154***  
   (0.004)  
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1    0.001*** 
    (4.6e-5) 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1    0.130*** 
    (0.005) 
Young   0.03*** 0.018*** 
   (0.003) (0.002) 
Old   0.007** 0.003 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm Fixed Effects X X X X 
Year Fixed Effects X    
SIC4dig×Postcode 
×Year Fixed Effects 
 X X X 
Observations 969,052 968,012 927,310 871,423 
N of firms 212,894 212,894 208,316 196,980 
R squared 0.338 0.444 0.462 0.445 
This table presents the results for the baseline regression. The dependent variable is the log difference of total assets by firm 
i between time t and t-1. All specifications include firm fixed-effects and either year fixed effects (column (1)) or 
SIC4dig*postcodearea*year fixed-effects (columns (2)-(5)). ∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the change in capital requirements between year t and 
year t-1 for the bank lending to firm i (it is averaged over all banks lending to firm i at time t in case of multiple banks). 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 
is the length of the relationship between firm i and its banks, measured in years since the creation of the loan. 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
is the Credit Score (QuiScore) of the firm, measured on a scale of 0 (worst risk) to 100 (no risk). 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is the ratio 
of Current Liabilities (short term debt, trade credit, taxes and dividends) over total assets. 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 𝑂𝑙𝑑 are dummies for the 
age of the firm, at the 25th and 75th percentiles (4 and 16 years old respectively). Finally, ∆ln (𝑇𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lagged growth 
rate of total assets (lagged dependent variable). For statistical significance, we use the following convention throughout: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Robustness of Baseline Results 
Robustness Exercise ∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) ∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
× 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 
Econometric Assumptions    
(1) Replace 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 by firm age 0.00415 0.739*** -0.0430 
(2) Dependent variable winsorised at 5%&95% 0.007** 0.321*** -0.038*** 
(3) Time-invariant capital requirement change  0.478*** -0.0715*** 
Sample Selection – Firms    
(4) Exclude small firms (size in bottom 50%) 0.015*** 0.502*** -0.093*** 
(5) Exclude small firms (size in bottom 75%) 0.019** 0.504*** -0.116*** 
(6) Exclude firms with < 50% single ownership 0.0146** 0.436*** -0.0654** 
(7) Exclude firms with > 50% single ownership 0.0151** 0.500*** -0.0835** 
Sample Selection – Banks  
(8) Excluding Barclays 0.013*** 0.469*** -0.07*** 
(9) Excluding HSBC 0.014*** 0.461*** -0.071*** 
(10) Excluding NatWest 0.017*** 0.474*** -0.098*** 
(11) Excluding Lloyds 0.015*** 0.468*** -0.086*** 
(12) Excluding RBS 0.013*** 0.457*** -0.077*** 
(13) Excluding HBOS 0.012*** 0.445*** -0.072*** 
(14) Excluding all Big banks together 0.025*** 0.514*** -0.123*** 
Endogeneity - Omitted Variable Bias    
(15) Include Bank-year effects  -0.0185* 0.471*** -0.0508*** 
(16) Include Bank-Sector-year effects -0.0191* 0.465*** -0.0586*** 
(17) Include Bank-Area-year effects -0.0144 0.467*** -0.0438*** 
(18) Include Bank-Sector-Area-year effects -0.0320** 0.493*** -0.0590** 
The dependent variable is the log difference of total assets by firm i between time t and t-1. All specifications include firm 
fixed-effects and SIC4dig*postcodearea*year fixed-effects, unless otherwise stated. Lagged firm variables, not shown are: 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 𝑜𝑙𝑑 Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Impact of Capital Requirements on Current Liabilities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.0109
** 0.0152** 0.0161** 0.0162** 
 (0.00547) (0.00680) (0.00677) (0.00678) 
1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 0.449
*** 0.430*** 0.395*** 0.408*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0149) (0.0160) (0.0161) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄  -0.0549
** -0.0716** -0.0712** -0.0797*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0287) (0.0288) (0.0287) 
Firm Fixed Effects X X X X 
Year Fixed Effects X    
SIC4dig×Postcode ×Year 
Fixed Effects 
 
 X X X 
Firm controls (t)   X  
Firm controls (t-1)    X 
Observations 901,290 900,301 865,887 869,180 
N of firms 199,394 199,225 195,148 196,546 
R squared 0.233 0.345 0.383 0.382 
This table presents an extension of the baseline results. The dependent variable is the log difference of current liabilities by 
firm i between time t and t-1. All specifications include firm fixed-effects and either year fixed effects (column (1)) or 
SIC4dig*postcodearea*year fixed-effects (columns (2)-(5)). All variables are defined as in Table 4, the baseline regression.. 
Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Impact of Capital Requirements on Firms controlling for Bank Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Assets - ∆ln(TA) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.0138*** 0.0140*** 0.0144*** 
 (0.00468) (0.00441) (0.00503) 
1 1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄  0.462*** 
(0.0114) 
0.435*** 
(0.0118) 
0.463*** 
(0.151) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) -0.074*** 
(0.02) 
-0.075*** 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.023) 
    
Bank Size -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
Liquidity 3.01e-4 -1e4 0.004*** 
 (7e-4) (8e-4) (0.001) 
Core Funding -7.2e-5 -5.2e-5 -1e-4 
 (1.2e-4) (1.2e-4) (1-e4) 
∆𝑊𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡 -5.08e-4  0.00347 
 (1.9e-3)  (0.00319) 
∆𝑊𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡+1  0.001  
  (0.002)  
    
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )   -0.0007 
(0.007) 
𝐿𝑖𝑞 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )   -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )   0.0008 
(0.0006) 
∆𝑊𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )   -0.0231 
(0.0145) 
Firm Fixed Effects X X X 
Lagged Firm Controls X X X 
SIC4dig×Postcode ×Year Fixed 
Effects 
X X X 
Observations 864,751 796,353 864,751 
N of firms 194,780 187,077 194,780 
This table presents results for the baseline regression with the inclusion of bank characteristics. The dependent variable is 
the log difference of total assets by firm i between time t and t-1. All specifications include firm fixed-effects and the 
SIC4dig*postcodearea*year fixed-effects (the difference with the year fixed-effects is minimal and we do not report it). All 
specifications include the lagged firm variables, not shown. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets, 
Liquidity is the ratio of the bank’s liquid assets (cash+government bonds) over total assets, Core Funding is the ratio of 
customer deposits over total assets and ∆𝑊𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡is the y-o-y change in loan writeoffs. Other variables are defined as before. 
Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 Table 8: Impact of Capital Requirements on Firms by Bank Characteristics - 2 
This table presents the results for the interaction with bank characteristics. The dependent variable is the log difference of 
total assets by firm i between time t and t-1. All specifications include firm fixed-effects and the SIC4dig*postcode- area*year 
fixed-effects (the difference with the year fixed-effects is minimal and we do not report it). All specifications include the 
following lagged firm variables, not shown. ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑢𝑓, 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑏𝑢𝑓 are dummies for the distribution of the bank capital buffer at 
the 75th (11.7%) and 25th (6.5%) percentiles respectively, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑞, 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑖𝑞 are dummies for the distribution of the bank 
liquidity ratio at the 75th (2.68%) and 25th (0.87%) percentiles.  The model is fully interacted and it includes the quartile 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Assets - ∆ln(TA) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.0141** 0.0135*** 0.0139** 
 (0.00588) (0.00516) (0.00669) 
1 1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄  0.474*** 0.458*** 0.472*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0114) (0.0131) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.085*** 
 (0.028) (0.024) (0.031) 
    
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑢𝑓 -0.01  -0.014 
 (0.009)  (0.011) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑏𝑢𝑓 0.074***  0.070*** 
 (0.023)  (0.023) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑢𝑓 0.054  0.09* 
 (0.043)  (0.05) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑏𝑢𝑓 -0.321***  -0.287*** 
 (0.086)  (0.092) 
    
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑞  -0.01 -0.002 
  (0.013) (0.015) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑖𝑞  0.009 0.016 
  (0.012) (0.016) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑖𝑞  0.064 0.035 
  (0.057) (0.061) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑖𝑞  -0.035 -0.073 
  (0.057) (0.071) 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  -0.06*** -0.063*** -0.071*** 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  for highbuf -0.016  0.004 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  for lowbuf -0.307***  -0.287*** 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  for highliq  -0.008 -0.037 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  for lowliq  -0.089** -0.128** 
Firm Fixed Effects X X X 
Lagged Firm Controls X X X 
SIC4dig×Postcode ×Year Fixed Effects X X X 
Observations 863,521 870,168 863,521 
N of firms 196,524 196,606 196,524 
R squared 0.447 0.445 0.447 
dummies for buffer and liquidity on their own and in interaction with 1/(1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡), but whose coefficients are not shown in 
the table. Other variables are defined as before. At the bottom of the table, below the coefficients, we calculate the marginal 
effect of KR for all groups: the group between 25th and 75th pct in the first row, above the 75th in the second and fourth rows 
and finally below the 25th pct in the third and fifth row . Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
Table 9 – The Impact of Capital Requirements on Firms by Sector 
 REAL 
(1) 
WHOL 
(2) 
MANUF 
(3) 
CONS 
(4) 
Other 
(5) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.0204** 0.00309 0.000795 0.019* 0.0152** 
 (0.00798) (0.00828) (0.0106) (0.011) (0.00772) 
1 1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄  0.575*** 0.343*** 0.263*** 0.434*** 0.427*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0225) (0.0276) (0.028) (0.0197) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) -0.116*** -0.0163 -0.0314 -0.069 -0.0571* 
 (0.0332) (0.0394) (0.0519) (0.051) (0.0345) 
      
Firm Fixed Effects X X X X X 
Lagged Firm Controls X X X X X 
SIC4dig×Postcode ×Year Fixed Effects X X X X X 
Observation 289,320 159,694 129,664 115,175 292,745 
N of firms 71,526 34,109 25,429 25,525 65,916 
R squared 0.408 0.510 0.576 0.293 0.432 
This table presents the results by firm sector. The dependent variable is the log difference of total assets by firm i between 
time t and t-1. All specifications include firm fixed-effects and the SIC4dig*postcode-area*year fixed-effects (the difference 
with the year fixed-effects is minimal and we do not report it). All specifications include the following lagged firm variables, 
not shown: 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 𝑜𝑙𝑑.  Column (1) includes firms in the Commercial Real Estate 
sector only, column (2) in Wholesale & Retail Trade, column (3) in Manufacturing and column (4) in other sectors. Firm-
clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table  10 – The Impact of Capital Requirement by Firm Characteristic 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Assets - ∆ln(TA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.0144** 0.0120 0.0159*** 0.0140 
 (0.00670) (0.00796) (0.00535) (0.00911) 
1 1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄  0.356*** 0.428*** 0.417*** 0.302*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0124) (0.0177) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) -0.0776** -0.0726** -0.0797*** -0.0804* 
 (0.0333) (0.0364) (0.0245) (0.0443) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 0.0113   0.0142 
              × 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 (0.0681)   (0.0684) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 0.0405   0.0388 
              × 𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 (0.0471)   (0.0476) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )  -0.00791  -0.0177 
              × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘  (0.0513)  (0.0547) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )  0.0162  0.0129 
              × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘  (0.0479)  (0.0519) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )   0.00824 0.00776 
              × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑎   (0.0594) (0.0641) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )   0.0166 0.0177 
              × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑎   (0.0429) (0.0481) 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  -0.06** -0.06** -0.063*** -0.066* 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  for old -0.03   -0.034 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  for young -0.05   -0.053 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  for highrisk  -0.063**  -0.08** 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  for lowrisk  -0.045*  -0.0499 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  for highclta   -0.05 -0.052 
𝜕∆ln (𝑇𝐴) 𝜕𝐾𝑅⁄  for lowclta   -0.056* -0.06 
Firm Fixed Effects X X X X 
Lagged Firm Controls X X X X 
SIC4dig×Postcode×YearFixed Effects X X X X 
Observations 870,168 870,168 868,354 868,354 
N of firms 196,606 196,606 196,316 196,316 
R squared 0.446 0.445 0.445 0.446 
This table presents the results for the interaction with firm characteristics. The dependent variable is the log difference of 
total assets by firm i between time t and t-1. All specifications include firm fixed-effects and the SIC4dig*postcode- area*year 
fixed-effects (the difference with the year fixed-effects is minimal and we do not report it). All specifications include the 
following lagged firm variables, not shown. ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 are dummies for the distribution of the risk variable at the 
75th and 25th percentiles respectively, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑎, 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑎 are dummies for the distribution of the current liabilities to total 
asset ratio variable at the 75th and 25th percentiles.  The model is fully interacted and it includes the quartile dummies for all 
of these dummy variables on their own and in interaction with 1/(1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡), but whose coefficients are not shown in the 
table.. At the bottom of the table, below the coefficients, we calculate the marginal effect of KR for all groups: the group 
between 25th and 75th pct in the first row, above the 75th in the second, fourth rows and sixth row and finally below the 25th 
pct in the third, fifth and seventh row . Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
Table 11 – The Impact of Monetary Policy 
This table presents the results for the interaction with monetary policy. The dependent variable is the log difference of total 
assets by firm i between time t and t-1. All specifications include firm fixed-effects and the SIC4dig*postcode- area*year 
fixed-effects (the difference with the year fixed-effects is minimal and we do not report it). All specifications include the 
following lagged firm variables, not shown: 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 𝑜𝑙𝑑. 𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡 is a monetary 
policy shock constructed following a narrative approach a’ la Romer and Romer (2004) for the UK economy (Cloyne 
(2014)). 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑡 are the y-o-y changes in the term premium of interest rates, defined as the difference between 
[…]. 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes value one if the monetary policy surprise is positive and zero otherwise. Given 
that 𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡, 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑡, 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑡 are aggregate time shocks, they are absorbed by the time fixed-effects, so their 
coefficients are not shown in the regression. Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Assets - ∆ln(TA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.0123
*** 0.0164*** 0.0160*** 0.0361*** 
 (0.00437) (0.00619) (0.00618) (0.00987) 
1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 0.447
*** 0.447*** 0.449*** 0.492*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0173) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) -0.0657
*** -0.0799*** -0.0793*** -0.171*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0428) 
𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) -0.0490
*** -0.0499*** -0.0488*** -0.00332 
 (0.00972) (0.00985) (0.00988) (0.0168) 
𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )    -0.128
*** 
                    × 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑡    (0.0381) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡  0.00893 -0.00297 0.0364
*** 
  (0.00918) (0.0118) (0.0141) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡    -0.0773
** 
               × 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑡    (0.0377) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡   0.0173  
              × 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑡   (0.0110)  
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )   -0.0320 0.0214 -0.157
** 
  (0.0399) (0.0506) (0.0621) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )    0.348
** 
               × 𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑡    (0.164) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ )   -0.0787  
              × 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑡   (0.0484)  
Firm Fixed Effects X X X X 
Lagged Firm Controls X X X X 
SIC4dig×Postcode ×Year Effects X X X X 
Observations 871,423 871,423 871,423 871,423 
N of firms 196,980 196,980 196,980 196,980 
R Squared 
 
0.445 0.445 0.445 0.445 
  
 
Table 12 – The Impact of Multiple Banks on Capital Requirement Transmission 
 Multiple Multiple Multiple Single  
∆𝐾𝑅𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘1,𝑖,𝑡 0.00385 -0.00120 -0.002 0.012**  
 (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.019) (0.0048)  
∆𝐾𝑅𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘2,𝑖,𝑡 -0.0146 -0.0156 -0.007   
 (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.012)   
1 (1 + 𝐿𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘1,𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 0.470*** 0.473*** 0.470*** 0.444***  
 (0.0222) (0.0234) (0.045) (0.013)  
1 (1 + 𝐿𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘2,𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.150***   
 (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.011)   
∆𝐾𝑅𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘1,𝑖,𝑡
× 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘1,𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 
-0.0164 -0.0121 -0.0270 -0.055**  
 (0.0478) (0.0493) (0.0755) (0.022)  
∆𝐾𝑅𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘2,𝑖,𝑡
× 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘2,𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 
-0.0156 -0.00974 -0.00362   
 (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0215)   
Firm Fixed Effects         X    X      X X  
SIC4dig×Postcode ×Year Effects X      X X X  
Firm Controls          X    
Lagged Firm Controls   X X  
Observations 144,805 139,859 134,741 712,707  
N of firms 27,705 27,319 26,952 165,835  
R squared 0.549 0.560 0.547 0.4688  
This table presents the results for firms with multiple (two) banks relationship on the effects of capital requirements. The 
dependent variable is the log difference of total assets by firm i between time t and t-1. All specifications include firm fixed-
effects and the SIC4dig*postcode-area*year fixed-effects (the difference with the year fixed-effects is minimal and we do not 
report it. Firm controls are: 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 𝑜𝑙𝑑, either lagged or contemporaneous. Column (4) 
reports the results for firms with single banking relationship. 
 
Table 13 – The Impact of Multiple Banks on Monetary Policy 
 single multiple single multiple 
1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 0.402*** 0.485*** 0.434*** 0.470*** 
 (0.00649) (0.0202) (0.0135) (0.0332) 
     
𝑀𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) -0.0580*** -0.0814*** -0.0393*** -0.108*** 
 (0.00675) (0.0217) (0.0111) (0.0337) 
Firm Fixed Effects X X X X 
SIC4dig×Postcode ×Year 
Effects 
X X X X 
Lagged Firm Controls   X X 
Observations 798,860 147,044 713,574 136,819 
N of firms 181,277 27,824 166,135 27,089 
R squared 0.467 0.544 0.469 0.543 
This table presents the results for firms with single and multiple (two) banks relationship on the effects of monetary policy 
shocks. The dependent variable is the log difference of total assets by firm i between time t and t-1. All specifications 
include firm fixed-effects and the SIC4dig*postcode-area*year fixed-effects. Firm controls are: 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
and 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔, 𝑜𝑙𝑑 
 
Table 14 – Impact of Capital Requirements by Sectoral Bank Dependence 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Assets - ∆ln(TA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.019
*** 
(0.007) 
0.007** 
(0.00392) 
0.03*** 
(0.008) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) 0.511
*** 0.429*** 0.561*** 0.460*** 
 (0.01) (0.006) (0.019) (0.012) 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 1 (1 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡⁄ ) -0.0703
*** 
(0.0236) 
-0.036*** 
(0.014) 
-0.134*** 
(0.0360) 
-0.079*** 
(0.021) 
     
𝐵𝐿𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔/𝐵𝐿𝑟𝑒𝑔 5-e4 
(0.01) 
 0.017*** 
(0.006) 
 
∆𝐾𝑅𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐵𝐿𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔/𝐵𝐿𝑟𝑒𝑔 -4.38e-4
*** 
(1.52e-4) 
 -5.34e-4*** 
(1.81e-4) 
 
1/(1+L)*BLnonreg -0.003*** 
(2.12e-4) 
 -0.003*** 
(3.80e-4) 
 
     
DKR*1/(1+L)*BLnonreg/BLreg 0.001** 
(5.49e-4) 
 0.002** 
(8.27e-4) 
 
     
Nonbank/BLreg  -0.004 
(0.004) 
 0.005* 
(0.003) 
DKR*nonbank  -3.46e-5 
(3.25e-4) 
 -5.50e-5 
(3.65e-5) 
1/(1+L)*nonbank  -1.96e-4*** 
(5.20e-5) 
 -1.89e-4** 
(1e-5) 
     
DKR*1/(1+L)*nonbank  4.26e-5 
(1.16e-4) 
 2.15e-4 
(1.62e-4) 
     
∂TA/∂DKR -0.0507*** -0.0281** -0.1039*** -0.0639*** 
∂TA/∂DKR for a one std.dev.increase 
in (BLnonreg) or (Nonbank) 
 
-0.0338*** 
 
-0.0274** 
 
-0.0721*** 
 
-0.0491*** 
Firm Fixed Effects X X X X 
SIC4dig×Postcode ×Year Effects X X X X 
Lagged Firm Controls   X X 
Observations 954,167 954,167 860,355 860,355 
N of firms 209,340 209,340 193,900 193,900 
R squared 0.443 0.443 0.443 0.443 
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